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Preface 
 
This doctoral portfolio is about meanings: how we, as scientists and practitioners, try to 
make sense of psychological and behavioural phenomena. Each piece was completed 
during my training at City University, and provides evidence of the knowledge and 
skills I gained during that time. As will be further described below, each of the three 
components making up this thesis also represents one approach to sense-making around 
emotions and self-injury. Although their purpose and epistemological position differ, 
taken together they offer a rich picture of what counselling psychologists must engage 
with in their research and clinical work. 
 
The first section presents a critical appraisal of the literature on emotion regulation 
skills training, and queries the way in which cognitive-behavioural therapists have 
embraced recent research on emotion dysregulation and developed new approaches to 
psychological disorders. The meaning-making process this review exemplifies is of the 
sort many would regard as ‘scientific’. The literature being scrutinized is concerned 
with arriving at a consensual definition of emotions and emotion regulation; developing 
models and measurement tools to study them empirically; and eschewing individual 
understandings and social context to test hypotheses and produce generalizable results. 
These are then used to underpin therapeutic approaches aimed at addressing 
maladaptive deficits in emotion regulation, deficits presented as central to a wide range 
of psychological and behavioural difficulties, including self-injury. The review 
concludes that while treatments like dialectical behaviour therapy or mindfulness-based 
approaches are widely seen as beneficial to those receiving them, evidence that they 
actually improve emotion regulation remains sparse, and research in the field rife with 
methodological shortcomings. However the critique itself subscribes to a realist 
epistemology, since it rests on the assumption that the ‘truth’ of emotions awaits full 
discovery. It thus mirrors the approach to meaning-making around emotions adopted by 
quantitative researchers and CBT practitioners, one in which emotions can be labelled 
and quantified, and behaviours such as self-injury eliminated through manualised 
interventions.  
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The original piece of research presented in the second section stands in sharp contrast to 
this view, with its refusal to portray individual experience - very much including 
emotions - as made up of measurable phenomena. Here the idea is to explore the 
meaning-making process around self-injury by using an ideographic and pluralistic 
qualitative approach. One participant’s account of her experience of self-injury and 
attending emotions is repeatedly analysed, each time using a different interpretative lens 
so as to avoid ‘shoehorning’ the behaviour into a particular theoretical frame. The text is 
visited first from a phenomenological perspective, using interpretative 
phenomenological analysis; then from a narrative perspective, drawing on linguistics 
and story-telling; and finally from a psychosocial perspective, combining discursive and 
psychoanalytical readings. The result is a multi-layered picture, one which emphasizes 
the highly individual nature of self-injury and of the emotional experiencing underlying 
it; and which acknowledges the role played by unconscious, linguistic, relational and 
social factors in any attempt at elucidating the behaviour. The work also points to the 
contribution of the researcher to the meaning-making process: not as neutral scribe or 
analyst, but as fully involved creator of meaning alongside the participant. Though 
rigorous it thus embodies a tentative and reflexive approach to scientific sense-making 
around self-harm and emotions, one that may hold particular relevance for counselling 
psychologists given its respect for individual experience and its pluralist ethos. 
 
The third and final section of this portfolio, a client study, engages with therapeutic 
meaning-making: the attempt by client and clinician to explore, understand and work 
with difficult emotions and behaviours. It illustrates a piece of therapeutic work carried 
out with a young woman presenting with low mood, severe anxiety and a range of 
maladaptive coping behaviours including self-injury. The approach chosen was schema-
focused cognitive-behavioural therapy, which works explicitly with emotions through 
the use of experiential techniques, and with the client’s unmet emotional needs through 
‘limited reparenting’ by the therapist. The study shows how, as the work unfolded over 
the first nine sessions of a yearlong intervention, therapist and client tried to construct 
meaning around the latter’s overwhelming emotions and self-destructive behaviour. 
This third section thus points to the openness, complexity and value of therapeutic 
meaning-making. It also considers how the practitioner herself makes sense of her 
emotions in the counselling room, both in the moment and retrospectively.  
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Taken together, these three pieces reflect different ways of ‘making meaning’ around 
emotions and self-injury. But they also document my own journey through the training, 
from positivist academic eager to engage with the quantitative literature on emotions to 
inform a CBT practice, to counselling psychologist seeking to explore the unique reality 
of her client’s emotional landscape and self-injuring. My doctoral research forms an 
important bridge between the two: an intensive foray into qualitative research and an 
exercise in reflexive curiosity around the experience of one individual. The three 
components of my portfolio thus express different aspects of the learning I hope to take 
forward in my counselling psychology practice: the ability to engage critically with the 
psychological literature regardless of methodology and theoretical orientation; an 
awareness of epistemological stances and how they inform the construction of meaning 
in and out of the therapy room; a pluralistic approach to therapeutic work, guided by an 
ongoing exploration of my client’s world; and a constant reflection on my own input 
into research and therapy.  
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Part 1 – Critical literature review 
 
Improving emotion regulation through cognitive-behavioural 
interventions: A review of the evidence so far 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Problems with emotions or emotion regulation characterise the vast majority of the 
diagnostic categories of psychopathology in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). In some cases (e.g., mood and anxiety disorders), emotional 
dysregulation is so prominent that it forms the definitional basis of the disorder; in 
others (e.g., borderline personality disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder or substance 
abuse), emotional difficulties are ‘merely’ seen as pervasive. 
 
Yet, while counsellors and psychotherapists of different persuasions have long 
recognised the role of emotions in psychological well-being and psychopathology, it is 
only recently that emotional processes have become a clear focus for clinical work. At 
the time of writing, emotion regulation skills training had been incorporated in 
cognitive-behavioural interventions for a growing range of disorders, from depression 
and anxiety to borderline personality disorder, substance abuse disorder, and eating 
disorders. One American healthcare provider had even launched a Women’s Emotion 
Regulation Program, aimed broadly at ‘helping women better manage feelings’ (Free 
Press Release, 2010). 
 
The present work looks at recent efforts by cognitive-behavioural therapists to directly 
address impaired emotion regulation in a range of psychological disorders. More 
specifically, it asks two closely related questions: how much do we know about the 
relationship between emotion regulation and psychological health? And how much 
support is there for emotion regulation skills training as a means of addressing 
psychological disorders? In the process, the potential contribution of emotion regulation 
skills training to the practice of counselling psychology is tentatively outlined. Given 
the breadth of the subject, this review will not aim at being exhaustive; instead, it will 
provide an overview of the field with particular attention to work carried out with 
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adults, as well as a more rigorous evaluation of those pieces of research deemed 
especially relevant.1 
 
2. Emotion regulation and psychological health 
 
2.1 Defining emotion regulation 
 
Defining emotions is no easy task. According to the Paperback Oxford English 
Dictionary, the term emotion refers to ‘a strong feeling, such as joy or anger’, and to an 
‘instinctive feeling as distinguished from logic or reasoning’ (Soanes, 2006). This broad 
definition can of course refer to an unmanageable array of experiences as regards 
intensity, length, complexity etc. One way to address this issue is to focus on the role of 
emotions: from a functional standpoint, emotions can be defined as ‘adaptive, goal-
defining aspects of experience that help aid in decision making concerning movement 
towards or away from particular actions or plans’ (Mennin, 2006, p.95). However 
emotions can also be maladaptive and hurtful, something a functional approach 
struggles to accommodate. 
 
In the modal model of emotions, this pitfall is avoided by concentrating instead on the 
core features of emotions, namely: the way they arise in situations seen by the 
individual as relevant to a goal, and possessing meaning; their multifaceted aspect, as 
emotions are typically accompanied by physiological and behavioural changes; and 
finally their malleability (Gross & Thompson, 2007). This approach goes a long way 
toward providing an encompassing conceptual framework for the study of emotions; it 
also brings out their multiple manifestations and determinants, which make the 
empirical study of emotions especially challenging (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). 
 
While the topic of emotion regulation has been attracting academic interest since the 
early 1990s, it is only in the past ten year that it has become a major focus of attention 
for researchers and practitioners. This, together with the aforementioned complexity of 
emotions themselves, may account for the lack of a single, consensual definition of 
emotion regulation in the literature (Bloch, Moran, & Kring, 2010). Still, recent years 
                                                          
1
 Campos and his colleagues (2011) report 564 peer-reviewed empirical articles on emotion regulation in 
adults and adolescents since 2001. 
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have been marked by considerable efforts to clarify the construct, and by a relative 
convergence on certain definitional features. 
 
Gross and Thompson (2007) thus identify three core features of emotion regulation, 
acceptance of which has become widely shared: first, emotion regulation may entail the 
maintenance, enhancement or downward regulation of both positive and negative 
emotions; second, emotion regulation encompasses both conscious, effortful, and 
controlled regulation and unconscious, effortless, and automatic regulation; and third, 
emotion regulation processes can be adaptive or maladaptive according to context.2 This 
last aspect is worth emphasizing here, since it calls for attention to potential 
dispositional factors or situational characteristics alongside regulatory processes 
(Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004).  
 
The differences between emotion regulation and related constructs also appear to have 
been tentatively clarified: coping is thus distinguished from emotion regulation by its 
dominant focus on decreasing negative affect, and this over relatively long periods of 
time; defences tend to be unconscious, automatic, and concerned with the regulation of 
sexual or aggressive impulses, and of attendant emotional states such as anxiety (Gross 
& Thompson, 2007).  
 
Last, and of particular relevance to clinical work, efforts have been made to delineate 
the nature of adaptive emotion regulation, recently described as involving ‘choosing 
and implementing regulation strategies that are appropriate for the context, appropriate 
for how controllable the internal and external events are, and are in accordance with 
one’s long term goals’ (Werner & Gross, 2010, p.20). These strategies can be many: 
perspiration and a more rapid breathing may be physiological ways to regulate 
emotional arousal; screaming, laughing and crying can all be behavioural responses to 
unwanted emotional states. Researchers must therefore make a choice between focusing 
on one strategy or a limited set thereof (e.g., Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001), 
with the attendant risk of partiality; or adopting a more holistic approach.  
 
                                                          
2
 The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic emotion regulation (emotions regulated by self or others), 
highly significant in developmental psychology, has so far not been a salient feature of work on adult 
processes. 
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In line with the latter, full-fledged models of emotion regulation have been developed to 
map emotion regulation processes. The dual memory model thus views emotion 
regulation as akin to schema activation, with regulation taking place in three different 
ways: the regulation of peripheral feedback (e.g. manipulating facial expression or 
modifying body posture to modulate the body state generated by the schema); the re-
direction of attention away from elements activated by the schema; and the elaboration 
of emotional information so as to focus on all aspects of the situation (Philippot & 
Feldman, 2004).  
 
In another approach, Gross and Thompson (2007) build on their process model of 
emotion regulation to array different families of emotion regulation strategies along 
different points of the emotion generative process: (1) selection of the situation (e.g., 
avoidance of situations expected to give rise to negative emotions); (2) modification of 
the situation (e.g., seeking support); (3) deployment of attention (e.g., distraction); (4) 
change of cognitions (e.g., reappraisal); and (5) modulation of experiential, behavioural, 
or physiological responses. As will be shown below this approach, with its distinction 
between antecedent- and response-focused emotion regulation strategies, seems to hold 
particular appeal for cognitive-behavioural therapists intent on developing targeted 
interventions. 
 
2.2 Studying emotion regulation 
 
With research in the field taking off, different tools and methods have been used to 
measure emotion regulation and study emotion regulation strategies. Among the former 
figure the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Garnefski, Kraaij, & 
Spinhoven, 2001), the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation (Gratz & Roemer, 2004), and 
the Emotion Regulation Skills Questionnaire (Berking et al., 2008), all of which were 
found to have good reliability and have been used in several studies. However it is 
worth noting that some of the strategies included in these questionnaires, such as self-
blame and rumination, do not constitute emotion regulation strategies as defined by 
Gross and Thompson (2007). Nor are self-reports an unbiased source of evidence. In 
that respect, efforts to include peer reports in assessments of emotion regulation seem 
worth pursuing (e.g., Gross & John, 2003). 
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More recently, research on unconscious or automatic emotion regulation has used 
computer-based experimental tasks (e.g., Hopp, Troy, & Mauss, 2011), while functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of cognitive reappraisal have yielded 
valuable light onto the neural processes involved (e.g., Ochner & Gross, 2004). In 
laboratory studies, expressive behaviour and physiological change have also been used 
as indicators of emotion regulation (e.g., Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008). 
Thanks to this growing range of methods and instruments, understanding of individual 
differences in emotion regulation and how they may relate to psychological health has 
grown considerably.  
 
Still, this proliferation of instruments also carries with it significant issues: for instance, 
the use of different scales to measure emotion regulation skills or difficulties limits the 
comparability of the resulting findings. As for experimental designs, they may miss 
important contextual or relational factors only observable in naturalistic settings. There 
is also a need for research into the individual goal conflicts that underpin the choice of 
one emotion regulation strategy over another (Campos, Walle, Dahl, & Main, 2011). In 
that respect qualitative work may be regarded as a valuable addition to a field so far 
marked by the heavy (indeed, quasi exclusive) use of quantitative approaches, despite 
early calls for a greater use of narrative and ethnographic methods (Campos, Frankel, & 
Camras, 2004).3 
 
In the end, even if one rejects the view that emotion generation and emotion regulation 
are concurrent, coterminous processes, making it impossible to study ‘pure’ emotion 
regulation (ibid.), the study of emotion regulation appears riddled with methodological 
challenges, some of which may impede the establishment of a solid evidence base for 
targeted treatments. 
 
2.3. Implications for psychological health 
 
One can think of various ways in which ineffective emotion regulation may underlie 
psychopathology: emotions may be too intense for the appropriate strategy to kick in; or 
the strategy itself may have been lost (e.g., in Alzheimer’s dementia) or not developed; 
                                                          
3
 See Eatough and Smith (2006) for a significant exception. 
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or emotion regulation strategies may be intact, but poorly implemented in inflexible, 
context-insensitive ways (Werner & Gross, 2010). Still, if emotion regulation is to 
represent a target for treatment, the link between impaired or maladaptive emotion 
regulation and psychological health must be rigorously documented. Here again, 
research work has significantly increased in recent years. 
 
Looking first at general emotion regulation skills, a study using self-reports of emotion 
regulation skills in a sample of 289 inpatients diagnosed with a range of mental 
disorders found that these patients reported fewer skills than non-clinical controls 
(Berking et al., 2008). Moreover, pre-treatment emotion regulation skills appeared to be 
significantly related to measures of mental health and well-being in the clinical sample, 
even after controlling for the intensity of negative affect. Despite the limitations 
introduced by the sole use of self-reports, and by the fact that clinical and non-clinical 
samples were not matched, this study lends credence to the idea of a relationship 
between general emotion regulation skills and mental health.  
 
Work has also been carried out on the relationship between specific emotion regulation 
strategies and various indicators of psychological functioning. For instance cognitive 
reappraisal has been associated with positive affect, better interpersonal functioning, 
and well-being (Gross & John, 2003). In another study, this time with schizophrenic 
participants, greater use of reappraisal was associated with reduced depression (Henry, 
Rendell, Green, McDonald, & O’Donnell, 2008). By the same token, work on 
suppression has shown it to be used more in clinical populations than healthy controls, 
and this for a range of disorders including anxiety and mood disorders (Campbell-Sills, 
Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006); panic disorder (Baker, Holloway, Thomas, 
Thomas, & Owens, 2004); and posttraumatic stress disorder (Roemer, Litz, Orsillo, & 
Wagner, 2001). At the same time there is some evidence that suppression can be a 
successful way of downregulating distressing emotions in  healthy subjects (Dunn, 
Billotti, Murphy, & Dalgleish, 2009); and of reducing sadness in depressed individuals, 
at least in the short term (Liverant, Brown, Barlow, & Roemer, 2008).  
 
Still, a meta-analysis of the relationships between six emotion-regulation strategies 
(acceptance, avoidance, problem solving, reappraisal, rumination, and suppression) and 
symptoms of anxiety, depression, eating disorders and substance related disorders found 
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that ‘despite all the interest that emotion regulation and strategies have received in the 
last decade, the number of effect sizes for some combinations was, indeed, small’, and 
this especially for acceptance and reappraisal (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 
2010, p.233). It also pointed to the paucity of work exploring the flexible use of 
different emotion regulation strategies depending on context. Overall, while findings to 
date are encouraging, there seems to be a need for further emotion- and context-specific 
work if the processes at play are to be more precisely delineated. 
 
Future research should also factor in age and gender-related differences. That age has an 
impact on the forms of emotion regulation used (e.g. from extrinsic to intrinsic, from 
behavioural to mentalistic, increasingly reflective of cultural norms etc.), and on 
manifestations of emotional dysregulation, is well known (Holodynski & Friedlmeier, 
2006; Thompson & Goodman, 2010). Indeed, developmental psychologists have been 
among the first to take an active interest in the topic, in line with their attention to 
emotional development generally.4 However research suggests that age may continue to 
impact emotion regulation strategies over the life cycle (Garnefski & Kraaj, 2006). 
 
Somewhat surprisingly given the fact that women are diagnosed with affective disorders 
up to twice as frequently as men (Gater et al., 1998), gender differences in emotion 
regulation and dysregulation have only recently become a focus of attention. One study 
using fMRI to explore possible gender differences in emotional reactivity and emotion 
regulation found no behavioural difference in men and women’s emotional responses, 
but significant neural differences surrounding the use of cognitive reappraisal (McRae, 
Ochsner, Mauss, Gabrieli, & Gross, 2008). Two non-competing explanations were 
tentatively outlined: that men may make greater use of automatic emotion regulation 
than women; and that women may use positive emotions in the service of reappraisal to 
a greater degree than men. The latter hypothesis received some support in another study, 
this time using self-reports, which found that women tended to use positive refocusing 
as a cognitive emotion regulation strategy more often than men (Garnefski, Teerds, 
Kraaij, Legerstree, & van den Kommer, 2004). While these findings suggest that gender 
may affect emotion regulation, they will need replicating in clinical settings before the 
                                                          
4
 See notably the special issue of Child Development dated March/April 2004. 
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potential role of gender as a moderator of the relationship between emotion regulation 
and psychopathology can be fully ascertained, and its therapeutic implications explored. 
 
To conclude, while work is still on-going to clarify the processes involved, the bulk of 
evidence so far points to a relationship between maladaptive emotion regulation 
strategies and psychological ill-health. This has been used to justify new treatment 
approaches targeting emotion regulation.  
 
3. Working with emotion regulation therapeutically: CBT approaches 
 
The idea that emotion work has therapeutic value has long been embraced in a range of 
approaches, especially within the psychodynamic and experiential modalities 
(Greenberg & Safran, 1987). However, as recently as thirteen years ago it could still be 
claimed that ‘Although CBT clearly addresses “emotional” problems, the role of in-
session emotional arousal in CBT, with few exceptions, remains terra incognita in both 
research and clinical practice’ (Samoilov & Goldfried, 2000, p.373). This is not to say 
that cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) had no impact on the emotional awareness or 
states of the client: mood rating for instance was used widely to develop the former, 
while practicing cognitive restructuring offered to many a novel, adaptive form of 
emotion regulation. However primacy was given to thoughts and behaviour, with the 
reduction of negative emotions arguably representing a (significant) by-product. Since 
then however, emotion and emotion regulation have become a key focus for therapeutic 
work for a growing number of cognitive-behavioural therapists; indeed, addressing 
emotional dysregulation could be seen as a cornerstone of the much vaulted ‘third 
wave’ of behavioural therapies (Hayes, 2004).  
 
At the same time it is important to acknowledge that cognitive-behavioural approaches 
are not the only ones to incorporate emotion regulation training. For instance, in the 
experiential emotion-focused therapy (EFT) emotions are seen as fundamental to the 
construction of the self, and a key determinant of self-organisation (Greenberg, 2006). 
The role of the therapist is therefore to help people become aware of, accept, and make 
sense of their emotional experience. Therapy involves both altering emotional 
experience, and changing the narratives in which emotional experience is embedded 
(Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 2006). Like their CBT counterparts, EFT practitioners 
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use methods such as identifying and labelling emotions, developing meditative practice, 
relaxation and self-talk. 
 
Still, for reasons of space this review is primarily concerned with efforts by cognitive-
behavioural therapists to design new modes of interventions that are explicitly geared 
towards helping clients improve their emotion regulation skills, and will therefore 
concentrate on these, starting with three forms of cognitive-behavioural therapy that 
specifically target emotion regulation through dedicated skills training: dialectical 
behaviour therapy; emotion regulation therapy; and the unified protocol for the 
treatment of emotional disorders. A last sub-section will consider the contribution of 
more indirect forms of emotion regulation ‘training’: those based on mindfulness and 
acceptance approaches. Taken together these represent the most prominent examples of 
CBT interventions on emotion regulation to date, and as such worthy foci for the 
present review. 
 
3.1 Dialectical behaviour therapy for borderline personality disorder 
 
According to the DSM-5, diagnostic criteria for borderline personality disorder (BPD) 
notably include: affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood; chronic 
feelings of emptiness; and inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Whereas Beckian formulations of the 
disorder focus on key assumptions and beliefs, and Young’s more recent schema mode 
model on child-like regressive states or modes, Marsha Linehan’s dialectical behaviour 
therapy places the emphasis firmly on emotional dysregulation (Beck et al., 2004). 
Correspondingly, hers is the only approach to go beyond general work on experiencing 
and expressing emotions to include emotion regulation skills training.  
 
According to Linehan’s biosocial theory, BPD is primarily a disorder of the emotion 
regulation system. Borderline individuals are both emotionally vulnerable and lacking 
in emotion regulation skills, something that she assigns to the interplay between 
biological predispositions and environmental experiences, more specifically a lack of 
validation by others when experiencing painful emotions (Linehan, 1993a). Treatment 
should therefore focus on ‘the twin tasks of teaching the borderline patient (1) to 
modulate extreme emotionality and reduce maladaptive mood-dependent behaviors, and 
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(2) to trust and validate her own emotions, thoughts, and activities’ (ibid., p.62). 
Teaching emotion regulation skills mostly addresses the first of these two tasks. 
 
Learning to modulate emotions requires first of all the application of mindfulness skills. 
A central assumption of DBT is that much of the distress experienced by borderline 
individuals is the result of their secondary responses to primary emotions. Reducing 
shame, anger or anxiety therefore requires accepting those primary emotions that are 
adaptive and appropriate to the context, i.e. experiencing them in a supportive, non-
invalidating environment. This emphasis on acceptance is common to other recent 
approaches in cognitive-behavioural therapy (see below). 
 
However Linehan’s approach also specifies a range of specific DBT emotion regulation 
skills taught weekly, in a group format, over a period of one year (Linehan, 1993b). 
These include: identifying and labelling affect;  identifying obstacles to changing 
emotions, i.e. helping the individual to identify the functions and reinforcers for 
particular emotional behaviours; reducing vulnerability to ‘emotion mind’, with advice 
on nutrition, exercise, general health and the use of non-prescribed mood altering drugs; 
increasing positive emotional events, both short and long term; increasing mindfulness 
to current emotions; taking opposite action, i.e. altering emotional states by changing 
facial and postural expression (e.g., adopting a relaxed stance when feeling anxiety or 
anger), or taking a different action (e.g., sitting down instead of leaving the room). 
Finally, work is done on applying distress tolerance techniques so as to be able to 
tolerate negative emotions without resorting to impulsive, and possibly harmful, actions. 
 
In addition to a number of uncontrolled trials, at the time of writing several published 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) appeared to support DBT’s efficacy in addressing 
suicide attempts and self-harm in patients with BPD, with and without comorbid 
substance abuse (Linehan, Armstrong, Suarez, Allmon, & Heard, 1991; Linehan, Heard, 
& Armstrong, 1993; Linehan et al., 1999; Koons et al., 2001; Linehan et al. 2002; 
Verheul et al., 2003; van den Bosch, Koeter, Stijnen, Verheul, & van den Brink, 2005; 
Linehan et al., 2006; McMain et al., 2009; Feigenbaum, 2012; Priebe et al., 2012). 
Further RCTs supported the use of DBT in the treatment of eating disorders (Safer, 
Telch, & Agras, 2001; Telch, Agras, & Linehan, 2001); and two more offered 
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preliminary confirmation of the efficacy of DBT in older patients with depression 
(Lynch, Morse, Mendelson, & Robins, 2003; Lynch et al., 2007). 
 
However these RCTs suffered from a number of methodological shortcomings, 
including one or several of the following: small sample size; variable length of both 
DBT treatment and treatment as usual (TAU); use of multiple therapists; superior 
experience, training and supervision of the DBT therapists compared with those in the 
TAU condition; lack of treatment specificity in the TAU condition; and absence of 
follow-up (Robins & Chapman, 2004; Öst, 2008).  
 
One RCT seemed to avoid most of these pitfalls (Linehan et al., 2006). In the study, 101 
women aged between 18 and 45 years who met the criteria for BPD and for current and 
past suicidal behaviour were randomized to two treatment groups: DBT or community 
treatment by experts (CBTE). The CBTE therapists were nominated by community 
mental health leaders for their expertise working with difficult clients. Treatment was 
offered over a one year trial, with a one year post-treatment follow-up. Despite a high 
drop-out rate among CBTE clients, which was factored into the statistical analyses, the 
study provided convincing evidence of the efficacy of DBT in preventing suicide 
attempts, reducing the frequency of emergency department visits and inpatient 
psychiatric care for suicidal ideation, and keeping subjects in treatment (though not in 
reducing the frequency of non-suicidal self-injury). Subjects receiving DBT were also 
less likely to continue taking psychotropic medication, including anti-depressants, 
during the treatment year.  
 
However there was no description of the treatment received under the CBTE condition, 
a potentially significant methodological flaw. Further, in common with previous RCTs 
the study did not attempt to tease out the effects of different components of DBT, 
making it impossible to assess the relative efficacy of the emotion regulation skills 
training component (as opposed to that of cognitive restructuring, behavioural skills 
training, or emotional validation more generally), or whether improved emotion 
regulation mediated the positive treatment outcomes. The same critique could be 
levelled at another study, this time looking at DBT skills use as an outcome and 
mediator for treatment in women with borderline personality disorder (Neacsiu, Rizvi & 
Linehan, 2010). While the authors found that the self-reported use of DBT skills had 
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significantly improved over time, and that it fully mediated both the decrease in suicide 
attempts and depression and the increase in control of anger observed (but not the drop 
in non-suicidal self-injury), they did not distinguish between emotion regulation skills 
and others.  
 
This last shortcoming Nadja Slee and her associates (2008) partially addressed. They 
conducted mediation analyses as part of a RCT of CBT for young people engaging in 
deliberate self-harm (DSH). The 90 participants, aged between 15 and 35 years, were 
randomly assigned to CBT including emotion regulation skills training in addition to 
treatment as usual, or to treatment as usual only. Findings showed that changes in DSH 
were partially mediated by changes in emotion regulation difficulties, and in particular 
difficulties with impulse control and goal-directed behaviours when experiencing 
negative emotions. But these effects were small. Moreover, other emotion regulation 
skills such as awareness, clarity, and acceptance of emotional response, as well as full 
access to emotion regulation strategies perceived as effective, were not found to have a 
mediating effect.  
 
Two recent RCTs also deserve attention here. The first one used emotion regulation 
group therapy in addition to ongoing treatment for deliberate self-harm among women 
diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, and found significant effects on self-
harm and other self-destructive behaviours, as well as on emotion dysregulation, 
depression, BPD symptoms and quality of life (Gratz, Tull, & Levy, 2013). The second 
tested whether adding an intensive emotion regulation skills training component to 
inpatient CBT for major depressive disorder would improve its efficacy; results 
suggested that it did, participants reporting decreased negative affect, improved well-
being and improved emotion regulation (Berking, Ebert, Cuijpers, & Hofman, 2013). 
However the mechanisms of change remained unclear, including the possible mediating 
effect of emotion regulation.  
 
Looking at the research conducted on what is probably the best known and best 
supported CBT intervention targeting emotion dysregulation through emotion 
regulation skills training, one can only be struck by the paucity of outcome studies using 
an additive design, such that the distinct contribution of emotion regulation training to 
treatment outcome could be ascertained. Recent studies seem to be addressing this issue 
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at last, but their small number, variable treatment protocols, and different therapeutic 
foci mean that conclusive cumulative findings remain a long way off. 
 
3.2 Emotion regulation therapy for generalised anxiety disorder 
 
According to David Barlow (1988), anxiety disorders are essentially disorders of 
emotion. Despite having different phenotypes, they all involve negative affect, typically 
in the form of fear and anxiety, the timing and intensity of which appear to be 
problematic. Hence a growing interest in possible relationships between anxiety 
symptoms and a range of emotion regulation strategies (Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, 
& Hofmann, 2006; Amstadter, 2008; Hofmann, Heering, Sawyer, & Asnaani, 2009). 
 
Among anxiety disorders, general anxiety disorder (GAD) has attracted particular 
attention as a syndrome involving emotional regulation deficits and an overuse of 
cognitive strategies. According to the DSM-5, one essential feature of GAD is excessive 
worry occurring over a period of more than six months (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). While some of the more recent theoretical models of the disorder 
tend to emphasize cognitive avoidance and faulty metacognitions in accounting for this 
excessive pattern of worrying, others focus on deficiencies in emotional awareness and 
processing (Behar, Dobrow Di Marco, Hekler, Mohlman, & Staples, 2009; Cooper, 
Miranda & Mennin, 2013).  
 
The emotion dysregulation model (EDM) of GAD developed by Douglas Mennin and 
his colleagues falls in the latter category (Mennin, 2004). The EDM is articulated 
around four main propositions: first, individuals with GAD experience more intense 
emotions than do other people, especially when it comes to negative emotional states; 
second, these individuals have a poorer understanding of their emotions than do most 
individuals; third, they tend to perceive their emotions as more threatening; and fourth, 
they possess maladaptive emotion regulation strategies that potentially leave them in a 
worse emotional state than that which they initially set out to regulate. 
 
The corresponding treatment, emotion regulation therapy (ERT) for GAD, incorporates 
components of emotion focused treatments into a cognitive-behavioural framework, and 
is delivered in individual work over 20 sessions. In its original formulation, ERT was 
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delivered over a 16-week period, and included four distinct phases: the first four weekly 
sessions focused on psychoeducation about the disorder (Phase I); the following four 
aimed at developing somatic awareness and emotion regulations skills (Phase II). These 
skills were then practiced intensively over a four week period, with twice-weekly 
sessions during which the client was exposed to emotionally evocative themes (Phase 
III); during Phase IV the final, weekly sessions focused on termination and relapse 
prevention (Mennin, 2006).  
 
Of particular interest here is the emotion regulation skills training component. In Phase 
II, it first concentrated on the acquisition of somatic awareness skills, in order to 
increase flexible awareness of bodily reactions to emotions; this was done largely 
through the use of progressive muscle relaxation. It then focused on increasing 
understanding of emotional experience and regulation, especially when confronted with 
intense emotional experiences. Clients were given lists of emotions and their 
corresponding motivational information, and learned to identify, label and differentiate 
between different emotional states, with particular attention to primary emotional 
experiences. Finally, work was done on contextual skills, involving strategies for 
getting needs met and regulating emotions as appropriate in different life domains. 
These comprised skills for increasing client understanding of how needs become salient 
through different emotional experiences; skills for facilitating emotional expression in 
an interpersonal context; and skills to manage intense emotional states, including self-
soothing and learning about contextual clues.  
 
These emotion regulation skills were then practiced and deepened in Phase III through 
thematic experiential exposure, which could include techniques such as the two-chair 
dialogue, the use of a derivative of Beck’s downward arrow technique to explore the 
worry and attendant emotional arousal, imagery work and role-play. 
 
A recent overview of ERT suggests a significant modification of the approach, which 
seems to have become suffused with ACT interventions (Mennin & Fresco, 2010), thus 
bringing it much closer to Roemer and Orsillo’s acceptance-based behavioral therapy 
for GAD (Roemer & Orsillo, 2007). Whether this merely reflects the growing 
popularity of acceptance-based therapy or is indicative of shortcomings in the early 
version of ERT is unclear. 
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More problematic is the fact that while the emotional dysregulation model of GAD has 
received some support (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005; Mennin, Holaway, 
Fresco, Moore, & Heimberg, 2007), the evidence supporting ERT is only emerging. At 
the time of writing it included a NIHM-funded open trial (N=19) and a RCT (N=60), 
both of which reported considerable reductions in GAD and depression symptoms, with 
gains maintained at the 9-month follow-up (Fresco, Mennin, Heimberg & Ritter, 2013). 
While these results are encouraging, once again the empirical evidence supporting the 
role of emotion regulation training in addressing psychological disorders seems sparse. 
 
3.3 The unified protocol for the treatment of emotional disorders 
 
One potential benefit of using an emotion regulation framework in psychopathology is 
to better delineate the mechanisms that are common across psychological disorders, and 
to design interventions with broad applicability and effectiveness. It is on this premise 
that the unified protocol for the treatment of emotional disorders was developed (Moses 
& Barlow, 2006; Barlow et al., 2011). 
 
The treatment itself maps onto the model proposed by Gross (Gross, 1998; Gross & 
Thompson, 2007): each of the five families of emotion regulation is directly targeted, 
with a total of seven different modules. This modular approach, and the possibility to 
extend the treatment from nine to 18 sessions, is meant to ensure flexibility, maybe even 
full tailoring to the individual client. In each module assessment measures (mostly 
nomothetic self-report scales) are used to track progress and help guide intervention.  
 
Briefly summarized, the modules address maladaptive situation selection through 
emotion exposure; situation modification through preventing emotional avoidance; 
attentional deployment through training in present-focused non-judgmental awareness 
(using mindfulness of the breath); maladaptive cognitive change through cognitive 
reappraisal; and maladaptive emotion-driven behaviour through opposite action-
tendencies.  
 
The approach has been supported by case studies (e.g., Allen, McHugh, & Barlow, 
2008), and by an encouraging series of open trials (Ellard, Fairholme, Boisseau, 
Farchione, & Barlow, 2010). A RCT was also recently completed, which found 
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significant reductions in symptoms across a range of anxiety disorders as well as 
treatment effects on measures of temperamental affectivity, suggesting that emotional 
processing was being altered (Farchione et al., 2012). However the sample size 
remained small (N=37), the control group was not in active treatment, and mediation 
effects were not documented, thus preventing a fuller understanding of emotion 
regulation processes therein. A larger clinical trial is now under way, which should shed 
further light on the efficacy of this modular form of emotion regulation training. Should 
it prove successful, it would further establish the centrality of emotion dysregulation in 
a range of emotional disorders, and the value of using targeted approaches to emotion 
regulation. For the time being however, the evidence base remains thin. 
 
3.4 Mindfulness-based approaches to emotion regulation 
 
No review of emotion regulation interventions would be complete without taking a 
closer look at the role of mindfulness-based work in the so-called ‘third wave’ of 
behaviour therapies, a term originally seen as encompassing mindfulness-based 
cognitive therapy (Segal, Wiliams, & Teasdale, 2002), acceptance and commitment 
therapy or ACT (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) and DBT, among others (Hayes, 
2004).5 With the exception of DBT, reviewed above, these approaches do not comprise 
specific modules on emotion regulation skills training. However they claim to improve 
emotion regulation indirectly, by enabling individuals to achieve healthier emotional 
awareness and acceptance. As such, they also form the backdrop of the three treatments 
reviewed so far (indeed, in the case of ERT and the unified protocol, increasingly so). 
 
According to the proponents of mindfulness-based therapies, the practice or process of 
mindfulness (e.g., through meditation or, in both DBT and ACT, through work on 
cognitions and behaviours) can produce a decrease in negative emotional arousal, 
facilitate increased engagement with positive emotional states, generate greater 
metacognitive insight, and promote acceptance of emotional experiences (Chambers, 
Gullone, & Allen, 2009). This last aspect is central in ACT, a major goal of which is to 
help individuals get rid of cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance, two rigid forms 
of emotion regulation which interfere with normal adjustment to ever changing life 
                                                          
5
 Marsha Linehan  reportedly regards DBT as a form of CBT, not as part of  a ‘third wave’ (Hofmann & 
Asmundson, 2008). 
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conditions (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). It is also claimed that mindfulness 
training can reduce reliance on strategies such as rumination and over-engagement with 
thought (Corcoran, Farb, Anderson, & Segal, 2010). It would thus counter maladaptive 
response-focused emotion regulation strategies, and as such could potentially 
complement traditional CBT, with its emphasis on antecedent-focused strategies 
(Hofman & Asmundson, 2008). 
 
There is already some evidence that mindfulness-based approaches may indeed promote 
adaptive emotion regulation. One study found significant correlations between self-
reports of mindfulness and self-reported use of a range of adaptive emotion regulation 
strategies in a sample of 212 college students (Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson, & 
Laurenceau, 2007). Another study comparing emotional responses to affectively 
valenced picture slides in two groups, one of which had received a 15mn recorded 
focused breathing induction, concluded that receiving such mindfulness-based 
interventions might produce more adaptive emotional responding to negative stimuli 
(Arch & Craske, 2006).  
 
A third, more recent piece of work used multimodal assessment to examine the effects 
of a brief mindfulness-based intervention in a laboratory setting on emotional 
experiences and regulation in response to three film clips: one distressing, one positive, 
and one affectively mixed (Erisman & Roemer, 2010). While no significant differences 
between mindfulness and control groups were found on physiological measures, 
significance differences emerged for self-reported scores on the Difficulties in Emotion 
Regulation Scale, with participants in the mindfulness condition reporting more 
adaptive regulation in response to the affectively mixed clip, and less negative affect 
immediately following this clip, though not after a 3mn recovery period.  
 
Still, in the last two studies the sample used was small and made up of college students 
rather than reflecting a clinical population, while the brief mindfulness intervention used 
may not have reproduced the full experience of mindfulness among the participants.  
 
The study conducted by Berking and his associates (2008) therefore provides interesting 
insights. In their survey of 289 inpatients treated for a variety of mental disorders, the 
addition of a specific training in emotion regulation skills to a 6-week CBT-based 
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treatment produced a greater reduction in depression and negative affect, and a greater 
increase in positive affect, compared with a control group receiving only the CBT 
intervention. Importantly, the emotion regulation subscales most strongly and 
consistently related to mental health outcomes were modification, resilience and 
acceptance of negative emotions, thus lending some support to acceptance-based 
approaches. However the assessment of emotion regulation skills and mental health 
outcomes was solely based on self-reports and patients were not randomized to 
conditions. Nor was there a follow-up confirming the durability of the gains achieved.  
 
As for the studies that have been recently conducted to assess the impact of mindfulness 
and acceptance interventions on both emotion regulation and symptomatology for 
specific disorders (e.g., Kumar, Feldman, & Hayes, 2008; Treanor, Erisman, Salters-
Pedneault, Roemer, & Orsillo, 2011), they tend to use small samples, self-reports and 
different intervention packages, three methodological shortcomings present in most 
empirical studies on mindfulness (Chiesa & Malinowski, 2011). 
 
Additional work using complementary measures and a true experimental design, and 
assessing longer term effects, is therefore warranted. As already asserted above, the 
conduct of rigorous mediation analyses will also be critical in teasing out the distinct 
impact of improved emotion regulation skills, both general and disorder-specific, on 
treatment outcomes.  
 
4. Summary and conclusion 
 
Emotion has long been recognised as central in psychotherapy, in a tradition going back 
to Freud himself. However the study of emotional processes in psychological disorders 
is relatively new, driven partly by more sophisticated research techniques (e.g., the use 
of fMRI) and the attendant progress in understanding normative emotional functioning.   
 
Emotion regulation is exemplar in that respect: it is only recently that consensus began 
to emerge on how it could be conceptualised, and even though there seems to be general 
agreement regarding its importance for psychological health, more work needs to be 
done on how different emotions and emotion regulation strategies may affect 
psychopathology, and this across age and gender groups. This in turn requires the 
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development of well-validated instruments: while the proliferation of scales may be 
unavoidable in a young field of study, a degree of integration is required if research 
findings are to be consolidated. Progress may also require a greater degree of 
methodological eclecticism, so as to get a better understanding of emotion regulation as 
it unfolds in its social and cultural context, and in response to personally relevant goals 
and emotional experiences. 
 
By the same token, treatments focusing on emotion dysregulation have produced 
encouraging results; some, like DBT, already have demonstrated value in improving 
psychological functioning. However it is not enough to show that such treatments 
improve psychological well-being: given that the treatments are specifically directed at 
improving emotion regulation, it is also important to demonstrate that clients do develop 
more adaptive emotion regulation skills in the process. On this last point however the 
evidence remains sparse, with the majority of outcome studies failing to adequately 
measure improvements (or otherwise) in emotion regulation as opposed to 
symptomatology.  
 
As this review hopefully showed, the field of emotion regulation is an exciting one. 
Research in the field is expanding, and has the potential for valuable clinical 
applications (both disorder-specific and transdiagnostic) which may usefully 
complement the toolkit of counselling psychologists. There is also scope for further 
exploration. For instance, research devoted to the role of emotion dysregulation in 
addiction, and to ways in which emotion regulation training might be usefully combined 
with CBT protocols in that area, is still in its infancy (Cheetham, Allen, Yücel, & 
Lubman, 2010; Kassel, 2010). This is intriguing considering the oft-encountered claim 
that mindfulness should become a standard component of interventions in the field.  
 
However future outcome studies will require a more rigorous design, with larger clinical 
samples, standardized measures and protocols, a greater attention to therapist effects, 
adequate follow up and, critically, a greater focus on the specific contribution of 
improved emotion regulation skills, whether imparted directly or, in the case of 
mindfulness-based approaches, indirectly. Only then will emotion regulation training 
stop being a promising intervention and become a proven, maybe even indispensable, 
component of CBT work. 
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Part 2 – Doctoral research 
 
Making sense of self-injury: A pluralistic qualitative approach 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Non-suicidal self-injury is a complex behaviour influenced by a wide range of 
biological, psychological, social and cultural factors. In an attempt to inform 
counselling psychology practice and research, this piece of work focuses on the 
individual meanings attached to self-harming, and more precisely on the ways in which 
someone engaging in repetitive self-injury may construct and convey her unique 
experience. A set of three interviews conducted with the same participant is analysed 
using three different interpretative lenses: interpretative phenomenological analysis, 
narrative analysis and a psychosocial approach. The result is a rich, multi-layered 
understanding of one individual’s experience of the behaviour, a reading that privileges 
complexity, intersubjectivity and openness over theoretical parsimony. The thesis also 
shows how the adoption of a reflexive stance, continuous engagement with the text, and 
close attention to the participant’s well-being can be used to tackle the significant 
epistemological, methodological and ethical challenges raised by a pluralist approach. 
Overall this doctoral research illustrates the value of qualitative pluralism as a mixed 
methods approach enabling researchers and scientist-practitioners to engage more 
deeply with the subjective meanings attached to severe emotional and behavioural 
difficulties, something of obvious relevance to counselling psychology.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Self-injurious behaviour has a long recorded history, going back to biblical times 
(Favazza, 1996). But the past twenty years have seen a rise in interest in the 
phenomenon from both researchers and practitioners, to the extent that non-suicidal 
self-injury was considered for inclusion as a distinct syndrome in the fifth edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2011).6 This first chapter surveys the rapidly growing literature on self-
injury, paying particular attention to the difficulties encountered in defining and 
measuring the phenomenon; the broad range of predisposing factors and possible 
functions already identified; and the way theoretical models have been developed to 
account for the behaviour and guide the treatment of self-injury. It then introduces the 
question guiding the research project presented in this portfolio, and shows how it fits 
with existing work on the perspective of the self-injuring individual. A brief reflexive 
section concludes. 
 
1.1 Describing self-injury: definition and epidemiology 
 
1.1.1 Definition 
 
There is no clear and consensual definition of self-injury. In part, this is due to 
disagreement regarding its key features, such as the absence or presence of suicidal 
intent. While American researchers have sometimes applied the label - or the equivalent 
‘self-injurious behaviours’ - to both suicidal and non-suicidal experiences, they have 
lately focused much of their attention on non-suicidal self-injury, defined as the ‘direct 
and deliberate destruction of body tissue in the absence of any observable intent to die’ 
(Nock, 2010, p.342). By contrast, in the UK the term ‘self-injury’ tends to refer to a 
sub-type of self-harm methods, to be distinguished from self-poisoning, and this 
regardless of the motivations behind the act (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2010; 
NICE, 2004).  
 
                                                          
6
 Non-suicidal self-injury was eventually classified as a ‘condition for further study’, i.e. ‘a condition that 
may be the focus of clinical attention, or that may otherwise affect the diagnosis, course, prognosis or 
treatment of a patient’s mental disorder’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
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The use of the term ‘deliberate’, prevalent in the American literature, has also attracted 
criticism, self-injuring individuals pointing to the blame attached to the notion of 
wilfulness, and to wide variation both in the manner in which the behaviour is carried 
out and in the level of awareness accompanying it (Pembroke, 2004). 7 Such is the 
confusion that authors have sometimes chosen to eschew definition altogether, alluding 
instead to ‘a complex set of behaviours, with different meanings in different contexts’ 
(Motz, 2001, p.152).  
 
Still, adopting a definition of self-injury, however tentative, seemed useful in order to 
develop a better conceptual, epidemiological and theoretical handle on this complex 
phenomenon. For the purpose of the present work, self-injury was therefore defined as 
an act involving the infliction of pain and/or injury to one’s own body, either 
deliberately or impulsively, without suicidal intent. Importantly, because of its 
simplicity this definition opened up space for individual meaning(s) to be attached to 
the act. However, as should be clear from the above discussion, it was also informed by 
current debates over terminology and therefore not ‘neutral’. 
 
1.1.2 Prevalence and forms of self-injury 
 
Efforts to collect clear statistics on the incidence and prevalence of self-injury are 
complicated both by the lack of a clear definition and by the overlapping use of terms 
such as self-mutilation, self-injurious behaviour, deliberate self-harm, self-cutting, self-
inflicted violence, and parasuicide.8 Researchers must also contend with the social taboo 
attached to the behaviour: some incidents are misreported as accidental; many others are 
treated in private and never reach the attention of health services or professionals. One 
large-scale community survey of adolescents thus found that only 6.3% of those 
engaging in self-cutting (with or without suicidal intent) reported presenting to a 
hospital (Hawton, Harriss, Simkin, Bale, & Bond, 2004). Data collected in clinical 
settings must therefore be approached with some caution. 
 
  
                                                          
7
 These critiques have been endorsed by British clinicians (NICE, 2004).  
8
 While this study privileged the use of the narrower term ‘self-injury’, ‘self-harm’ was also employed as 
synonymous, partly to avoid undue repetition and partly to reflect the participant’s usage of the term. 
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Bearing this caveat in mind, self-injury is thought to affect around 4% of the general 
population, with up to 1% reporting a severe history (Klonsky & Muelenkamp, 2007). 
Higher rates of self-injury have been found in adolescents and young adults, with a 
reported average age of onset of between 12 and 14 years; and in psychiatric patients 
more generally, with estimates of up to 20% for adult psychiatric inpatients and 40% for 
adolescent inpatients (Rodham & Hawton, 2009; Briere & Gil, 1998; Hurry, 2000). 
Further, there is some evidence that the occurrence of self-injury in the general 
population may be increasing, especially among adolescents and college students 
(Muehlenkamp, 2005).  
  
Regarding the methods used, skin-cutting appears to be the most prevalent form of self-
injury in clinical samples, followed by banging, hitting and burning. However 
scratching was found to be the most common form in a large non-clinical sample 
(Whitlock, Eckenrode, & Silverman, 2006). Other methods include picking, biting, 
scraping, inserting sharp objects under the skin or in bodily orifices, tying ligatures, 
pulling out hair and eyelashes, scrubbing, and swallowing sharp objects or harmful 
substances. Importantly, in most individuals self-injurious behaviour tends to combine 
different methods, and to vary greatly in terms of frequency, severity, and resulting 
impairment, both over time and between individuals (Gratz, 2001; Sutton, 2007). There 
is also considerable variation when it comes to the visibility and social acceptability of 
the behaviour (Turp, 2002). 
 
Self-injury is often seen as affecting females more than males, and several community-
based studies have found the behaviour to be more common among adolescent girls and 
women (Hawton, Rodham, Evans, & Weatherhall, 2002; Suyemoto, 1998). However 
studies of adults in clinical settings have reported inconsistent results (Muehlenkamp, 
2005). For instance, a study of adult presentations in Leeds A&E departments found 
that 54.4% of those attending for self-injury were men, and that the nature of the acts 
was broadly similar for males and females (Horrocks, Price, House, & Owens, 2003). 
Self-injury among men may therefore be more common than generally thought.9 Indeed, 
a recent survey using a random-digit dialing sample of 439 US adults found no 
association between self-injury and gender (Klonsky, 2011). Interestingly no association 
                                                          
9
 For a discussion of the gender stereotype commonly associated with self-harm, see Millard (2013). 
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was found with ethnicity, educational history or household income either, thus 
contradicting earlier findings based on young people presenting in casualty departments,  
which suggested a strong relationship between various forms of self-harm and socio-
economic deprivation (Ayton, Rasool, & Cottrell, 2003). 
 
It is also worth mentioning that psychiatric patients are not the only minority group to 
be affected disproportionately by self-injury. There is evidence that self-injury is rife in 
forensic settings (HM Prison Service, 2011).  It is also common among people with 
various kinds of learning disabilities, albeit in a more stereotypical form (Luiselli, 
2009). A higher incidence of self-harming behaviour, including self-injury, has been 
reported among young Asian women (Cooper et al., 2006); and gay men and lesbians 
are thought to be at greater risk of self-injury (Davies & Neal, 1996; Whitlock, 
Eckenrode, & Silverman, 2006).  
 
1.2 Explaining self-injury: aetiology and theoretical models 
 
1.2.1 Diagnosis and co-morbid disorders 
 
Research has shown that self-injuring individuals are also a heterogeneous population 
when it comes to diagnosis and aetiology. Among clinical patients self-injury is most 
commonly associated with borderline personality disorder (BPD), of which it is 
currently seen as a symptom (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Yet the 
strength of the association between the two has been questioned. For instance, Herpetz, 
Sass and Favazza (1997) found that if diagnostic criterion 5 (which includes self-
mutilation) was not included, only 28% of the self-mutilating individuals in their sample 
would meet the diagnostic criteria for BPD, leaving a large percentage without a 
primary diagnosis.  
 
Self-injury has also been linked with depressive and anxiety disorders, eating disorders, 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and substance abuse disorders. A recent literature 
search thus found that between 25.4% and 55.2% of eating disorder patients also 
presented self-injurious behaviour, while between 54% and 61% of self-injuring 
patients also had an eating disorder (Svirko & Hawton, 2007). Another study reported 
lifetime rates of deliberate self-harm greater than 50% among samples with PTSD 
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(Cloitre, Koenen, Cohen, & Han, 2002). But there is some evidence that maturity alone 
can lead to the cessation of self-injury, something which is not true of many of the 
disorders with which it has been linked (Walsh & Rosen, 1988).  
 
Such discrepancies led to calls for the classification of non-suicidal self-injury as a 
separate clinical syndrome in the DSM-5, calls which were eventually not heeded. 
While the recognition that self-injury is more than the ‘symptom’ of an associated 
disorder may have been a positive step, this move towards a pathologisation of a 
behaviour seen by many self-injuring individuals as adaptive, even life-affirming, 
would have carried serious implications. 
 
1.2.2 Predisposing factors 
 
Associations between self-injury and a wide range of predisposing factors have been 
found, the latter notably including: opioid deficiency (Sher & Stanley, 2009); childhood 
abuse (e.g., Klonsky & Moyer, 2008; Muelhenkamp, Kerr, Bradley, & Larsen, 2010); 
interpersonal difficulties (e.g., Adrian, Zeman, Erdley, Lisa, & Sim, 2011); suicidal 
intent (e.g., Muelhenkamp & Guttierrez, 2004); and exposure to media representations 
(Whitlock, Purington, & Gershkovich, 2009). However these associations are neither 
simple nor straightforward.  
 
The link with childhood abuse is a case in point. Self-injury is often reported by 
individuals having experienced abuse in childhood, especially sexual abuse (Briere & 
Gill, 1998; Yates, 2009). However Klonsky and Moyer’s meta-analysis (2008) found 
that childhood sexual abuse explained little or no unique variance in self-injurious 
behaviour, while Nock and Kessler (2006) found that sexual abuse was associated with 
an increased risk for suicide attempt but not self-injurious behaviour. This suggests a 
complex association between childhood abuse and self-injury, probably mediated by 
psychopathological factors such as alexithymia, dissociation or emotion dysregulation 
(Muehlenkamp, Kerr, Bradley, & Larsen, 2010; Rallis, Deming, Glenn, & Nock, 2012).  
 
Equifinality thus seems to be a defining characteristic of self-injury: one behaviour, 
several causal factors. But how these factors interact over time, and with cultural and 
social norms more generally, remains unclear; and the role of proximal factors such as 
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daily hassles, stress or conflicts, or that of protective factors, has yet to be adequately 
understood (Fliege, Lee, Grimm, & Klapp, 2009).  
 
1.2.3 The functions of self-injury 
 
Focusing on the possible aims or functions of self-injury raises additional questions. In 
his 2007 review of the evidence, including both self-reports and laboratory studies, 
David Klonsky identified such diverse items as: emotion regulation, with self-injury 
helping to alleviate overwhelming negative emotions such as anger, anxiety or 
frustration; self-punishment, the second most often cited function of self-injury after 
affect regulation; interpersonal influence, self-injury here serving as a means to 
communicate feelings, elicit attention or affection, or bond with others; the generation 
of feeling to combat dissociation, a phenomenon often experienced by those with severe 
self-injury (and a history of trauma); suicide prevention; sensation seeking; and the 
affirmation of personal boundaries or control. A more recent study, using a 
phenomenological approach on a sample of 154 participants, similarly listed emotional 
release, the reduction of dissociation or numbness, gaining control, self-punishment, 
suicide prevention and distraction from pain or flashbacks (Polk & Liss, 2009).  
 
Importantly however these functions are not mutually exclusive; they can and do co-
occur. While a consensus seems to have emerged regarding the basic functions of and 
motivations behind self-injury, how these may apply to individuals, or even to the same 
individual at different points in time, thus remains an open question, and one arguably 
best tackled by the clinician through phenomenological enquiry as the answer may have 
considerable implications for treatment (Babiker & Arnold, 1997; Walsh, 2007). 
 
It is also worth noting that most of these functions can be fulfilled through a wider 
range of behaviours potentially harmful to the body: tattoos or piercings for instance can 
be seen as ways to affirm personal boundaries; extreme sports offer strong sensations; 
and factitious disorders such as Munchausen syndrome can be directed at others, in an 
attempt to communicate feelings. Nor is it uncommon for an individual to combine 
several forms of potentially harmful practices, some of which are culturally 
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sanctioned. 10  All this should be borne in mind when attempting to understand the 
personal meaning of self-injury.  
 
1.2.4 Theoretical models and clinical implications 
 
As was made clear in the preceding review, theoretical models of self-injury must 
contend with a highly variable, complex and overdetermined behaviour. Several have 
nevertheless been developed, each with distinct clinical implications. While the purpose 
of this research is not to evaluate their usefulness, a look at their assumptions and 
limitations provides important background.  
 
Neurobiological theories 
 
A first set of theories emphasize the neurobiological underpinnings of self-injury. One 
hypothesis links self-injury with a deficit in endogenous opioids, itself associated with 
chronic and severe childhood trauma and stress. Engaging in self-injury would enhance 
opioids production, creating a ‘rush’. Evidence for this hypothesis is based on reports of 
diminished pain sensitivity during episodes of self-injury; findings of altered 
endogenous opioids levels in self-injuring individuals; and the partial success of opioid 
antagonist treatments such as naltrexone (Sher & Stanley, 2009).  
 
However not all individuals treated with naltrexone respond positively; some may even 
increase their self-injury. Further, while the evidence suggests that endogenous opioids 
may be implicated in self-injury, notably in the context of BPD, the relevance of this 
explanation for self-injuring individuals with less severe presentations remains unclear. 
Other hypotheses, supporting a role for the serotonergic and dopaminergic systems, 
have yet to be confirmed (e.g., Herpetz, Sass, & Favazza, 1997; Coccaro et al., 1989). 
While genetics and neurobiology may play a role in the pathophysiology of self-injury, 
possibly in interplay with childhood abuse, more research is required before firm and 
generalizable conclusions can be drawn. 
 
  
                                                          
10
 On the notion of culturally accepted self-harming acts/activities, or CASHAS, see Turp (2002). 
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Linehan’s biosocial approach to BPD  
 
Marsha Linehan’s biosocial emotional regulation model holds a particular place here, 
the therapeutic approach it underpins, dialectical behaviour therapy, having developed a 
strong evidence base for the treatment of BPD, including a reduction in self-injurious 
behaviours. 11  According to Linehan, BPD is primarily a disorder of the emotion 
regulation system. Borderline individuals are both emotionally vulnerable and lacking 
in emotion regulation skills, something that she assigns to the interplay between 
biological predispositions and environmental experiences, more specifically a lack of 
validation by others when experiencing painful emotions (Linehan, 1993a). Self-injury 
then becomes a way to regulate emotional arousal at times when the individual is 
flooded by distressing feelings. 
 
Treatment should therefore focus on ‘the twin tasks of teaching the borderline patient 
(1) to modulate extreme emotionality and reduce maladaptive mood-dependent 
behaviors, and (2) to trust and validate her own emotions, thoughts, and activities’ 
(ibid., p.62). This is achieved using a wide range of cognitive and behavioural 
techniques, with particular emphasis on developing mindfulness and distress tolerance 
(Linehan, 1993b). The therapist further has to strike a balance between encouraging the 
client to change, and simultaneously accepting her.12 
 
Linehan’s approach has been widely embraced in the treatment of BPD, including in the 
United Kingdom. However to the extent that self-injury is seen as a symptom of an 
underlying personality disorder, her biosocial model can be said to participate in the 
pathologisation of the behaviour. 
 
  
                                                          
11
 Several randomized controlled trials (RCTs) appear to support DBT’s efficacy in addressing self-injury 
in patients with BPD (Linehan, Armstrong, Suarez, Allmon, & Heard, 1991; Verheul et al., 2003; van den 
Bosch, Koeter, Stijnen, Verheul, & van den Brink, 2005; Priebe et al., 2012). However five RCTs found 
no significant effect of DBT on the frequency of self-harm (Linehan et al., 1999; Koons et al., 2001; 
Linehan et al., 2006; McMain et al., 2009; Feigenbaum et al., 2012). 
12
 Throughout the thesis, ‘he’ and ‘she’ can stand for either client or therapist. 
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Other cognitive and behavioural approaches 
 
While cognitive-behavioural (CBT) therapists often combine cognitive and behavioural 
interventions when working with self-injuring individuals, different models have been 
proposed for the behaviour, placing the emphasis either on cognitions or on behavioural 
responses. 
 
Kennerley’s theoretical conceptualisation of self-injury focuses on four types of 
cognitions thought to drive and facilitate the behaviour: fundamental beliefs (e.g., ‘I’m 
bad and I deserve to get hurt’); facilitating beliefs (e.g., ‘This is the only way to show 
how I really feel’); reactions to self-injury (e.g., ‘This is the only way that I can cope’); 
and flashbacks and other intrusive recollections of traumatic and/or painful events, 
which may trigger self-injury as a means to distract or dissociate (Kennerley, 2004). 
Therapeutic work aims at challenging the first three categories of cognitions, notably 
through the use of behavioural experiments. While this approach has the merit of being 
free from any associated diagnostic classification, it is arguable whether it can 
adequately address the multiple difficulties and maladaptive schemas presented by some 
self-injuring individuals, at least on its own.  
 
Behavioural accounts of self-injury emphasize the role of reinforcement in shaping and 
maintaining the behaviour. For instance attention linked to the practice may act as a 
form of positive reinforcement (Walsh & Rosen, 1988). So might the ‘high’ reported by 
a number of self-injuring individuals. The four-function model developed by Matthew 
Nock and Mitchell Prinstein thus conceptualizes self-injurious behaviours as resulting 
from the interaction of positive or negative reinforcement with intrapersonal or social 
contingencies (Nock & Prinstein, 2004). 
 
Though based on similar premises, the experiential avoidance model presents a more 
complex picture. Like Linehan’s biosocial model - but meant to apply to a broad 
population (rather than only individuals with a diagnosis of BPD), the model sees self-
injury as a negatively reinforced strategy for reducing or terminating unwanted 
emotional arousal (Chapman, Gratz, & Brown, 2006). Its authors hypothesise a range of 
potential underlying characteristics in self-injuring individuals, such as higher 
impulsivity or emotional intensity. Once established, the use of self-injury as an 
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experiential avoidance behaviour is maintained by rebound effects (heightened negative 
emotions following self-injury trigger another round of self-injuring); failure of 
emotional processing (the individual is never given a change to ‘survive’ her emotions); 
rule-governed behaviour (“If I cut, I’ll feel better”); and habituation to the negative 
consequences of self-injury. 
 
While the model clearly fits accounts of emotional release during or following self-
injury, and may account for the maintenance of the behaviour, it cannot adequately 
explain the development of self-injury when other forms of experiential avoidance 
could be used (e.g., thought suppression or substance use).13 To be fair, their inability to 
account for the onset and termination of self-injurious behaviour is a problem common 
to all cognitive and behavioural approaches. Here social learning theory may have 
something to contribute, and two hypotheses have indeed been proposed: that self-
injuring youths may initially have emulated the behaviour of peers, or media-based 
representations of peers; and that self-punishment may have become a substitute for 
family punishment, itself associated with relief from guilt or shame (Jarvi, Jackson, 
Swenson & Crawford, 2013; Nock & Cha, 2009).  
 
Like DBT, treatments based on an experiential avoidance model focus on the 
acquisition of distress tolerance and emotion regulation skills, greater exposure to 
emotional arousal, and response prevention (e.g., Gratz, 2007; van Vliet & Kalnins, 
2011; Razzaque, 2012). However their efficacy remains largely untested. 
 
Psychodynamic approaches 
 
In psychodynamic approaches self-injury is seen as reflecting unconscious conflicts and 
dynamics. Freud (1917) first identified a tendency in his melancholic patients to launch 
violent verbal attacks upon themselves, attacks which could have equally been directed 
at significant others; it was as if rather than directly attacking the object, their loved one, 
his patients had first internalised it. This idea was further developed by object relations 
theorists. Looking at young infants, Klein (1933) identified an internal struggle between 
a destructive self and a life-enhancing self, a struggle in which the primary caretaker 
                                                          
13
 As was already mentioned in section 1.2.1, other types of experiential avoidance behaviours can be 
used alongside self-injury. Associations between self-injury and thought suppression have also been 
recorded (Najmi, Wegner, & Nock, 2007). 
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played a key role. Thus, if the mother received the good and bad parts of the infant’s 
self and offered love and nurturance in return, then this experience would be 
‘reintrojected’ by the infant and would strengthen his life-affirming self. However if the 
infant experienced rejection, neglect or abuse, then a ‘dependency-hating’ object would 
be internalised, which would in turn attack the needy, infantile self.  
 
In self-injuring individuals, one therefore sees two processes at play: on a conscious 
level, the individual is trying to protect the body by getting rid of ‘bad’ feelings; 
however on an unconscious level the internalised, destructive self is launching an attack 
on the object itself and/or on the needy, dependent self (Nathan, 2004). Interestingly 
this makes the psychodynamics of self-injury radically different from those of suicide: 
in the latter, a conscious wish to self-destruct appears to combine with an unconscious 
desire to save the loved object or good part of the self.  
 
Bion’s concept of containment sheds further light on the behaviour. For Bion (1967), 
the capacity to process experience in non-harmful ways depends on a capacity for 
containment, including the ability to think in the face of distress rather than acting out 
painful feelings. This capacity normally develops in the presence of a maternal figure 
able to ‘contain’ the infant’s feelings, so that the infant gradually internalizes it. Self-
injury then reflects an absence of containment, both psychologically and 
metaphorically, the flow of blood from self-cutting serving to ‘eloquently express a 
spilling over of that which cannot be contained’ (Turp, 1999, p.314). It is worth noting 
that psychodynamic approaches place a significant emphasis on the symbolic 
significance of self-injury.  
 
They also emphasize the importance of control and mastery. In Fiona Gardner’s 
‘encaptive conflict’, relationship with the internalised object involves both possession 
and the wish to get away, so that ‘Cutting unconsciously serves to attack the inner 
mother who crosses all boundaries, and who is both needed and reviled’ (Gardner, 
2001, p.15). Though developed in infancy, the encaptive conflict can be compounded or 
triggered by later abuse, in which similar dynamics with an all-powerful abuser are at 
play. Self-injury can then be seen as an unconscious attempt to repeat and re-enact the 
trauma, this time under the victim’s own control. The fact that self-injury often develops 
in adolescence, a time not only of separation but also of rapid bodily changes, is also 
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given attention. As these changes take place, self-cutting can become a way to control 
the estranged body, which now provides ‘both the target and receptacle for 
unmanageable feelings and uncontrollable instinctual impulses’ (ibid., p.61). 
 
For the psychodynamic therapist working with self-injuring individuals, the therapeutic 
task is to provide containment through the transference. The therapist tries to contain his 
client’s intolerable feelings of pain, anger and hatred, and to return them to her in a form 
that can be assimilated, as interpretations, so they no longer need to be directed at her 
own body. As she develops insight into the origins and needs behind her self-injuring, 
the client also develops more autonomy; fantasies of omnipotence exerted through 
destructive control over the body are progressively replaced by a new sense of self-
worth (Gardner, 2001).  
 
The mentalisation-based approach to BPD 
 
The idea of maternal responsiveness so central to object relations theory is also at the 
heart of the more recent mentalisation-based approach to BPD. Mentalisation or 
mentalising is the process whereby we make sense of self and others in terms of 
subjective states and mental processes. The development of mentalising capacities is 
predicated on the presence of caring, attentive caregivers, capable of understanding and 
mirroring the infant’s mental states. According to Bateman and Fonagy (2006), the 
absence of a robust mentalising capacity mediates the relationship between disorganised 
early attachment and poor affect regulation, attention and self-control in borderline 
patients. Whenever their attachment system is triggered, their failure to mentalise and 
consequent use of ‘prementalistic’ modes of thinking will result in a distorted 
perception of the relationship between outer and mental worlds, making these patients 
more likely to self-injure. For instance, seeing mental and outer realities as one and the 
same (psychic equivalence) may result in unbearable feelings of badness; seeing them as 
disconnected (pretend mode) may lead to dissociative states; and seeing them as linked 
in terms restricted to the physical world (teleological stance) may encourage 
‘manipulative’ behaviours such as self-cutting, since only actions with a physical 
impact are seen as capable of altering the mental state of self and others.  
 
54 
 
The aim of therapy is therefore to restore the client’s mentalising capacity by focusing 
on his moment-to-moment state of mind, and in particular by: ‘mentalising the 
transference’, i.e. validating and exploring the client’s transference feelings; recognising 
the contribution of the therapist to enactments of the transference; developing 
collaborative interpretations; and presenting an alternative perspective. This approach 
has had encouraging results in alleviating symptoms of BPD, including self-injury 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2008; Bateman & Fonagy, 2009).  
 
Psychosocial approaches  
 
While recognising the importance of personal factors and histories in driving self-
injury, psychosocial approaches point to the importance of context. For these authors, 
self-injury ‘speaks of an individual’s pain and struggle. It also tells of the social, 
cultural, and political circumstances in which they and we find ourselves’ (Babiker & 
Arnold, 1997, p.144). 
 
Anna Motz (2001) points to the impact of institutional dynamics, and the way in which 
incarceration, whether in a prison or on a psychiatric ward, may act as a trigger for 
repeated self-injury by replicating earlier conditions of humiliation and powerlessness. 
Rather than accept the language of psychopathology and see self-injury as indicative of 
an underlying disorder, as is often the case in the so-called medical model, we should 
recognise the deeper meaning and communicative function of self-injury, and the social 
and cultural context in which it takes place.  
 
Feminist approaches to self-injury represent another significant contribution. Pointing to 
the recorded prevalence of the behaviour among women, feminist authors propose that 
‘self-injury reflects girls’ and women’s experiences of relational and cultural violations, 
silencing, and objectification’ (Shaw, 2002, p.192). Reduced to silence by the 
surrounding social and cultural norms, women can only express their psychological 
distress through bodily enactment. Yet instead of acknowledging and engaging with the 
meaning thus inscribed, professionals too often ignore or distort it, for instance 
diagnosing a personality disorder, thus replicating the very conditions that gave birth to 
the behaviour. This is hardly surprising since conceptualisations of mental illness and 
ideas about women’s place in society are products of the same cultural milieu.  
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Feminist therapists therefore reject the pathologisation of self-injury, preferring to see it 
as a coping strategy, a means of self-expression, and in some cases a form of self-
empowerment, the meaning of which must be explored and understood. Crucially, given 
that self-injury often develops against a background of coercion and interpersonal 
violence, the therapist will avoid imposing her own agenda and will not make 
eliminating the behaviour a goal of therapy unless the client specifically wishes it to be 
so (Brown & Bryan, 2007).   
 
Recent work on the sociology of self-injury further challenges the medical, pathological 
model, claiming that thanks to sub-cultural and interactional venues (e.g., online support 
groups), a growing number of self-injuring individuals has come to regard the behaviour 
as an acceptable - albeit deviant- coping strategy and means of expression, even a 
lifestyle choice (Adler & Adler, 2007).  
 
There is thus no ‘model’ of self-injury but a wide array of approaches placing varying 
emphasis on biological, functional, cognitive, unconscious, social and cultural factors, 
and in the process painting the picture of a complex, multi-layered behaviour.  
 
1.3 Understanding self-injury: towards an exploration of individual meanings 
 
‘self-injury is a language which we as helpers are called upon to comprehend in 
all its meanings’ (Babiker & Arnold, 1997, p.144) 
 
1.3.1 From function to meaning: the perspective of the self-injuring individual 
 
One point on which most if not all of those working on and with self-injury seem to 
agree, is the need to engage with the behaviour at the phenomenological level in order 
to gain greater understanding of the way it presents in the therapy room. Following in 
the footsteps of psychoanalytic writers, whose case-studies from Freud onwards 
documented the outer and inner worlds of their self-injuring analysands, qualitative 
researchers have therefore sought to provide a more intimate picture of self-injury, one 
in which meanings rather than prevalence, functions or aetiology would form the focal 
point. To do so, they have employed a wide variety of methods (Table 1.1).  
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Table 1.1: Qualitative research into the meaning of self-injury for the individual 
engaging in the behaviour: examples 
 
Study Method Data Participants 
Schoppmann et al. 
(2007) 
hermeneutic 
phenomenological 
observations, 
interviews, emails 
5 female interviewees 
aged 18 to 35 
Russell, Moss & 
Miller (2010) 
hermeneutic 
phenomenological 
repeat interviews 4 men aged 37 to 58 
Rao (2006) phenomenological interviews 6 women 
Crouch & Wright 
(2004) 
IPA interviews 6 male and female in-
patients aged 12 to 16 
Adams, Rodham & 
Gavin. (2005) 
IPA interviews, online 
focus groups, emails 
22 men and women, 
aged 16 to 26 
Alexander & Clare 
(2004) 
IPA interviews 16 lesbian or bisexual 
women aged 18 to 50 
Sinclair & Green 
(2005) 
narrative interviews 12 women and 8 
men, aged 16 to 48 
Walker (2009) narrative interviews 4 women 
Huband & Tantam 
(2004) 
grounded theory interviews 10 women aged 21 to 
48 
Reece (2005) grounded theory interviews 9 women  
Harris (2000) content analysis letters 6 women aged 20 to 
45 
Rissanen, Kylmä & 
Laukkanen (2008) 
content analysis written self-
descriptions 
69 female and one 
male, aged 12 to 21 
 
 
These studies have further illustrated the multifunctional nature of self-injury, and its 
individual variability. The phenomenological exploration of the meaning of self-injury 
also revealed previously overlooked aspects of the behaviour, for instance the role of 
social identity in accounting for the spread and maintenance of self-injury on an 
adolescent unit (Crouch & Wright, 2004); the way external signs of self-injury can take 
over one’s sense of self (Walker, 2009); the existence of different experiential pathways 
to cutting (Huband & Tantam, 2004); or that of a dynamic around vulnerability in self-
injuring men (Russell, Moss, & Miller, 2010). More generally, qualitative research 
confirmed that the men and women using self-injury made sense of their experience. 
They saw it as neither random nor irrational, but as a behaviour imbued with 
significance within the context of their personal and social history. 
 
What these ‘unitary’ approaches could not capture however was the multi-layered 
meaning-making process surrounding the phenomenon. Any of these studies’ 
participants could arguably have contributed different insights had they been recruited 
elsewhere; where one study identified a narrative of chaos, another could have brought 
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out symbolic overspill or a theme of secrecy. Meaning-making is neither a linear nor a 
unidimensional process: different narratives can coexist around a given experience, 
narratives which the narrator will bring forth, even combine, in response to particular 
internal states and external circumstances. It is this plurality of meanings that the 
present research tried to engage with. 
 
1.3.2 Aims of the research 
 
Having reached the end of this brief review of the existing literature, it is time to 
summarize its main conclusions and how they informed this study.  
 
First, self-injury comes across as a complex and multidetermined behaviour influenced 
by a wide range of biological, psychological, social and cultural factors, something that 
theories and measures of non-suicidal self-injury are only beginning to address (Nock, 
2009). Should an encompassing model of the behaviour ever be developed, its 
usefulness for therapeutic practice could still be questioned given the highly individual 
meaning attached to his or her self-harming by each client, meaning which, some have 
argued, must be discovered anew in each therapeutic encounter (Turp, 2002). It is this 
individual meaning that was the focus of the present research project, and more 
precisely the ways in which someone engaging in repetitive self-injury may construct 
and convey his or her unique experience, leading to the following research question: 
how does an individual with a history of self-injury make sense of his/her behaviour? 14 
 
Crucially, using the term ‘make sense’ opened up not one but several lines of enquiry, 
including for instance: phenomenological (making sense of the lived experience of self-
injury ‘in the moment’); autobiographical (making sense of the self-harming behaviour 
in the context of one’s history); and constructionist (making sense of self-injury in the 
context of broader social, political or cultural paradigms). One could also distinguish 
between making sense to self and to others; and between making sense deliberately and 
making sense unintentionally (the latter involving, for instance, unconscious dynamics). 
Rather than focusing on one reading of the meaning-making process taking place 
                                                          
14
 It is worth acknowledging here that an emphasis on ‘making sense’ can be seen as problematic. Frosh 
(2007) in particular argues that qualitative researchers may need to capture and reflect both the 
fragmentation of subjective experience and the limitations of language. 
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around self-injury, this research intended to explore several of these dimensions and 
ultimately to juxtapose them, thus providing a new, multi-layered understanding of the 
experience of self-injury in the hope that it would inform the practice of counselling 
psychology and inspire further research into the phenomenon. To that aim it adopted a 
pluralistic qualitative approach, and it is to this approach, and to other methodological 
considerations, that the next chapter turns. 
 
1.4 First reflections 
 
My interest in self-injury stemmed from a broader engagement with the rather diffuse 
field of emotions and emotional coping. While studying for a master in child 
development I had completed a dissertation on the possible role of trait emotional 
intelligence in ‘protecting’ adolescents from the psychological impact of adverse life 
events. I had later taken the opportunity afforded in the D.Psych. to write a literature 
review on the construct of emotion regulation, and how emotion regulation skills 
training could be used therapeutically. It seemed almost a natural progression to focus 
on a behaviour widely seen as a way to cope with unbearable emotions.  
 
However I was determined to approach this topic from a qualitative perspective. My 
previous use of quantitative methods had left me dissatisfied, and I hoped my doctoral 
research would thus parallel, and deepen, the relational and reflexive dimensions of my 
clinical work. Having first encountered the approach during a seminar at university, I 
was also excited by the possibilities of pluralistic qualitative research when it came to 
exploring psychological disorders. 
 
Although I had never self-harmed, I had worked therapeutically with several clients 
who did, and I was therefore wary of imposing their story or my reactions to and 
interpretation of it, onto the interviewee’s experience. Nor should my own story, and 
ways of coping with strong emotions, impinge. This would mean first of all opening up 
space for the interviewee’s story through a flexible and sensitive use of the interview 
schedule; and second adopting an open stance should questions arise regarding my 
own experience (or lack thereof) so as to establish the sort of collaborative, non-
hierarchical relationship so crucial to a project of this nature. Of course, the balance 
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between facilitative openness and impinging self-disclosure would need to be carefully 
thought through. 
 
Reflexivity also meant remaining aware of my own distinct identity as a middle-aged, 
middle-class, white French mother of two trying to make sense of another woman’s 
experience. To that aim I kept a reflexive journal, in which I recorded my immediate 
thoughts and experiences throughout the project. This helped me better delineate my 
own material, and keep it separate from that being contributed by the respondent. 
Keeping a journal also helped me reflect on the research process itself, with its 
complex, and to me very new, methodology. Given my background in international 
political economy, with its strong positivist outlook, I expected this qualitative project to 
be challenging as well as enriching, and I wanted to record my struggles and 
satisfactions with honesty. 
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2. Method  
 
2.1 A pluralistic qualitative approach 
 
2.1.1 Rationale for a pluralistic qualitative approach 
 
The project adopted a pluralistic qualitative approach. The assumption behind this 
relatively new approach to qualitative research is that people’s experiences are 
multidimensional; achieving a more holistic understanding of the way these experiences 
are described therefore requires the adoption of multiple theoretical and methodological 
frameworks (Frost, 2011; Chamberlain, Cain, Sheridan & Dupuis, 2011).  
 
That different qualitative lenses will bring forth different aspects of qualitative research 
data is well known. In an effort to illustrate the value of qualitative work for systemic 
research, Burck (2005) for instance used grounded theory, narrative analysis and 
discourse analysis to explore interview material on the experiences of speaking more 
than one language, producing a rich mix of insights underpinned by a social 
constructionist framework.  
 
However more recent work deliberately sets out to combine different theories and 
methodologies, both to capture multi-layered phenomena more fully, and to achieve 
greater methodological rigour via triangulation. Nollaig Frost’s pioneering work for 
instance crossed several models of narrative analysis to build a fuller account of one 
woman’s experience of her second pregnancy, each of her interpretations contributing a 
new layer of understanding (Frost, 2009). In the process she was able to extract more 
meaning from the text, outlining both spoken and unspoken ‘sense-making’. 
Interestingly, while she followed each of her models rigorously, she also showed how 
one could jump from one to the other before reaching the point of saturation in order to 
explore the questions raised by each interpretative layer, enabling the researcher to 
follow (and acknowledge) her particular interests. This mix of rigour and flexibility is 
further emphasized by Carla Willig: 
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Pluralistic qualitative research provides researchers with an opportunity to 
engage in theory-driven, ‘prescriptive’ styles of analysis and to generate 
‘suspicious’ interpretations whilst remaining committed to the tentativeness, 
openness and explorative orientation associated with a hermeneutics of 
meaning-recollection. (Willig, 2012, p.163) 
 
Pluralistic qualitative approaches may thus offer a middle ground between prescriptive 
methodological blueprints and fluid, ‘methodology-free’ research, a way for even 
relatively inexperienced qualitative researchers to let their creativity and curiosity 
follow their course without sacrificing methodological rigour.15  Crucially here, they 
also resonate with counselling psychology’s pluralistic orientation (Kasket, 2012). 
However these approaches place heavy demands on the researcher in terms of 
reflexivity, and this at two levels: that of the researcher who must, in typical qualitative 
fashion, continuously query her motivations, assumptions and social positioning; and 
that of the approaches themselves, since these must be held in tension throughout 
(Nolas, 2011). 
 
Still, a pluralistic methodology seemed uniquely suited to a project driven by a vision of 
self-injury as a hyphenated phenomenon, taking on different meanings in different 
contexts, even for a single individual. By combining different interpretative approaches, 
I hoped to build a fuller phenomenological picture of the behaviour, one that would not 
privilege a particular reading of the meaning-making process from the outset, but 
explore several of the ways in which a given individual might construct sense around a 
practice open to so many personal and social interpretations.    
 
2.1.2 Choosing the approaches: IPA, narrative and psychosocial 
 
The same interview was therefore analysed using three different qualitative ‘lenses’: 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA); narrative analysis; and a psychosocial 
approach. Of key interest was the way in which these different approaches might create 
distinct yet complementary layers of meaning, thus enabling the researcher to better 
capture the complexity and multidimensionality of self-injury.   
                                                          
15
 For arguments in favour of methodology-free qualitative research, see Chamberlain (2012).  
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The risk of dissonance between such epistemologically distinct approaches was real. 
For instance, whereas IPA and narrative analysis attempt to illuminate further the 
meaning already offered by the participant, thus gaining a richer understanding of the 
phenomenon being considered, the psychosocial approach, in line with its discursive 
and psychoanalytical grounding, seeks to look ‘under the skin’, to explain what is 
‘really’ going on (Hollway & Jefferson, 2005).  
 
However there were points of epistemological and methodological convergence 
between these qualitative approaches which, it was hoped, would permit the emergence 
of an integrated outcome, maybe even allow for a form of ‘theoretical triangulation’ 
(Frost & Nolas, 2011). First and foremost they all shared an interest in subjective 
experience and in the influence of sociocultural processes thereon. Further, all three 
paid close attention to language as the key to meaning-making and identity, and 
proponents of all three had consequently engaged in the analysis of narratives, seen as a 
prime means of interpretative enquiry. Thirdly, all three made use of the idiographic 
method, and of semi-structured interviews. Last, they all placed a strong emphasis on 
researcher reflexivity. It is also worth noting that the psychosocial approach is itself 
already pluralistic.  
 
2.1.3 Epistemological stance 
 
Still, the epistemological position underlying each approach required careful 
consideration. So did the adoption of an overall stance to give the work more coherence, 
and to help guide methodological and interpretative choices. A postmodernist position 
was briefly considered (Nolas, 2011). However such a stance did not chime with my 
own approach to knowledge, either as a researcher or as a practitioner. I was aware that 
my participant’s account of her experience would be shaped by language, history and 
culture, as would my analysis of it, making direct access to ‘how it was for her’ an 
illusory pursuit. But I also believed that the interpretative work could produce some 
insight into her subjective experience of self-injury, and most importantly, her sense-
making around it. 
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I therefore decided to adopt a position of contextual constructionism: assuming that 
knowledge is necessarily local, provisional and situational, but that there is such a thing 
as a phenomenon, and that the same phenomenon can be fruitfully approached by using 
different perspectives (Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 2000). Crucially, as contextual 
constructionism sees all accounts as imbued with subjectivity, alternative interpretations 
need not invalidate each other. However this stance requires that the researcher finds 
some grounding for her results, either in the participant’s account or, adopting a position 
closer to that of critical realism, in the social practices that underlie the account. 
Because the researcher’s input into the interpretative work is itself context-dependent, it 
is also essential that she openly states the factors that may have influence her position, 
be they demographic or theoretical. The implications of this epistemological stance for 
the multi-layered approach adopted here, and in particular the issue of validation, are 
revisited in chapter 6. 
 
2.1.4 Expectations and validity issues 
 
At the onset of the project it was anticipated that each of the interpretative lenses used 
would produce a different picture of what repetitive self-injury meant to the participant. 
Using the IPA lens would produce phenomenological insight: a ‘fresh’, here-and-now 
take on the quality, meaning and significance of the lived experience of self-harm as 
offered by the interviewee and understood by the researcher. The narrative analysis 
would, it was hoped, contribute a reflection on the role of language and sequencing in 
meaning-making, by showing how the experience of self-injury had been structured and 
conveyed to become part of the participant’s life story. Last, the psychosocial work 
would combine a discursive and a psychoanalytical reading of the text to produce a 
‘thick’ interpretation articulating past events and current self- or other-positioning 
(Gough, 2009). 
 
Whether the three pictures thus drawn would complement or challenge one another 
remained an open question however, and a crucial one. For instance, the very process of 
‘revealing’ underlying dynamics through a psychosocial reading may end up 
undermining the more immediate meaning framed using IPA. More generally, the 
cornucopia of qualitative insights thus generated may confuse rather than help the 
practising counselling psychologist trying to form a richer understanding of self-harm as 
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experienced by his client, calling into question the pragmatic value of combining 
different interpretative strategies (Williams & Morrow, 2009).  
 
2.2 Ethical considerations 
 
Given the intensely private nature of the material to be collected (and maybe put in the 
public domain through publication), ethics required particular attention. 
 
A first way to approach this issue was to be mindful of professional guidelines as 
regards informed consent, debriefing, confidentiality and protection of the participants 
(British Psychological Society, 2010). This entailed explaining the purpose and method 
of the project, and making sure the interviewee was comfortable with the number, 
length and nature of the interviews. Confidentiality also needed careful consideration, 
especially if sections of the interview were to be reproduced in print and biographical 
details incorporated into the analysis.16 A written agreement, signed by both researcher 
and participant, would provide informed consent and allow future use of the interviews. 
 
The potential psychological impact of the interview also needed acknowledging. The 
consequences of giving an in-depth interview on self-injury and associated memories 
had to be thought through well in advance, and every effort made to ensure the 
participant received appropriate support if needed. It was also important to make clear 
from the outset that the interview would constitute a research, and not a therapeutic, 
encounter. This meant monitoring the exchange closely, and ensuring that neither my 
participant nor I slipped into a different mode of relating, as this might generate 
unbidden emotional changes and interfere with the subjective relating of the experience 
itself (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008). 
 
Ultimately it was hoped that by shining multiple lights on the experience of one 
individual the project would contribute to the better understanding and treatment of a 
behaviour often seen as particularly challenging from a therapeutic viewpoint, thus 
indirectly benefiting the participant and others (Turp, 1999; Reece, 2005; Long & 
Jenkins, 2010). However with qualitative research comes a moral obligation to factor in 
                                                          
16
 This involved altering the biographical details provided in the final write-up in a way that maintained 
the integrity of the interpretation while protecting the identity of the participant.  
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the privacy and dignity of the participant’s experience, and this would need attending to 
throughout the project. 
 
2.3 Data collection and analysis 
 
2.3.1 Sampling and recruitment 
 
The decision to focus on a single case was taken for pragmatic and conceptual reasons. 
Both the depth of analysis envisaged and the constraints of a 3-year professional 
doctorate made it difficult to consider multiple participants. However in-depth case-
study research also presents unique strengths, including the production of concrete, 
context-dependent knowledge and that of rich narratives, both of which seem essential 
to learning about a phenomenon (Flyvbjerg, 2006). This may be of particular relevance 
to counselling psychologists who, like health psychologists and others, draw on research 
to inform a clinical practice (Radley & Chamberlain, 2001). The adoption of a single 
case design thus met both the practical and the professional requirements of counselling 
psychology training.  
 
Since this project relied on a single case, the selection of the participant needed careful 
consideration. Much of the existing literature has focused on adolescents, known to be 
at particular risk of self-injury (Klonsky & Muelenkamp, 2007). However, interviewing 
a minor requires gaining informed consent from both the respondent and his or her legal 
guardian. By the same token, while there is evidence that self-harm is rife in forensic 
settings (HM Prison Service, 2011), working with incarcerated individuals raises both 
legal and ethical issues. For these reasons, a decision was made to involve an adult not 
in incarceration.  
 
A further issue for consideration concerned whether the presence of a clinical diagnosis 
should be made an exclusion criterion. As was mentioned above, a substantial 
proportion of individuals engaging in self-injury present comorbid disorders. The 
possible impact of these additional difficulties and of the diagnostic labels themselves, 
on the participant’s subjective experience therefore needed to be considered. So did the 
ethical implications of working with such fragile individuals. On the other hand 
excluding a potential respondent on the basis of a previous diagnosis would mean 
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accepting at face value both the specific diagnostic label and the pathologisation of the 
self-injurious behaviour, thus compromising the ontological stance of the project. In the 
end the presence or absence of a clinical diagnosis was not made into a selection 
criterion. 
 
Last, because one of the foci of the research concerned the interviewee’s self-
constructed history of injurious behaviour, selecting an individual with several years of 
self-injuring seemed more appropriate; recruiting someone who was still engaging in 
the behaviour might further ensure greater ease of access into the experience. These 
criteria were reflected in the phrasing of the recruitment flyer (Appendix B). 
 
To recruit a participant several online self-harm forums were approached after ethical 
clearance had been gained, and flyers posted in a London university, with plans for 
posting in several more. However a couple of weeks into the recruitment phase of the 
project a volunteer came forward through another City University student. That student, 
then in her third year, had been researching the same area, and had already recruited a 
sufficient number of participants through an online self-harm forum; when a new 
volunteer came forward, eager to contribute, she agreed to ask the second year cohort. I 
immediately forwarded my information sheet to her (Appendix C), and the volunteer, 
Tina, made contact by email. 17  A brief email exchange followed, in which I further 
introduced myself, checked that she was of age, and offered to answer any question she 
may have. I also flagged the potentially upsetting nature of the interviewing process. 
We agreed on a place and time for the first of what I explained would be a series of two 
to three interviews. 
 
2.3.2 Interviews 
 
The interview material had to be of sufficient length and richness to provide the basis 
for multiple analyses. I therefore planned to carry out at least two semi-structured 
interviews lasting between one hour and one hour and a half, the latter providing an 
opportunity to explore the themes emerging from the former in the context of a deeper, 
                                                          
17
 All names and identifying details have been altered to ensure participant confidentiality. 
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and therefore more trusting relationship between interviewer and interviewee (Roulston, 
2010).  
 
An interview schedule was developed that would provide enough flexibility to remain 
‘interviewee-centred’, yet also some direction so that enough data could be collected on 
immediate experience of self-injury, past history around the behaviour, and biographical 
details (see Appendix D). Each of the interview questions was evaluated along three 
dimensions: thematic (how relevant is it to the theme of the research); dynamic (how 
might it contribute to a good interview interaction); and ethical (Kvale, 1996). The same 
principles applied to the preliminary ordering of the questions, with questions thought 
likely to be experienced as more ‘probing’ left for the latter part of the interviewing 
process. 
 
In the end three interviews were carried out with Tina, at weekly intervals, reflecting her 
willingness to share her experience and the richness of her material. The interviews took 
place at City University, in the room normally used by the staff of the psychology clinic 
where I was then working as a trainee. This location gave me greater control over risk 
management. The room also provided a comfortable, private space, well suited for 
discussing personal material. However this location meant that the interviews would 
take place on my ‘territory’, tilting the balance of power in my favour, with potential 
impact on the content and interpretation of the interview material. The fact that I was 
also using that room in my work with clients created an added difficulty: I would have 
to be extra careful not to slip into therapeutic mode. To assist in that aim, I deliberately 
rearranged the seating prior to each interview. 
 
2.3.3 Participant well-being 
 
Prior to the first interview, a consent form was read and signed by both of us, each of us 
retaining a copy (Appendix E). Tina was also given the contact details of organisations 
providing support for self-harming individuals (Appendix F). Interestingly, not only 
was she already familiar with them; she had also made her own arrangements for 
‘keeping safe’ after the interview, scheduling a meeting with her social worker at 
lunchtime. At the start of our second and third interviews, the resource sheet was 
produced again, and I enquired about Tina’s schedule for the day. Each time she 
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confirmed that she had set up a meeting with her social worker, partly to help herself 
through the day should she feel upset after the interview.  
 
Still, knowing that Tina had received a diagnosis of BPD and was still self-injuring 
made me acutely aware of her potential vulnerability. At the beginning of each 
interview Tina was reminded that the process would last up to one hour and thirty 
minutes, depending on how she felt, and that she could ask for an interruption at any 
time by word or hand gesture (she never did). During the interview itself Tina’s state of 
mind was constantly monitored through careful observation. Twice, when she appeared 
distressed, this was acknowledged and I asked her if she wanted to pause. Both times 
she opted to continue. At the end of each interview I asked Tina how she felt and what 
her experience of the interview had been like. Each time she explained how helpful it 
was to her to talk about her experience, and how she had surprised herself with her 
loquacity and self-understanding. This was reiterated in the confirmation emails that 
were exchanged prior to the second and third interviews. 
 
Particular care was also taken with the ending, on the ground that researchers have an 
ethical responsibility to ‘invest as much care and attention into negotiating the ending of 
a research project as they would into negotiating access at the start of the study’ 
(McLeod, 2004, p.176). When a third meeting was arranged, it was made clear that it 
would be the last one; and at the end of the third interview, time was spent discussing 
how it felt, for Tina, to have come for the last time, and reflecting on what may have 
been the difficulties and the gains from contributing to the research project.  
 
2.3.4 Transcription and analysis 
 
In preparation for the psychosocial analysis I used my reflexive journal to record 
immediate impressions and countertransference reactions in the hours immediately 
following each of the interviews. However a decision was made not to transcribe, or 
even listen to, the previous interview before carrying out the next. I was aware of the 
risks involved: an opportunity for probing more deeply might be lost, and relying on my 
sole recollections might make the second and third interviews more ‘interviewer-driven’ 
(Flowers, 2008). But I wanted to keep a (relatively) open mind every time, without 
letting the mood and content of our previous encounter weigh too heavily. As a result I 
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limited my preparation to reading my process notes and reorganising the interview 
guide. In hindsight, I believe it was the right decision: given the short interval between 
two meetings (a week), notes and questions were sufficient for me to recall key 
information, yet parsimonious enough not to overshadow the forthcoming encounter. 
 
I carried out the transcription of the tapes in the fortnight following the last interview, to 
ensure maximum recall of context as well as verbal and non-verbal communications. 
Because of the nature of the interpretative work to be carried out, the approach chosen 
was to transcribe in detailed verbatim form, and to include the emotional tone of the 
conversation wherever possible, including pauses, sighs and so on. Confidentiality was 
maintained by anonymising the data immediately upon transcription, and by using 
pseudonyms to protect the identity of the participant throughout. The consent form was 
kept separately from the data, under lock and key; and the data itself was password-
protected and kept in a locked filing cabinet when not in use.  
 
Once transcribed in full, the interviews were analysed using each of the aforementioned 
approaches in turn, with breaks between segments of interpretative work so that I could 
return to the text with (relatively) fresh eyes. The sequence to be followed was given 
due consideration, and a decision was made to use IPA first, narrative analysis second 
and psychosocial analysis last, in an effort to protect potential phenomenological 
insights from ‘contamination’ by more constructed, theory-led interpretations. I also 
decided to work on all three interviews as a block, only moving to another interpretative 
lens once I was satisfied that I had extracted sufficient meaning from the whole series. 
This was to preserve the coherence of Tina’s overall narrative, as elaborated over a 
relatively short span of time (three weeks). However I took care to respect the 
sequencing of Tina’s material, so as not to miss possible repetitions, amplifications, 
contradictions or reservations from one week to the next.  
 
Each time a rigorous approach was followed as regards the steps of the analysis and the 
types of questions to be considered, in line with the methodological guidelines 
identified as most appropriate in the course of the literature survey. Further details 
regarding the analytical process used for each of the three approaches are given in the 
next three chapters. Last, Figure 2.1 provides select biographical details on Tina, so the 
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reader can better engage with the content of the interpretations. As already mentioned, 
these were altered to preserve anonymity.  
 
Figure 2.1: Select biographical details on the participant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Reflections on data collection 
 
The speed and ease of the recruitment process took me by surprise, and left me in a 
state of mixed relief and anxiety lest Tina suddenly pulled out. Learning that she had 
received a diagnosis of BPD was another source of concern. I was reassured to hear 
that she had received treatment and was still under the care of a psychologist. I was 
also relieved when she explained that she had made her own arrangements for 
safekeeping after each interview. It felt almost as if Tina was taking charge, which 
helped me challenge my initial sense of her as a helpless woman, and my fear that the 
interview might ‘push her over the edge’. Still, I remained mindful of her difficulties 
throughout, and of my responsibility as researcher to take every precaution to ensure 
her well-being.  
 
The interviews themselves were very rewarding. Over the three weeks Tina and I 
developed good rapport. Relieved of my therapeutic responsibilities I was able to truly 
listen, and felt that I was opening up a wide space for her, wider than with many of my 
clients. I tried to use the interview schedule in a flexible manner, rearranging my 
questions every week to suit our progress and following up on her associations 
whenever possible. At times I found myself worrying that the material would not be rich 
or ‘original’ enough. But I made a conscious effort to stay with the process, and to let 
Tina was a 35 year old white female, of Irish catholic background. She had 
been raised by her mother and father, one of six children, and reportedly 
abused by her father. 
 
Though she described having self-harmed from an early age, it is only in her 
teenage years that Tina’s self-injuring became known, after she shot herself in 
the shoulder. A first hospitalisation followed. 
 
Tina was and in out of psychiatric units through her twenties, having received a 
diagnosis of borderline personality disorder. At the time of the interviews she 
had been living on her own for three years. 
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Tina lead the way in a manner that would feel safe for her. I also tried to pay close 
attention to my own reactions to Tina’s material, both during and after the interviews. 
 
The ending felt timely and well prepared, if ever so slightly sad. I was thankful for 
Tina’s time and openness, and I expressed this in a card which I gave her at the close of 
our final interview, together with the promised M&S voucher. After walking her back to 
the entrance one final time, I wondered if she would get in touch again. She did not. 
 
The transcription work took five days. As I listened to the tapes I was keenly aware of 
starting a journey away from the live encounter, and of making choices regarding 
format and the use of punctuation to signify non-verbal information that would alter the 
material. Although the dynamic of the interviews had involved both of us, the fact that I 
was now in command made me a true ‘co-author’ of Tina’s narrative, a daunting but 
exciting shift. After printing out all three interviews, ready for analysis, I took a break 
of several weeks, further weakening the link between interviews and material, and in the 
process achieving a distance from the text which I hoped would enable me to carry out 
the three distinct segments of my work with greater clarity of intent. 
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3. IPA reading 
 
This chapter presents the first of three segments of interpretative work around Tina’s 
material, using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) to address the question 
at the centre of this work: how does someone engaging in repetitive self-injury make 
sense of her behaviour? In a first section I outline the approach taken, briefly 
introducing IPA, exploring its relevance to this particular project, and detailing the 
analytical method followed. I then review the results of the analysis, before drawing on 
the existing literature to query their significance. A short section relaying my experience 
of using IPA concludes. 
 
3.1 The approach 
 
3.1.1 Choosing interpretative phenomenological analysis18 
 
Interpretative phenomenological analysis is concerned with exploring the lived 
experience of research participants. True to its phenomenological roots, IPA calls for a 
bracketing of scientific constructs to focus on subjective experience, conceived as ‘a 
lived process, an unfurling of perspectives and meanings, which are unique to the 
person’s embodied and situated relationship to the world’ (Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 
2009, p.21). At the same time, its grounding in hermeneutics makes IPA explicitly 
interpretative: the researcher is asked to develop a new perspective on the participant’s 
experience by using detailed iterative analysis, and by developing an awareness of her 
own preconceptions. The latter point is of particular import, and refers to the ‘double 
hermeneutic’ of the analytical process, since ‘The participants are trying to make sense 
of their world; the researcher is trying to make sense of the participants trying to make 
sense of their world’ (Smith & Osborn, 2003, p.53). Last, IPA is concerned with the 
particular. It advocates thorough, systematic analysis and a focus on individual 
understandings of particular phenomena in particular contexts. This idiographic 
approach makes IPA especially welcoming of case studies in psychological research 
(e.g., Eatough & Smith, 2006).  
                                                          
18
 Lack of space prevents a fuller description of the philosophical, theoretical and methodological 
dimensions of IPA. In what is perhaps the best known précis in the field, Smith, Flowers and Larkin 
(2009) provide a comprehensive overview. 
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All three sensibilities made IPA eminently suitable here. First, the diversity of practice 
and multiple meanings attached to self-injurious behaviour seemed to lend themselves 
particularly well to the use of a phenomenological approach, as evidenced by previous 
studies (see Table 1.1). Of particular interest was the way in which an IPA reading 
might encompass both cognitive sense-making and more unfocused, ‘edge of 
awareness’ aspects of Tina’s subjective experience (Willig, 2008). As a counselling 
psychologist in training I was also mindful of the need to pay close attention to my own 
set of thoughts and beliefs around the subject, and to how they may colour both my 
interaction with Tina and the analysis itself. IPA’s insistence on rigorous interpretation 
therefore seemed wholly appropriate. Last, the project would focus on a sole case. The 
fact that IPA seemed an especially popular methodology among qualitative researchers 
and counselling psychology trainees further increased its appeal, as it might give the 
work added relevance. 
 
3.1.2 Methodological considerations 
 
From a methodological standpoint, this first, IPA reading of the transcript largely 
followed the suggestions of Smith and his associates (2009), adapting them to suit the 
demands of a single case and my own sense of ease with alternative techniques.  
 
The interviews were treated as one set of data. Each of them was analysed in turn, and 
in similar stages: a first reading was carried out whilst listening to the tape, so as to 
recapture more of the mood and flow of the interview. At that stage only skeleton 
descriptive comments were produced in the right margin, outlining what seemed to be 
especially salient points for the interviewee and querying their meaning in a tentative, 
free-flowing fashion. These were revisited and expanded upon during a second, line-by-
line reading of the text, and initial themes tentatively identified in the left margin of the 
script, to capture the essence of a particular extract in a succinct and more conceptual 
set of words. In a third reading those themes that failed to speak directly to the research 
question were bracketed out, and the relevance of the remaining themes was checked 
once more against the participant’s wording (see the extract in Appendix G).  
 
The salient emergent themes were then ‘extracted’ and tentatively mapped so as to 
identify overarching, superordinate themes; in the process connections were drawn 
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between the themes, and a few of them discarded as they became subsumed under 
others. For the first interview, this was done using a simple chronological list and 
rearranging its component parts on paper until distinct constellations emerged; for the 
second interview, and in an attempt to keep the analytical process fresh, the themes 
were copied onto separate pieces of paper and rearranged in visual clusters; by the third 
interview, using a list had come up as the most congenial means of abstracting 
superordinate themes, and this method was used again. Attention was also paid to how 
linguistic elements (e.g., choice of metaphors, repetitions) might further support a 
particular theme. 
 
Throughout, my own preconceptions regarding the functions and meanings of self-
injury, and how the behaviour may tie in with the symptoms and aetiology of borderline 
personality disorder, were held in awareness. Efforts were also made to bracket 
emerging themes so as to approach each stage of the analysis with an open mind. 
However it is important to acknowledge that my fore-structures were inevitably 
modified as the work unfolded. This may account, at least in part, for the perceived fit 
between the superordinate themes initially identified around the first interview, and the 
constituents themes listed under the second and third interviews. Still, given that the 
research bore on a single case, this was in keeping with IPA’s idiographic commitment.   
 
A list of superordinate themes and themes was then produced for each of the interviews 
(Appendix H), in which each of the themes was linked with one or more specific quotes 
from the text. A table further summarised the themes and superordinate themes 
identified across the interviews, so as to provide a thematic map of the overall material 
and further guide the writing-up process (Appendix I).  
 
Although carried out within the limits of the above mentioned double hermeneutics, the 
analysis that follows is thus the result of a deep, reflexive engagement with the 
interview material. It followed the hermeneutic circle model of the research process, 
moving back and forth between words, sentences and the transcript as a whole; and it 
was carefully documented, with the help of a field journal.  
 
  
75 
 
3.2 The interpretation 
 
3.2.1 Analysis 
 
Over nearly four hours of interview Tina offers a complex and multi-layered account of 
her self-injurious behaviour. In an effort to make sense of her self-harm she weaves 
together several strands of meaning: a descriptive strand, in which she seeks to describe 
and explain the behaviour itself; a first contextual strand, in which she relates her self-
harm to the distress that sits ‘underneath’, itself a reflection of her fragile self; a second 
contextual strand, this time querying the ways both her self-harm and the underlying 
distress may be linked to her experience of the ‘other’; a third, more historical strand 
where she explores the impact of her family experience; and finally a meta-cognitive 
strand, in which she reflects on her growing understanding of, and ability to verbalise, 
her experience of self-harm.  
 
Figure 3.1: Making sense of self-harm: superordinate themes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While these five strands are here presented as distinct superordinate themes, they are 
closely intertwined in practice, for instance when, reflecting on her journey from severe 
self-harm to a more controlled behaviour, Tina explains that 
 
I realised then that I, you know, that uh, the self-harm was just the surface, the 
bit on the surface that other people see, but there is a whole lot more to it 
underneath. 
 
Exploring Tina’s meaning-making process around self-harm therefore meant balancing 
the need for interpretative themes with that to respect the layered nature of her material. 
The result is an analysis in which aspects of her experience are outlined within a 
particular theme and then revisited in the light of another, as a fuller understanding 
1. Self-harm as a way of managing life 
2. What’s underneath: the fragile self 
3. What’s underneath: experiences of the other 
4. What’s underneath: experiences of the family 
5. Developing a new understanding of self and self-harm 
 
76 
 
gradually emerges. As will become apparent below, the theme of control even seems to 
cut across several subordinate and superordinate themes, to the point when its own 
subordinate status may become questionable. However the list of superordinate themes 
proposed here is one that I, as interviewer and researcher, believe best conveys my 
understanding of the nature and complexity of Tina’s attempt to create meaning around 
her self-injury.  
 
SELF-HARM AS A WAY OF MANAGING LIFE 
 
Throughout the three interviews Tina describes and explains her self-harming. In the 
process she builds an intricate picture, in which the many forms, triggers and functions 
of her behaviour are progressively rendered, and its adaptive and problematic 
dimensions clearly outlined.  
 
A multi-faceted, but ever-present, behaviour 
 
One of the first themes to emerge has to do with the variety of her self-harming: minor 
or severe; open or hidden; premeditated or impulsive; deliberate or carried out without 
awareness. What seems to unite what at times almost come across as different 
phenomena is a sense of continuity since, in one form or another, self-harm has always 
been with Tina: 
 
I’ve self-harmed so much over, like, for as long as I can remember, from doing 
little things right up to doing massive things, um… So it’s been a big part of my 
life.  
 
Triggers are similarly disparate: ‘lots of little things that build up’. Still, stress and 
mood play a role, as do recollections, initially presented as ‘things from the past’ and 
later described more explicitly as flashbacks linked to being abused by her father. 
Emotions also figure prominently in Tina’s account, with self-harm seen as an 
automatic response whenever her feelings threaten to engulf her: ‘it’s just, this 
automatic thing, um… you just get from, um… emotion to… to self-harm’. 
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While some of her self-harm is impulsive and at times carried out in a dissociative state, 
Tina describes premeditation as playing an important role. Self-harm then becomes a 
constant, clandestine obsession: 
 
The times when I had to have surgery were the times where the self-harm, um, 
was completely premeditated. I mean I would obsess about it for maybe two 
weeks, um… and…uh.., so I know that a lot of my self-harm isn’t always 
impulsive. Um, I mean, it’s a, it’s a strange state of mind to be in, because 
although you kind of, uh, during those two weeks you have like, um, you know 
you get on with your normal day to day things, um, as if there is absolutely 
nothing wrong with you, but in the background you’ve got this.  
 
Tina’s reference to a ‘strange’, split state of mind is worth emphasizing here; so is the 
‘as if’ quality of her experience, which suggests that a normal front is presented to the 
world while a more problematic, ‘wrong’ phenomenon is actually going on in the 
background. Both are taken up in the next section. 
 
Having control 
 
The ‘how’ can be planned as well as the ‘when’, and a scenario played out again and 
again, giving Tina a precious, indeed essential sense of control: 
 
It’s like I’ve got control over something, and that’s something that I can control.  
 
This repetitive construction suggests more than mere emphasis. Running her scenario 
through her head gives Tina control over ‘something’ at a time when everything seems 
out of control; it also gives her something to control, i.e. something to work on, make 
her own, absorb herself into: 
 
it’s like you’re in this bubble. It’s like, you can… you… you can block 
everything else that’s going on outside but also you could divert your attention 
from how you’re feeling. 
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Tina also compares her self-harm to a Sat-Nav kit, a ‘way to monitor things’, keep 
things in check, maybe not lose herself.  
 
However in the process she often reaches a point where backing out is no longer an 
option: 
 
the strange thing is that, um, as I approach that, that date, then I start getting 
doubts in my head: do I really want to do this? Um... But because I have 
obsessed about it for so long, it’s like: I have to do it. And you know, it’s like: 
no, I made this decision, I have to do it.  
 
By that point Tina often feels that self-harm is the only way out, and she overcomes her 
last minute qualms. It is as if she has entrapped herself: from something she can control, 
self-harm has turned into something that controls her.  
 
‘This awesome sort of rush’ 
 
The act itself is marked by an absence of pain, coupled with an ‘awesome sort of rush’, 
which Tina compares to a rush of adrenaline and describes as a sort of sensory 
awakening, her inner numbness finally dissipating: 
 
during those times when I’ve started to self-harm, like I’m in, like I’ve started to 
cut for example, that I… I start to feel something again, um... I don’t mean like, 
um, any pain in my arm, but there’s this rush, this… There’s something there 
again, that wasn’t here before.  
 
This rush has an ‘addictive element’ to it though, and this pulls her back. Tellingly, the 
theme of self-harm as addiction is present in all three interviews, Tina variously 
drawing parallels between self-harm and drugs, tobacco, and alcohol. Here again, she 
outlines a complex relationship between her and her self-injuring, one in which her 
control over the behaviour is at best questionable.  
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Cutting the bad 
 
The image of Tina as a woman at war with herself also ties in with what she describes 
as the punishment function of her self-injury; the act is then driven by Tina’s self-
hatred, her sense of being ‘a bad person’. During some dissociative episodes this 
struggle takes on a particular, more extreme form: no longer recognising her limbs as 
her own, she tries to sever them:  
 
it’s probably part of why I’ve cut quite deeply on my arms, is that I have this 
sense in me that I want to remove them.  
 
Cutting off the bad, ‘alien’ parts of herself might be seen as a desperate attempt by Tina 
to restore integrity to a compromised self, a theme that will be further developed in the 
next section. However the fact that the act takes place in an altered state of 
consciousness also places it outside her control.  
 
The following extract brings this out even more clearly: 
 
T. it’s just like the time passes and I know when it’s over, and, um, sometimes in 
those times I’ll have self-harmed, um… and, that’s really frustrating for me, 
cause… because… it’s almost like I’m fighting so hard not to do it that maybe 
it’s coming out in another way, and… you know, it’s such a strong, um… pull 
towards it, that I’m doing that unconsciously or something, um… [sighing] 
Um…and that can be really frustrating, um... [sounding tired] yeah… Well more 
than frustrating, um… that’s… 
 
D. More than frustrating. 
 
T. Yeah, it’s… scary, it’s, um… [sighing] It’s anxiety-provoking, um… It’s… in a 
way it kind of makes you, makes me feel crazy. 
 
Here Tina brings out the frustration and anxiety her irrepressible behaviour creates in 
her. The harder she fights her urge to self-harm, the more the behaviour seems to elude 
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her, becoming the product of unconscious, i.e. uncontrollable, forces. Instead of helping 
her feel in control, self-harm can thus expose her at her most out-of-control: ‘crazy’.  
 
Touching the void 
 
Tina’s discussion of the aftermath of cutting or shooting herself stands in stark contrast 
with this image of internal warfare. It is also indicative of how deeply self-harm seems 
embedded into the fabric of her life, this time from an existential perspective. In one of 
the most severe episodes the act is followed by a profound sense of calm as Tina 
contemplates her own death: 
 
T. as I was lying on the floor I was thinking: this is what it’s like to die. And… 
 
D.  And how was that? Was that scary? Comforting? Strange? 
 
T.  It was, I mean I think, maybe to start with it was a little bit scary, and then in 
some way it was, it was almost the most calm I’ve ever felt, um… So… Yeah, 
that’s... yeah… It was almost like: now I’ve got no worries. It was almost like 
that whole chatter in my head just left. 
 
In that moment at least Tina seems to be finally at peace, her stance one of acceptance 
and serenity. Her description of the ‘warm feeling of blood’ she experiences further 
evokes a sense of almost womblike comfort.  
 
Tina’s relationship with death is also an important theme in its own right, suggesting 
fascination and a desire to challenge life’s boundaries: 
 
And quite often it’s… it’s been my head that… I don’t know if I’ve actually had 
this narrative in my head about it but it’s like a feeling maybe, but I’ve had: how 
badly, how close to death can I get, without actually dying? 
 
Significantly, the theme of self-harm as control (over life and death) is again implicit in 
this last extract. Taking her body right to the edge seems a way for Tina to assert 
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ultimate control, perhaps a last resort when her inner life and outer circumstances 
become truly unmanageable. 
 
Communicating distress 
 
In addition to mediating her relation to herself, self-harm is for Tina an essential form of 
communication with others, a way to make them realise how much emotional pain she 
is in. This indeed constitutes one of the most pervasive themes across the interviews. 
Because she cannot convey the magnitude of her distress verbally, Tina communicates 
it through her actions, and her scars: 
 
The scars on my arms they are kind of… almost represent how I feel inside, 
um… They kind of tell… I don’t know, they kind of tell a story or something, 
they sort of… They like… allow other people… For me they allow other people 
to see the magnitude of how difficult things can get. 
 
The term ‘allow’ is worth considering: Tina’s scars are both story and barometer, 
something for others to read if, and only if, they want to understand her better. They 
bring the inside out, but they ‘allow’ rather than force or confront.  
 
Still, underlying her self-harm is a hope that others will react, that she will be helped. 
Behind her first self-inflicted injuries, when as a young child she picked at her nail until 
it fell, was the comforting certainty that the school nurse would fix it; and if her self-
harming gets so severe when staying on hospital ground, it is partly because  
 
in hospital there’s always gonna be someone there to rescue you, um… You 
know there’s always gonna be someone that’s gonna go round and do ticks 
every 15 minutes or half an hour or an hour or whatever, and so… um… for me 
maybe that makes my self-harm even worse. 
 
But self-harm is a flawed mode of communication, one which can too easily be 
distorted by uncomprehending nurses and medics, and turned against Tina. Although 
her act bears ‘no malice’, instead of being heard she is labelled ‘manipulative’, 
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‘attention-seeking’, a ‘time-waster’ or someone who ‘obviously likes pain’. As her 
distress deepens, her self-harm increases: 
 
I already felt bad, I mean I didn’t actually need anyone to, to…say that was a 
bad thing cause I… bad thing… the word ‘bad’ is maybe not the best word that 
is but… I already knew that I wasn’t, and I felt bad about it, I felt guilty about it. 
But then that on top of it… Um, hearing that, this was like: I just feel even worse 
now, you know. And so then you get this cycle where you feel worse after, so 
maybe just to communicate how bad you feel you self-harm again, and it’s just 
like this vicious cycle that it’s really hard to get out of. 
 
There are several important issues to note in this brief extract. As her attempt to 
communicate her pain backfires, Tina’s guilt and distress are compounded by the 
negative, judgmental reaction of others, a theme that will be further explored in the third 
section. Yet this only leads Tina to try harder, in a desperate effort to make others 
realise. Far from being in control, she becomes trapped in a vicious cycle in which self-
injury, despair and the need to be heard seem to feed off each other. 
 
A way of managing life, in and out of hospital 
 
The impact of hospitalization figures prominently in Tina’s narrative. Like self-harm, 
hospital has been an important part of her life, and the two are closely linked in her 
mind. While the triggers and functions of her behaviour are many, being in hospital 
seems to act as a all-round catalyst: it gives Tina a signal that she is at the lowest ebb, 
and has ‘nothing to lose’; it takes away most of her control over her life (even as 
medication takes away whatever control she still has over her thoughts); it means that 
she is surrounded with people who want to know how she feels, so that she just reverts 
to the only way she knows how to express pain; and it offers her an almost fail-proof 
safety net. Being sectioned means self-harming more, as cutting becomes a way of 
managing the pressures of hospital life.  
 
Conversely being out of hospital, like being away from family, coincides with a 
reduction in the behaviour. But self-harm remains a part of her life, something that will 
‘work’ when feelings become unbearable, and more generally a means for her to 
83 
 
manage, sometimes out of awareness, her difficult relationship with herself and with the 
world.  
 
It is a bit like taking a tablet when you’ve got headache, um… You know… 
although it’s the wrong term, you know, it’s not helpful, you know in the short 
term that it does… serve a function, it does do something for you, um… 
especially when the other options are really hard, like talking to someone. 
 
As such, one gets a sense that Tina’s self-harm can neither be completely eliminated, 
nor made sense of in isolation. 
 
WHAT’S UNDERNEATH: THE FRAGILE SELF 
 
In her efforts to understand and explain her self-harm, Tina returns time and again to the 
distress that lies ‘underneath’ it. In doing so, she reveals the many facets of her fragile 
sense of self, and some of the powerful feelings her cutting taps into.  
 
The distress underneath 
 
Just underneath, close to the surface as befits an identifiable trigger, are the ‘flashbacks 
from the past’ that enter her head when she least expects them; then… 
 
Then the bad feeling itself, like the distress itself, um… That almost feels like 
you’re being sucked underground, like you’re just being… the life is being 
drained from you, that, um… One minute you just feel completely like… you… 
you just can’t function to do anything, like make a cup of tea and… and the next 
minute you feel like, um… You know sometimes I’ve this image of, um… like 
these thoughts, like they’re being… pushed into my head, um… and it’s almost 
like there’s so much going in there, um… that there isn’t any room left. 
 
In this short account Tina describes two distinct experiences, which seem to occur in 
rapid succession: being drained of all vitality, ‘sucked underground’, turned into an 
empty, helpless vessel; and then having her mind forcibly filled with thoughts, until 
‘there isn’t any room left’. While seemingly in stark contrast, these experiences both 
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involve a total absence of control on Tina’s part and rather porous boundaries, since her 
life can be ‘drained’ and thoughts ‘pushed into’ her head.  
 
Tina returns to these experiences, and how they relate to her self-injuring, throughout 
the interviews. However along the way she introduces experiential variations, painting a 
complex picture of what may lie ‘underneath’. For instance she speaks of a confusing 
numbness that ‘kind of feels like kind of empty, like an empty shell or something’. Self-
harming then means feeling something again, the rush dispelling the sense of emptiness. 
At times the numbness resembles dissociation: things and people seem ‘strange’ and 
Tina no longer feels connected to reality, or to herself:  
 
it can feel like, you know, I’m not me in a way, like I’m not, like, uh…[pause] 
It’s almost like I’m looking at me.  
 
As already mentioned, at such times she may cut quite deeply what no longer feel like 
her arms.  
 
The numbness can also ‘feel quite powerful’, like a shield around her, a force acting on 
her behalf, making people move out of her way on the main street, and the pedestrian 
light go green as she walks to the traffic lights. The experience tends to be short-lived 
however, and to be followed by ‘this massive nosedive, um, where this rush of 
everything just comes in’. Cutting might offer a way to cope with this onslaught of ‘bad 
stuff’. 
 
The experience of being overwhelmed, filled up, is indeed another theme common to all 
three interviews. Sometimes thoughts are the problem, with Tina’s head ‘flicking’ like a 
late night TV. At other times Tina struggles with a ‘snowball of feelings’, to the point 
that she cannot think ahead and stop herself from cutting. She becomes stuck in time: 
 
see when you get really distressed or really anxious or overwhelmed, you can’t 
think… It’s really really hard to think beyond the next minutes or the next few 
seconds even. It’s like: I can’t stand this any longer, um... So you don’t… it’s 
like you just don’t have this foresight. You don’t have, um… you know, it’s 
really really hard to be able to stop yourself, to say, you know: this time next 
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week I’m gonna have another scar on my arm or, you know, even in a couple of 
hours’ time, I might end up having to go to hospital, and I hate hospitals. But, 
you know, it’s just that, you know, you can’t see past the next few seconds or 
minutes; because it feels like forever. 
 
It is worth noting that Tina’s subjective experience of time and how it frames her self-
harming constitutes a distinct if somewhat elusive ‘theme’ across the interviews, 
whether she refers to the exact moment when she injures herself (‘that moment’), or to 
the endless wait for help that follows. 
 
Crashing down 
 
Even in good times Tina’s distress can only be kept at bay for so long, as the pressure 
slowly builds up. This she conveys using several metaphors, including a roller-coaster, 
an airplane the engine of which suddenly blows off and, perhaps most movingly, a tale:  
 
T. It’s almost like, when I’ve had that powerful feeling, I’ve like filed away, my 
head has filed away all the bad stuff, um… But then it starts to maybe, leak out, 
and it’s, uh… I suppose it’s a bit like… I don’t know what it is, is it a fairy tale 
or a, story about the little boy who puts his finger in the hole in the dam, um. 
 
D. Um. 
 
T. And so, um, it’s almost like the only thing that’s holding the dam is this, you 
know, this tiny little thing holding it in there, um, and, like… I think the story 
goes this way that the boy takes his finger out of the hole in the dam and the 
whole dam comes crashing down, um…  That’s the little weakness there, and 
then… so, um… 
 
This extract illustrates several important aspects of Tina’s experience: her sense of inner 
split, since it is her ‘head’ that files away the bad stuff; her almost mechanical 
understanding of the pressure created by her negative feelings (perhaps a reflection of 
her engineering background); her sense of her own fragile equilibrium, dependent on 
‘this tiny little thing’, the small finger of a little boy. 
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Interestingly the story of the boy who stuck his finger in the dyke and saved the 
Netherlands actually ends well, the boy being rescued at dawn by a parish priest and 
hailed as his country’s saviour. But for Tina there is no happy ending, just an exhausting 
back and forth: 
 
Sometimes the hardest thing is that… you know sometime someone will say: 
‘Well, I know you’re feeling bad now, but you know that after a few hours or a 
day or two you’ll feel fine again.’ But then in my head as well I’m thinking: but 
then a few days after that, a few hours after that, I’ll feel rubbish again. And that 
just feels like this kind of roller coaster, like up and down, and up and down 
[smiling/laughing]. You know, it’s really hard to keep on a level. 
 
Tina’s experiences can be neither controlled nor properly monitored, and she 
humorously bemoans the lack of an ‘internal gage’. Against the background of a self out 
of control, the need for self-harm to act as a SatNav system takes on a fuller meaning. It 
also echoes the 19th century practice of bleeding patients to restore balance to their vital 
humours, thus possibly reflecting an experiential ‘truth’.19  
 
Divided and confused 
 
Tina’s account also suggests a lack of inner unity, with separate selves co-existing more 
or less harmoniously. At times being able to ‘split’ herself has definite advantages. 
When stuck in a difficult or longwinded conversation she quite enjoys having ‘a little 
person’ at the back of her head who is taking notes so she can appear engaged whilst 
drifting off in her mind. When planning her next self-harm she can keep up appearances 
whilst nursing her growing obsession.  
 
But her divided inner world can also be challenging. Sometimes the separate Tinas 
disagree and she reports vigorously admonishing herself, notably around her cutting: 
‘I’ve even said to myself, out loud: “Tina, you don’t want to do this, you don’t want to 
do this”’. The struggle generates frustration, anger and guilt, thus compounding her 
distress. Tina also describes ‘different people in my head’, constantly ‘talking and 
                                                          
19
 I am indebted for this point to my supervisor Carla Willig. 
87 
 
arguing or… sometimes them saying that I’m stupid’. Cutting then becomes a way of 
silencing the incessant chatter, if only for a moment.  
 
Tina’s inner landscape is thus full of confusion, another theme that repeats across the 
interviews. She evokes her doubts over her actions and how she often finds herself  
 
debating things in my head, you know: should I, shouldn’t I? You know: why 
did this happen or, or… 
 
She can also question her feelings, with devastating consequences: ‘my self-harm got so 
bad because I just got so confused about how I was supposed to feel’.  
 
Often the loudest voice is also the most judgmental, calling into question Tina’s 
efficacy and intelligence: why can’t she do, ask, say? Why is she being so stupid? Why 
can’t she be fine? Here again she shows insight, acknowledging the extent of her self-
judgment and the way in which it hampers her communication with others. But her 
sense of helplessness and inadequacy is easily triggered, and that very ease makes her 
berate herself even more:  
 
I end up looking at other people and I think, you know: other people can deal 
with this, why can’t I? It’s only just a simple, you know, confusion with the, the 
train, you know, it’s not like, uh, you know, someone’s just stolen a thousand 
pounds from my account or [smiling/laughing], from my bank account or 
something, it’s not like that, you know… 
 
Hiding the self 
 
Frustrated with herself, ashamed of her lack of control Tina tries to hide her distress. 
Speaking of her struggle to ‘return to baseline’, she comments: 
 
T. And, the funny thing is, I think I, I know, um… well I’m pretty sure that... I, you 
know, until somebody properly knows me, they won’t actually see that in me. 
 
D. Uhu. 
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T. Cause I’m often wearing a smile on my face. And it is just that sort of, um… it’s 
just me bottling things up, and that has to come out somewhere, and that’s where 
self-harm comes in, um...  
 
Once again self-harm is presented as a form of expression, a way to communicate 
beyond words. But here it also seems a way to bring out the ‘real’ Tina: not the fake, 
coping woman, but the suffering, out of control individual. There is honesty about the 
act, and about the resulting scars. By contrast language falls short: even when Tina can 
bring herself to express her pain, she tends to minimize it, both for fear of being judged, 
and because saying it feels ‘scary’: 
 
maybe I will say something like, uh…uh… ‘I’m really not having a good day 
today’. And then I’ll say, the next sentence will be: ‘but I’m sure it’ll be fine 
tomorrow’ or something, or ‘I’m sure if I get X, Y and Z done I’ll be fine’. Even 
though I know in my head… that I know I won’t be fine. That, you know… But 
I’m always kind of trying to minimise it. 
 
This backtracking and minimizing runs through the interviews too, with Tina carefully 
qualifying her most distressing statements, and often adding ‘a little’ or ‘a bit’: ‘a bit 
scary’; ‘a bit trapped’; ‘a little bit like that’. 
 
But scars, like 999 calls, deliver a raw message of distress. As such they can shock and 
offend, and are best kept hidden, like Tina’s feelings. Taking people’s stares requires a 
particular sort of confidence, one that Tina achieves only occasionally: 
 
There are days when I feel, uh… I feel confident to go out, well not out of my 
flat so my neighbours see, but it’s like, you know, sometimes I will be confident 
enough to walk down T high street and, you know, just have a tee-shirt on. And 
I am very… I’m aware that people look at my arms, but you know, I feel 
confident enough that I can manage it. And there’s other days when I’m feeling 
a bit… not so good and… I don’t feel like I can manage people staring at me. 
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Underpinning this need to hide is a deep fear of being judged. Exploring this, and other 
ways in which Tina experiences the ‘other’, further enriches our understanding of her 
meaning-making around self-harm. 
 
WHAT’S UNDERNEATH: EXPERIENCES OF THE OTHER20 
 
Just as Tina’s self-harm only becomes intelligible to her when set against her difficult, 
confusing inner experiences, making sense of her fragile sense of self leads her to take a 
look at how outer experiences, and in particular experiences of other people, are 
impacting her. From the first interview onwards, this perceived impact appears to be 
overwhelmingly negative.  
 
The judging other 
 
The other is first of all seen as judgmental, his input compounding Tina’s own 
tendencies towards self-criticism. Sometimes judgments are explicit, and she reports 
‘horrible comments’, in particular from the emergency personnel tasked with helping 
her: 
 
there was a nurse when I was in the ambulance and she, you know, said to the 
ambulance driver, like I was close to death and she, but I was still conscious 
enough to be able to hear what people were saying and she said: ‘do you get 
many time-wasters like this?’, um… I also had, I think it was a consultant or a 
registrar when I was in the resuscitation area, at A&E, and I’d cut myself really 
really badly, quite a lot, and I needed about 50-something staples, um. But he 
said, when the younger doctor asked him, um, if I should be stitched up or 
stapled, and the older doctor, who was maybe a registrar or whatever, he said: 
‘no, just staple her cause she obviously likes pain’, um… 
 
Tina’s account powerfully conveys the discrepancy between her own subjective distress 
and helplessness (‘close to death’, ‘really really badly’) and the dismissive, objectifying 
response these elicit from health professionals. Both the nurse and the registrar talk of 
                                                          
20
 When referring to the ‘other’ the masculine form ‘he’ or ‘his’ is used throughout. This is for clarity’s 
sake only, as Tina reports difficult experiences with both men and women. 
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her in the third person, as if she weren’t really present. In so doing, and in their choice 
of words, they deny both her pain and her right to be helped: she is a waste of time, a 
masochist. Over time these experiences are internalised. Any hospital visit becomes 
loaded with negative expectations: 
 
there’s anticipation in me that there’s gonna be some negative comment that’s 
gonna be really hurtful, um… so… yeah, I just hate going to hospital. 
 
Actions can speak equally loud to Tina, as when strangers on a bus take a look at her 
scars and get up to sit further away. But the judgment of others is often implied: a nurse 
looks at her ‘as if I shouldn’t be saying stuff like that’; neighbours might come to ‘all 
sorts of conclusions’ after seeing her scars.  
 
Crucially, Tina’s perception of how others are judging her strengthens her inner critical 
voice, especially if those judgments are verbalised. She explains: 
 
you kind of internalize all that and you say those things to yourself as well, and 
believe them yourself which [knocking the coffee table slightly] – sorry - which 
makes your mood worse, um… so…. which obviously, you know, can lead to 
self-harm, so… 
 
Others can thus hurt both directly through their words, and indirectly through the way 
these are then owned by Tina, with consequences for her distress and self-injuring.  
 
The controlling other 
 
Others can also be experienced as probing and controlling, forcing Tina back into her 
shell. This applies to her first encounter with a mental health professional: 
 
T. […] I was referred to a child psychologist, who was also a psychiatrist as well, 
and I remember him wanting to, wanting me to talk about this, but I was like, 
and about other stuff you know, like what’d happened with my dad and stuff, 
and it was like: this man wants me to talk about this horrible stuff, I don’t 
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understand, and I just wouldn’t talk about it. In fact I would sit there… for, you 
know, the whole hour, and not speak. 
 
D.  In silence. 
 
T.  And not speak at all. And, quite often, there would be times when he would 
maybe say three things in the whole hour. That silence was soo [accentuated] 
uncomfortable. And then I, you know, I did feel myself drifting off in my mind, 
with other things, cause I didn’t want to deal with the silence as well.  
 
Here Tina offers a disturbing image of therapeutic work: a distressed 16 year old kept in 
a room for a whole hour and given a choice between talking about personal, ‘horrible 
stuff’ to a stranger, or exercising her only freedom: that to ‘not speak’, and endure 
harrowing silence. As was already mentioned, hospitals are presented throughout as 
coercive environments in which Tina is denied control and space, with severe 
consequences for her self-harming. 
 
They don’t get it 
 
Even beyond their judgment and control, others are experienced as out of touch with 
Tina’s reality, unable or unwilling to understand and validate. This applies to those 
strangers on the bus who Tina feels may perceive her as a danger when she is anything 
but (‘I only ever harm myself’). It also applies to well-intentioned others who try to 
advise and encourage: 
 
sometimes you know, and these comments they’re probably always well 
intentioned, but you know when you get someone saying to you: ‘Oh, you need 
to stop being negative, you need to be positive, um…’ And I feel like saying: ‘I 
really want to be but I can’t, I mean that’s just not as simple as that’, um… And 
all the other comments like: ‘You need to leave the past behind you’, and I feel 
like saying: ‘D’you know what, if I could ask for a part lobotomy to remove 
those things then I would but I know that’s not gonna happen’. It’s not that I 
want to remember stuff but, it just… it’s there you know, I can’t remove it. 
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Hearing those words only increases Tina’s sense of frustration with herself, with her 
inability to move on when she ‘should be fine’:  
 
You’re already frustrated at yourself, so… it actually makes you feel more 
frustrated at yourself, cause you already feel that yourself but then you only feel, 
when other people are saying that you’re thinking that maybe you’re not trying 
hard enough, and so that kind of compounds it, it just makes it worse so… 
 
Thus, interacting with others mostly seems to further strengthen her critical self and 
weaken her fragile grip on life. Angry at herself, denied control, privacy and 
understanding, she may then resort to self-harm as a means to punish herself (and 
maybe those unhelpful others), reassert her boundaries and/or try to communicate her 
pain more effectively.  
 
But setting herself apart can also trigger feelings of profound aloneness and despair. 
Tina describes spending ‘an awful lot of time’ on her own prior to her shooting incident, 
and feeling ‘really alone’, her voice catching for the first of very few times. Elsewhere 
she explains that her near-delusions of power tend to occur when she spends too much 
time on her own. Finding the right distance from others, having her own space, 
therefore seems essential to helping Tina control her self-harm.  
 
So does finding understanding others, a discreet theme that resonates across the 
interviews as a recent, hopeful development. The role played by these new ‘others’ 
relates both to her self-harming (‘there’s people that can really grasp, that can 
understand the reasons you’re doing it’) and to her underlying needs. In an interesting 
double-entendre, Tina explains that she now has ‘an understanding’ with her local 
CMHT that hospital admission is an extreme last resort: at last she seems to have found 
health professionals who can both understand her and negotiate a mutually acceptable 
arrangement for her care, thus making her feel heard and in control.  
 
WHAT’S UNDERNEATH: EXPERIENCES OF THE FAMILY 
 
Though she makes brief references to her dad and family in the first two interviews, it is 
only in the third that Tina presents a more complete picture of her early experiences, 
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something that may reflect both the interview schedule and a growing trust between us. 
However there can be little doubt as to the impact these experiences have had on her 
sense of self, her perception of the other and, ultimately, her self-harm. Indeed, though 
she characteristically tries to exonerate them from blame, Tina herself makes the 
connection: 
 
My parents… if I’m honest my parents are like, part of the reason why I am the 
way I am, um… part of why I self-harm, um… Not that they’re, you know, not 
that they’re directly responsible, it’s not that they’re holding the blade on my 
arm or anything but, you know, some of the things that happened just… that’s, 
that’s the way it’s turned out. 
 
The abuse 
 
First and foremost, Tina draws a clear link between her self-harm and the abuse suffered 
at the hand of her dad: 
 
Um… yeah my dad abused me, as I was growing up [voice catching], me and 
my older sister C, and…. So… part of what, um, triggers self-harm for me is like 
I get lots of flashbacks and, um… 
 
Tina finds the random, intrusive nature of these flashbacks particularly hard to deal 
with: 
I could be walking down the street and just, you know, be overwhelmed by this 
image that… it feels like it’s in front of me, um, and… You know it’s… it’s 
like… it’s like a thing I’ve got no control over, um... so… yeah that’s quite hard, 
and that can, that can trigger, um… that can trigger off, um, the self-harm, um 
[sighing]. 
 
As if by extension, unexpected reminders of her filial duties are also a source of 
considerable upset. Stumbling upon a stand of Fathers’ Day cards at the supermarket 
‘throws’ Tina, and prompts a complicated train of thoughts, involving perceived 
coercion (‘it’s expected of me to send a Father’s Day card, and a Mother’s Day card, 
and their birthday cards as well’) and painful pretence: 
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They all say: “to the world’s number one dad” or “to a wonderful father”, or, 
you know, “to a special dad” or something like that and, I don’t really want to 
buy… a card that says that. 
 
More generally, Tina seems determined to protect her newfound space and disturbed by 
intrusions therein, including by text or phone call. She sees her move to London as ‘the 
best thing that’s ever happened’, and her occasional visits to the family home as 
breeding confusion and distress.  
 
Denial  
 
The hypocrisy of a loving Fathers’ Day card also ties in with another important theme: 
denial. Even as an adult, Tina feels that she had to negate both her difficulties and her 
past history in order to be accepted as part of the family: 
 
T. I had to… deny outwardly you know, kind of like… sweep everything under the 
carpet, you know, everything’s fine… 
 
D. Everything’s ok. 
 
T. Yeah, everything’s fine and everything is, you know, nothing… nothing 
happened in the past, and, you know, or stop thinking about the past, you do 
your best to move on, um… You know these are kind of words that I’ve heard 
from my parents, well, from my mum really, um… And, so… uh… Yeah, 
that’s… that’s hard. 
 
This attitude sheds some light on her perception of others as ‘not getting it’, not wanting 
to hear, especially where difficult feelings and realities are involved. Significantly, this 
parental refusal to hear and validate Tina’s story very much extends to her self-harming: 
 
T. I think that was maybe a couple of times I tried to explain but, um…. I actually, 
I… I’m not sure they’re open enough. Maybe they don’t want to get it. 
 
D. Is it a little bit too personal for them? 
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T. Yeah, yeah. If I told them, if I pointed the finger and told them everything, um… 
then that would be too hard for them to listen to… and… so, it’s almost like me 
trying to explain to them that just got closed ears. They’re not, they’re not really 
hearing what I’m saying, um, you know… 
 
In any case painful feelings always constituted a no-go area. Tina recalls feeling sad 
after the death of her grandfather: ‘I remember at that time, um, wanting to cry, um, but 
knowing that I could only just go to my room and cry, I couldn’t do it in front of my 
parents’. At the risk of stretching the boundaries of the interpretative work, one could 
argue that the perceived negation of Tina’s emotions and experience within the family 
speaks to the theme of the confused self as well as to that of the hidden self, with direct 
relevance to her self-injurious behaviour. 
 
Trapped 
 
Last, Tina paints the picture of an isolated, restricting family home, where few visitors 
were allowed and strict rules were enforced: no fun in the kitchen, no talking at the 
dinner table, no visits to or from friends. From an early age she tried to run away, 
planning and effecting an escape on her bike at the age of 9, climbing out of the window 
and walking off the following year, before coming back after a few hours of freedom.  
 
Tina describes having to listen to her parents’ reproaches after one such incident: 
 
T. Yeah, it was always my fault, and those times I would just… have them… I 
could… I was aware of them talking to me, but I would be staring at the floor 
and in my head… I just had that… Cause the carpet that we had on the floor was 
quite, sort of patterned, old-fashioned sort of, like flowery designs on it. And I 
was just in my head, just thinking about these flowers on the floor, and 
describing them in my head, sort of to block out what they were saying, um… 
and… yeah… so… And it was like that sort of inescapable thing, um. In a way I 
suppose it’s a bit like the times I’ve been in hospital, how hospital has felt like to 
me, like feeling trapped… 
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D. Ok. 
 
T. Like other people have control over what happens to me, and make decisions 
about  me, and that I can’t leave when I want to, um…  
 
Once more a problématique of coercion is outlined: at home, like later in hospital, Tina 
feels powerless, trapped. When physical escape is not an option she copes by removing 
herself from the scene mentally, by being both there and not there, a form of splitting 
which she still uses in similar situations. In this particular instance she uses the design 
on the carpet as an alternative focal point. Elsewhere, she explains that early forms of 
self-harm (picking at a nail until it fell) partly served a similar purpose (‘It’s almost like, 
there was that wee thing, that I could just focus on’).  
 
Importantly, her sense of still being under family control continues to fuel her self-
harming. Tina describes the strong feelings of entrapment elicited by reminders of 
family events such as Fathers Day, or by the position of her parents as ‘gatekeepers’ to 
the rest of her family, and especially her siblings, nieces and nephews:  
 
I don’t want to feel that my parents have control over me still, um… And that, 
really… yeah, it’s really… difficult to… get my head round. Even though like I 
know that, you know, I make the choices now, for me, but in that, that 
particular… any choices related to my family my parents just have… this 
control, um, which is what they had when I was growing up, you know… And 
that’s, that’s really hard. It makes it really hard to move on, um… And so I just, 
I suppose... when things get overwhelming I just… Self-harm is what I do. 
 
Tina’s experiences of the family, as she was growing up but also as she lives them 
today, caught up between her need to belong and her bid for freedom, thus form 
another, inescapable layer in her meaning-making around self-harm. 
 
DEVELOPING A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF SELF AND SELF-HARM 
 
The fifth and last superordinate theme is of a different sort: no longer descriptive or 
explanatory, but reflective. Here Tina looks back on her journey towards greater self-
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understanding and self-expression, and in the process offers new ‘keys’ into her 
meaning-making. 
 
A new awareness 
 
Several times during the interviews Tina contrasts her past ignorance or confusion with 
her newfound understanding of her self-injuring. Whereas she used to be ‘clueless’, she 
now surprises herself with her insight into the behaviour: 
 
T. I was actually… um… Cause I see my psychologist on the Tuesday, when I saw 
her yesterday I said to her, you know, that I’d surprised myself from coming 
here, how much my… Well it’s not just having the words for it, but having the 
awareness of how self-harm, what it means for me and what… you know… how 
it affects me and… you know, and my reasons for doing it.  
 
D. Um. 
 
T. And I was actually really surprised how great an awareness I have. 
 
Once again, the process of understanding - or making sense of - her self-harm is 
inextricably tied to that of making sense of her emotional difficulties in general; and to 
do that Tina uses several tools. One is observation: 
 
I’m often thinking about why other people do things, and how they manage to be 
around other people, and I kind of file it in my head.  
 
Tina gives several examples in which she attempts to make sense of a situation and of 
her own response thereto, by looking at the reactions of fellow human beings. This 
curiosity goes back a long way, to a Tina of 4 or 5 walking away to gaze at the homes of 
others in a nearby tower block. But benchmarking her behaviours against other people’s 
can also result in further confusion and a painful sense of inadequacy, thus ultimately 
prompting further self-harm. 
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Another tool is the ‘scientific’ insight gained through her psychology studies, which 
provides elements of both explanation and external validation of her inner experience: 
 
I feel that I can trust that, that that’s something that’s… um… What’s the word? 
More tangible or more sort of quantifiable in a way. And so I, um … yeah, I… 
through my studies, um.., then I can even take things out of DBT that… um… 
there are, there’s a psychological basis for, um, and… you know, say to myself: 
people have jobs for doing this, people do lots of research, people you know, 
spend their lives, you know, studying this, so, it can’t be rubbish.  
 
The more Tina reads about psychological research and phenomena, the more she can 
construct meaning around her distress and behaviour and attach value to them since they 
are no longer ‘rubbish’. Significantly in light of her past history of denial and 
invalidation, developing a scientific understanding of her difficulties also gives them a 
new reality: ‘it’s like saying: oh, now I know it’s not all in my head’. The interviews are 
thus interspersed with references to statistics, the neurobiology of addiction and 
emotions, the psychological basis for behaviour, reflecting Tina’s attempt to make 
scientific sense of her self-harm. While no overall scientific explanation for her self-
injuring emerges from the text, this process also seems to give her a new sense of 
control over it, since ‘understanding that actually helps me reduce doing it’. 
 
Saying it loud 
 
Alongside her new awareness, Tina reports a new ability to label and verbalise her 
experience: 
 
T. Now, probably in the last couple of years through doing DBT and through my 
studies, I actually have the words for things. Or maybe I had the words for 
things before but I just didn’t know how to apply them to me, um… 
 
D.  Things like feelings. 
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T.  Yeah, yeah. It’s almost like, um... Yeah, that’s… the word… what’s the word? 
The words for emotions just didn’t apply to me. Or the words were just a waste 
of time. 
 
While Tina continues to attach enormous importance to selecting the right words, 
sometimes to the point of hampering her communication, knowing how to apply them is 
helping her in several ways. First, she can finally seek help: after impulsively cutting, 
she manages to stop herself by calling a supportive other and openly stating her resolve: 
‘I just said: “Look, this is what I’ve done, and I don’t want to do it anymore”.’ Words 
are thus presented as an alternative to self-harm, and using them better as a way to 
reduce it. 
 
But words are also the essential building blocks of meaning-making, and therefore 
instrumental to understanding and measuring change: having briefly narrated her 
journey at the beginning of the first interview, Tina smiles:  
 
when I say it all in one thing long, you know when I say that out loud it loud of 
makes me realise how far I’ve come so… It’s good.  
 
Even using the word self-harm seems like an achievement, a victory over the judging 
other; and at the end of the third and final interview, Tina openly expresses her surprise 
and her pride at having been ‘able to talk so much’ and given the researcher ‘a lot to 
type up’, hoping that it will in turn help self-harming others. By enabling her meaning-
making and strengthening her fragile sense of self, words can thus also provide Tina 
with a new sense of control over her self-harm.  
 
However she remains cautious: having developed a better understanding of her self-
harm may help her manage it better; so may being able to talk about it. But words can 
still fail sometimes, and self-harm remains an easier option. Words can even act as 
triggers, and Tina carefully distinguishes between constructive ways of talking about 
self-harm (e.g., our interviews) and not so helpful ways of talking about it (e.g., sharing 
self-harm memories with fellow patients). Tina’s meta-reflection around language and 
understanding is thus an integral part of her efforts to make sense of her self-harm, and 
of her progress and difficulties in controlling it. 
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3.2.2 Discussion 
 
The analysis presented above has thus identified several frames of meaning-making 
around the experience of self-injury: a descriptive frame in which Tina outlined the 
important and complex role played by self-harm in her life; three more contextual 
frames, in which Tina explored what may be sitting ‘underneath’ the behaviour in terms 
of self and others, including her experiences of family; and finally a reflective frame, in 
which Tina evoked key elements of the meaning-making process itself. In this brief 
discussion section I bring out some of the ways in which these themes may echo others 
from the literature on self-injurious behaviour, and inform therapeutic work. In so doing 
I am careful not to step away from Tina’s own frames of reference, less I take the 
interpretative process too far and produce a reading that she would not recognise or 
accept. 
 
SELF-HARM AS A WAY OF MANAGING LIFE 
 
Tina’s description of self-harm as being an integral part of her life, a way of managing 
its multiple pressures, is one frequently encountered in the literature on self-harm, 
especially when it uses first-person testimonies (e.g., Pembroke, 2004; Sutton, 2007). 
Here, like indeed in other pieces of qualitative enquiry, the emphasis is on the partly 
adaptive nature of self-harm: it may not be a perfect or harmless way to cope, but in the 
words of Tina: ‘it works’. The implication seems clear: working towards a reduction, or 
even a complete elimination of the behaviour may well be justified, but only if this goal 
is endorsed by the client herself.  
 
That self-injury can take many forms, respond to different triggers, and perform a wide 
range of functions for the individuals engaging in it is also well known from both 
quantitative and qualitative work (see chapter 1). David Klonsky’s (2007) review for 
instance points to affect regulation, self-punishment, communication, the generation of 
feeling to combat dissociation, sensation seeking and control as key functions, all of 
which are reported by Tina.  
 
However two aspects of her experience come out as especially significant: one is the 
very multi-functionality of the behaviour in a single individual; the other is the 
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importance of control, a theme that surfaces again and again in the analysis. For Tina 
the use of self-harm is a means to assert or reassert her control over self and life; 
paradoxically, it is also the blatant manifestation of her lack of control over her feelings 
and circumstances. Both aspects speak to the necessity for the clinician to explore the 
nature and meanings of self-injury for each individual client from a phenomenological 
perspective, and to reflect on the ways these may play out in the therapeutic 
relationship. Questions are also raised regarding the potential impact of inpatient 
treatment when perceptions of the hospital as a coercive environment, perhaps mirroring 
adverse family experiences, may lead to further and more extreme acts of self-injury 
(see also Motz, 2001).  
 
WHAT’S UNDERNEATH: THE FRAGILE SELF 
 
Tina’s account of her inner turmoil and how it often spills over into self-harm echoes 
other accounts of the phenomenon (e.g., Babiker & Arnold, 1997). Her efforts to make 
sense of what’s underneath the act also speak to the literature on affect regulation. The 
‘bad feelings’ powerfully described by Tina, her sense of never being ‘on a level’, her 
episodes of depersonalization can be read as indicative of pervasive difficulties in 
regulating her emotions, which often include ‘insufficient control of impulsive 
behaviors related to strong positive and negative affects’ (Linehan, Bohus & Lynch, 
2007, p.583).21  
 
Her overall confusion, her constant challenging of thoughts, actions and feelings, even 
her loud inner critique also suggest a fragile sense of self. Her self-harm then becomes a 
way to provide a focal point and/or assert personal boundaries, albeit temporarily. What 
may be especially striking here is the way in which these various ‘markers’ of 
psychological difficulties seem to co-exist in a fluid, and perhaps mutually reinforcing 
way. Making sense of the powerful, ever-shifting experiences underlying her self-harm 
becomes for Tina a challenge in itself, perhaps preventing reconstructive rescripting 
until usable ‘keys’ are finally found.  
  
                                                          
21
 Given her enthusiasm for dialectical behaviour therapy it is likely that Tina would endorse such a 
reading. 
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WHAT’S UNDERNEATH: EXPERIENCES OF THE OTHER 
 
The role of negative other-related perceptions in self-injury seems to have so far 
received less attention. One finds some evidence of interpersonal skills deficits among 
self-injuring individuals, which may result in lower perceived social support 
(Muehlenkamp, Brausch, Quigley, & Whitlock, 2012). But it is only recently that the 
social context of self-injurious behaviour became a focus of interest among researchers. 
Tina’s account of her lived experience thus sheds a unique light onto the sort of world 
she may inhabit. 
 
However perceived criticism and rough treatment by health care professionals have 
been identified in several studies, one of them even referring to ‘hostile care’ (Harris, 
2000).  Tina’s experience of the judging and disapproving ‘other’ through her 
interactions with certain medics and nurses, and this at a time of heightened 
vulnerability is thus reflective of a widespread perception among self-injuring 
individuals. The interlacing of themes produced by the analysis gives this finding 
additional depth: being labelled and criticised is not only hurtful; it can also echo past 
mistreatments, thus compounding emotional distress in complex and profound ways, 
and directly feeding into the self-harm itself. This finding further supports the need for 
health services to respond more sympathetically to the plight of those who self-injure, a 
need that has lately been increasingly recognised (Longden & Proctor, 2012). 
 
WHAT’S UNDERNEATH: EXPERIENCES OF THE FAMILY 
 
As stated in chapter 1, the link between childhood abuse and self-injurious behaviour is 
complex, and probably mediated by factors such as emotional dysregulation. My 
interpretation of Tina’s experience neither supports nor invalidates this proposition. 
However in her particular case, flashbacks of sexual abuse emerged as a key identifiable 
trigger, while the physical and emotional abuse she reported at the hand of her father 
chimed with her sense of self and other in significant ways. Here again Tina’s account 
resonates with those of many others (e.g., Babiker & Arnold, 1997; Sutton, 2007). 
 
The invalidation of her experience at the hands of her family was also an important 
theme. The denial of Tina’s reality and feelings seemed to run from the abuse itself right 
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through to her later mental health difficulties. Tina reported confusion over her feelings 
around her family, and showed open distress when describing her dilemma between 
being ‘let in’ by her parents and being true to herself. These findings can be related to 
others, showing the impact of invalidating family environments on later self-injuring 
(e.g., Martin, Bureau, Cloutier, & Lafontaine, 2011). Conversely, Tina’s reported 
satisfaction with the interviewing process may have a lot to do with the way I bore 
witness to her account, thus providing much-needed validation of her subjective 
experience.  
 
DEVELOPING A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF SELF AND SELF-HARM 
 
The last superordinate theme takes the analysis in a different direction, no longer 
concerned primarily with the ‘raw’ experience of self-harm as conveyed by Tina, but 
with the meta-awareness she has developed around it. Here the research question at the 
core of this project (how does an individual engaging in repetitive self-injury make 
sense of her behaviour) is taken literally, and the interpretative work turns to the process 
of meaning-making: as she constructs a narrative around her self-harm, Tina also 
reflects on her journey towards understanding and expression, offering a further frame 
of meanings around the act. Self-injury becomes the mindless act of a ‘clueless’ 
sufferer, the silent cry of a wordless victim. When seen in the context of recovery, 
meaning-making becomes a slow, deliberate process of self-enquiry, reflection and 
verbalization. The parallels with therapeutic work are obvious, and were not lost on 
Tina herself, who remarked that spending time discussing her self-harm with me may 
have been therapeutic in itself. 
 
The idea that being able to reflect and communicate around self-harm can be crucial to 
recovery is lent further support by qualitative research (e.g., Craigen & Foster, 2009). 
However attending directly to the client’s meaning-making process could give the 
therapist additional insight. In Tina’s case, finding an approach (DBT) that matched her 
need for evidence-based psychological understanding and clear, tool-based guidance 
seemed key to a better management of her self-injurious behaviour. This should be of 
value to counselling psychologists, whose training places particular emphasis on 
integrative work and reflexivity. 
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Overall this first reading of Tina’s account produced a rich, intricate picture of her 
sense-making around self-harm, one which resonated with much of the existing 
literature yet, as befitted its phenomenological intent, brought out her individual 
subjective experience.  
 
3.3 Reflections on the use of IPA 
 
Using IPA to develop a first interpretation of Tina’s account proved challenging in 
several respects. Firstly, presenting a layered account of Tina’s meaning-making 
around self-injury was not without risk. Like other phenomenological approaches, IPA 
is concerned with the lived experience of the participant, not its origins. Digging too 
deep might take away from the immediacy of the approach, and maybe obscure the 
phenomenon itself. Yet Tina’s account seemed to foreground the underpinnings of her 
self-harm to such an extent that experiences of the self and others became an essential 
part of the interpretation. To complicate matters further, one theme, that of control, 
appeared time and again and I had to decide whether to make it a superordinate theme 
in its own right or keep it as a leitmotif. Having consulted other works I chose the latter, 
for fear of distorting the overall picture. But my self-doubt lingered. Still, throughout 
the analytical work I took heart in the explicit openness of the approach, its recognition 
that the analyst is trying both to ‘give voice’ and to ‘make sense’, and in the process 
may ‘transcend or exceed, the participants’ own terminology and conceptualizations’ 
(Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006, pp.113-4). 
 
Bracketing my assumptions by holding them in awareness proved a second challenge. 
Not only did it require that I not ‘commit’ to a particular theoretical or diagnostic 
understanding of Tina’s experience; it also meant not letting my ongoing work with 
another self-injuring young woman colour the interpretative work. I tried to keep Tina’s 
picture in mind as I worked, and to immerse myself in the individuality and ‘messiness’ 
of her narrative. Yet my counselling psychology training, as well as my prior interest in 
self-harm and in emotional dysregulation, probably informed my own meaning-making 
process around the text, for instance by framing some of the connections drawn between 
the behaviour and its psychological underpinnings.  
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Not getting drawn into a more narrative or discursive reading of Tina’s account 
represented a third challenge. IPA’s boundaries can be stretched to accommodate 
elements of other approaches, and in particular narrative analysis with which it has 
been said to have ‘a natural affinity’ (Eatough & Smith, 2008); and indeed I found 
myself attending to both linguistic and non-verbal cues throughout the analysis. Yet 
knowing that two more interpretations were planned which would pay close attention to 
these and other elements made me draw a somewhat artificial boundary around my IPA 
reading. This difficulty, probably inherent to the use of a pluralistic approach, is 
revisited in chapter 6. 
 
Overall however I enjoyed the work immensely, especially the clustering and writing up 
of themes to create a tapestry that would mirror and enhance Tina’s own efforts at 
sense-making.  
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4. Narrative readings 
 
This chapter turns to the second of our interpretative approaches, this time using 
narrative analysis to explore Tina’s sense-making around self-injury. A first section 
introduces the approach and clarifies the epistemological position adopted. Two distinct 
pieces of narrative analysis are then presented, one bearing on a single narrative episode 
and the other on the meaning of self-harm in the context of Tina’s illness narratives. As 
before, the chapter ends with a brief reflexive section. 
 
4.1 The approach 
 
4.1.1 Narratives and stories 
 
If you want to know me, then you must know my story, for my story defines 
who I am. (McAdams, 1993, p.11) 
 
Narrative approaches to psychology take as their premise the central role of stories in 
human life: born complex creatures into a complex world, we use stories to make sense 
of our experience and to define our identity. These stories are part family inheritance 
and part ongoing construction; they are temporally organised, with a beginning, middle 
and end; and their creation and sharing enable us to engage with our social world 
(Murray, 2008). Studying narratives thus provides the researcher with a means to 
understand how individuals make sense of their world and selves.  
 
Unsurprisingly given their emphasis on language and cultural embeddedness, narrative 
approaches can at times embrace a social constructivist, even relativist epistemology, 
assuming that individual stories are by definition ever-shifting constructions with no 
underlying reality or unity. But some among narrative researchers are primarily 
concerned with the lived experience of the individual, seen as possessing some degree 
of coherence and continuity, and thus adhere to a (critical) realist epistemology (e.g., 
Crossley, 2000). As already explained in chapter 2 the stance adopted here stands 
somewhere in the middle, and can best be characterised as contextual constructionist. 
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4.1.2 Choosing one approach…or several 
 
Narrative research comes in many flavours, with different authors privileging different 
conceptions of the self, different ontologies, different foci of interest. For instance, 
whereas McAdams argues that ‘the story is inside of us’ (McAdams, 1993, p.12), 
Gergen regards the self-narrative as ‘a linguistic implement constructed and 
reconstructed by people in relationships, and employed in relationships to sustain, 
enhance, or impede various actions’ (Gergen & Gergen, 1983, p.156). These divisions 
are largely mirrored in researchers’ choice of narrative approach, some focusing on 
what is being told; others on how (Smith & Sparkes, 2006).  
 
Of particular interest here is the way in which narrative analysis, especially when 
applied to accounts of personal experience, can emphasize one or more of the following: 
the content of a text; its form or structure; the dialogic process between narrator and 
listener; and/or the way the narrative is ‘performed’, implying a positioning of 
storyteller and audience (Riessman, 2003). Also of relevance is the fact that the 
interpretative work can take in the text as a whole, concentrate on the properties of a 
section thereof, or combine the two in order to bring out the complexities of the 
underlying subject, for instance human identity. Indeed, it is not unusual for narrative 
researchers to cross interpretative lenses around a given text, and in the process lend 
support to the sort of pluralistic design adopted in the present work  (e.g., Lieblich, 
Tuval-Mashiach, & Zilber, 1998; Hiles & Čermák, 2008; Frost, 2009). 
 
In determining which narrative approach (or approaches) would be used here, the 
research question, the data, and the potential contribution of these different emphases to 
the overall interpretation were all key considerations. IPA had already produced a 
rigorous analysis of the content of Tina’s interviews, whilst the forthcoming 
psychosocial reading of the text was expected to bring out its performative elements. 
Focusing on the linguistic properties of the narrative therefore seemed a priority, and 
after a careful re-reading of the text a long, temporally-ordered narrative episode was 
selected for detailed structural analysis (Gee, 1991). In addition, the overall form or type 
of Tina’s narrative would be tentatively interpreted so as to better frame the personal 
significance of her experience of self-harm in the context of her life story (Frank, 1995). 
Choosing this twofold approach meant effectively adding an extra layer of pluralism to 
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an already demanding methodological design. Yet the extra effort also held the promise 
of a more nuanced, and it was hoped novel, reading of Tina’s rich material.  
 
4.2 Making sense of an episode of self-injury using Gee’s poetic reading 
 
McAdams defines nuclear episodes as ‘those scenes from our past that are the climaxes 
of different acts of the life story’; they ‘represent our subjective memories of particular 
events, in particular times and places, which have assumed especially prominent 
positions in our understanding of who we were and, indeed, who we are’ (McAdams, 
1993, p.296). The study of nuclear episodes or memories can thus provide unique 
insight into an individual’s sense of self and story.  
 
While Tina’s interviews contained a number of significant mini-narratives around self-
injury and early memories of family life, one, developed at the closing of the first 
interview, seemed especially meaningful in the context of the present work. In it Tina 
described ‘the first major self-harm that I did that people knew about’. This episode 
marked a turning point in her experience of self-injury, both because of its severity and 
publicity, and because it led to her first hospitalisation in a psychiatric ward. A thorough 
structural analysis therefore seemed warranted, and Gee’s (1991) linguistic approach 
was chosen for its rigour, level of detail and sensitive approach to narrative texts.   
 
4.2.1 Gee’s poetic approach 
 
In a seminal piece published in 1991, Gee sets out to show how the very structure of a 
text raises interpretative questions at a number of different levels. By paying attention to 
these linguistic and paralinguistic clues whilst drawing on his contextual knowledge, the 
analyst can develop a fuller, richer interpretation of the text. Using the free-flowing 
‘language sample’ produced by a young woman diagnosed with schizophrenia, Gee 
explores the contribution to the interpretative work of five distinct levels of structure 
and meaning in the text (see Table 4.1). Importantly these levels are hierarchically 
organised: each makes its own contribution whilst also amalgamating that of the levels 
below it. 
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Table 4.1:  Gee’s five levels of structure and meaning in a narrative text 
LEVEL   FORMAL MARKING  ROLE IN INTERPRETATION 
 
1. Line and stanza  patterning   ideas and perspectives on characters, 
    structure      events, states, information 
 
2. Syntax and  word order and    logic and connections 
    cohesion  grammatical words 
 
3. Main line/  verbal system and aspect plot 
     non-main line 
 
4. Psychological grammar   point of view 
    subjects 
 
5. Focusing system pitch and stress   image/theme 
 
Source: Gee (1991) 
 
Crucially, when parsing the text to bring out its structure equal importance is given to 
meaning and linguistic/prosodic characteristics. For instance, a line is made up of one or 
more ‘idea units’, each containing a new piece of information (or focus) and a unitary 
intonation contour (or pitch glide); in turn, the line possesses a central topic and is 
intonationally disconnected from other lines. Lines are grouped in stanzas, each stanza 
capturing a particular scene or vignette, and stanzas with similar themes are arranged 
into strophes and broader parts. By rearranging the text in this way, the researcher gains 
new insight into its structure, and thus its meaning. 
 
4.2.2 Analysis 
 
Working out the structure of a particular segment of interview material requires careful 
attention both to its content and to the way in which it is said by the interviewee. Here 
this meant listening to the extract several times, each time focusing on the way Tina 
used pitch and hesitations to accentuate certain words and/or mark a shift in focus from 
one line or stanza to the next. The text was correspondingly arranged in lines, stanzas, 
strophes and parts, with “/” separating idea units within individual lines (see Figure 
4.1).22  
 
                                                          
22
 The text was also parsed for legibility by removing non-verbal clues from the original transcript 
including ‘uh/um’, punctuation and mentions of vocal/facial expressions; see Gee (1991) and Riessman 
(1993) for similar approaches to the text. 
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Figure 4.1: Tina’ first major episode of self-harm, parsed using Gee’s (1991) model 
 
 
 
  
 
PART ONE (The context) 
 
STROPHE ONE (Opening up) 
 
STANZA 1 (Working for the lady) 
 
1. When I was 15/ just before my 16th birthday 
 
2. I was working for this lady who 
 
3. She was a prison officer/ she had pedigree dogs that she showed  
 
4. And so I got a job with her looking after her dogs 
 
 
STANZA 2 (Going to the police) 
 
5.  And then I was working for her/ working for her for a few months or almost a year or 
something 
 
6. And I told her that my dad was doing some things to me/ that he was abusing me 
 
7. And she encouraged me to go to the police 
 
8. So just before my 16th birthday/ when I was 15/ I went to the police about it 
 
 
STANZA 3 (Staying with the lady) 
 
9. And then because I had quite a good relationship with this lady 
 
10. I stayed with her 
 
11. And they had suggested me going into foster care/ which I didn’t want to do cause it 
would have been with strangers 
 
 
STROPHE 2 (On my own) 
 
STANZA 4 (A lot of time on my own) 
 
12. But then/ leading up to me shooting myself 
 
13. She was/ cause she was a prison officer she worked quite long hours/ twelve-hour shifts 
sometimes/ night shifts  
 
14. And I would quite often spend quite an awful lot of time on my own 
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15. And I did/ at the time I did have a social worker/ but I saw her once a week 
 
 
STANZA 5 (GCSEs) 
 
16. And, as well as that it was my GCSE year/ so the pressure with exams as well 
 
17. To be honest the exams were like/ way down on my list of priorities so 
 
18. I did actually pass them/ which was amazing  
 
19. But yeah the pressure of that and 
 
 
STANZA 6 (The shock of leaving my family) 
 
20. The time spent on me own because I came from 
 
21. My family is quite a big family/ there is five of us kids/ it was always a busy house and 
 
22. The shock of leaving that to being on my own 
 
23. Considering what I’d just told the police  
 
 
PART 2 (The act) 
 
STROPHE 3 (Rehearsals) 
 
STANZA 7 (Looking at the gun) 
 
24. So a few times I knew she kept her gun under her bed/ and I 
 
25. Strangely it was just in/ like some sort of shoebox type thing/ it wasn’t locked in a 
 cabinet  
 
26. So I knew she kept it there/ and when she wasn’t in the house I would go take it/ I 
would go into the lounge with it and 
 
27. Look at it 
 
 
STANZA 8 (Figuring the gun out) 
 
28. I think at first it was just curiosity/ I wanted to know what it/ what it felt like/ how 
heavy it was and/ you know and what you could do with it 
 
29. And it’s strange because after I shot myself the police asked me how did I figure out 
how to use it/ cause they thought that R/ this lady/ had shown me how to use it 
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30. And I remember feeling quite insulted that they thought/ I was that stupid that I couldn’t 
figure it out for myself  
 
31. But obviously over a few weeks/ I figured out how to use it 
 
 
STANZA 9 (Ready to pull the trigger) 
 
32. And there were times when I would sit in her lounge/ and I would have the barrel of the 
gun in my mouth with my finger on the trigger 
 
33. And be ready just to pull the trigger  
 
 
STANZA 10 (Powerless and alone) 
 
34. And it wasn’t/ it wasn’t really the actual/ it was again it was having that power/ that 
something that I could control/ that you know I can decide what happens to me  
 
35. Cause everything else then just felt/ just felt like once I’d opened my mouth and said 
what/ what’s happened/ what was happening to me/ what my dad was doing 
 
36. Then I felt like/ then everybody else just had control/ that I didn’t have any say in what 
happened/ or any final say in what happened 
 
37. And so that just kind of yeah/ I felt really powerless then/ and really alone 
 
 
STANZA 11 (Wanting to but not doing it) 
 
38. So quite often I would go into her lounge and experiment  
 
39. And want to do something but not actually do it 
 
 
STROPHE 4 (Doing it) 
 
STANZA 12 (Choosing the day) 
 
40. And then/ I think I may have decided a few days prior that you know/ on such and such a 
day I was maybe/ I think it was either a Tuesday or a Wednesday/ on this particular day 
that this was when I was going to do it/ and I’m trying to remember 
 
41. On that particular day I think I had to/ I had cousins young cousins who lived down the 
street from me/ from where I was living at the time/ and their parents wanted me to baby-
sit/ and there was that that I had to do and  
 
42. I partly couldn’t face that either  
 
43. So that was the day that I decided I wanted to do it  
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STANZA 13 (Choosing the spot) 
 
44. She/ R the lady that I lived with she had an anatomy book in her/ in one of her 
bookshelves  
 
45. And I remember looking through this anatomy book and thinking to myself/ where could I 
shoot myself that it would be bad enough that/ people would realise how/ how much pain 
I’m in emotionally/ but that wouldn’t be so bad that/ I would die  
 
46. And then so I figured out that/ shooting myself in the shoulder was where to do that 
 
47. So that’s where I shot myself just here  
 
 
STANZA 14 (Doing it) 
 
48. So I remember going/ taking the gun/ went into her garage 
 
49. She had a garage that was attached to the house 
 
50. And I went by the back garden into her garage and 
 
51. Yeah I shot myself there 
 
 
PART 3 (The aftermath) 
 
STROPHE 5 (First impressions) 
 
STANZA 15 (A big shock) 
 
52. I remember at the time it was/ yeah the initial thing I didn’t feel any pain 
 
53. It was like a complete shock in a way/ I was like astounded that I’d actually done it  
 
 
STANZA 16 (Freaked out) 
 
54. And I remember/ one of the most vivid memories I have about it is 
 
55. You know I think where I’d shot myself there was maybe some muscles or tendons or 
something/ or nerves or something in there that were/ that when I shot myself my whole 
arm just twisted/ twisted like it was really unrecognisable as an arm 
 
56. It just like/ that freaked me out the most/ I still have that memory that thing about it that 
freaked me out the most 
 
57. And that was immediately I think/ as the bullet was going through me 
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STANZA 17 (This warm feeling of blood) 
 
58. Then I remember then this warm feeling of the blood 
 
59. At the time it did not occur to me that it was blood/ but this warm feeling of/ obviously it 
was the blood going down my chest  
 
 
STANZA 18 (Calling for help) 
[Were you scared?] 
 
60. Not at that very moment 
 
61. I think my first impulse or my first thought was to go to the phone 
 
62. So I went to the phone and/ phoned 999/ said I needed an ambulance 
 
63. And I vaguely remember/ I think it was a woman I spoke to and/ I can’t remember exactly 
what I said to her  
 
 
STANZA 19 (Scared) 
 
64. But the next thing I was then lying on the floor near the phone/ and I remember then feeling 
scared/ cause I was still bleeding and it’s then I could feel pain and/ then I felt like I/ yeah 
that’s/ I was actually 
 
65. I seem to remember a lot actually/ I remember lying saying to myself/ I wish I hadn’t done 
this/ I wish I hadn’t done this 
 
 
STROPHE 6 (The rescue) 
 
STANZA 20 (Banging and shouting) 
 
66. And the next thing I could hear people banging on the door 
 
67. And it was the police obviously  
 
68. Then they/ I think they got in through the back door 
 
69. Yeah it was just all them/ all the police shouting/ with their guns in their hand and you 
know/ me lying there 
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STANZA 21 (Lying in the dark) 
 
70. And I think I remember that the room that I’d gone to the phone/ that was the nearest room 
with a phone/ that was at the back of the house/ and it was a bedroom/ and the light bulb in 
that bedroom wasn’t working 
 
71. I remember lying there/ it was getting dark and I remember lying there 
 
72. And I remember the police/ I could hear the police going around the house but I/ it was like 
they couldn’t find me 
 
73. And that felt like forever 
 
 
STANZA 22 (Found) 
[Did you want them to find you?] 
 
74. Yeah I think I did yeah 
 
75. And I think maybe I called out to one of them 
 
76. And then they/ they dragged me out into the hall so they/ cause there was no light in the 
bedroom and 
 
77. Yeah and then I was 
 
 
STANZA 23 (Closing my eyes) 
 
78. But I remember the whole time that/ that from then on/ I remember being aware of everything 
but just closing my eyes  
 
79. And it wasn’t that I wasn’t conscious but I just 
 
80. I was like a dead woman I didn’t want to deal with what was happening around me/ cause 
there was too much happening 
 
 
STANZA 24 (Not dealing with it) 
 
81. And I’ve done that other times when I’ve self-harmed/ you know/ when it gets to the point 
that/ other people have to come and help me/ then I just close me eyes because I can’t deal 
with it  
 
82. It’s like I don’t want to see their faces or I don’t want to/ deal with what/ you know/ with 
everything else that’s going on around because 
 
83. Yeah it’s hard enough dealing with what I’m thinking of I suppose/ at the time 
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Level 1: line and stanza structure 
 
Figure 4.2 presents an outline of Tina’s narrative in terms of stanzas, strophes and parts. 
This patterning provides an overall framework within which to read the other levels of 
meaning; it also orients the reader to the text’s main ideas, events, characters or states. 
 
Figure 4.2: Outline of the narrative in terms of stanzas, strophes and parts 
 
PART 1. THE CONTEXT 
 
STROPHE 1. OPENING UP 
Stanza 1. Working for the lady 
Stanza 2. Going to the police 
Stanza 3. Staying with the lady 
 
STROPHE 2. ON MY OWN 
Stanza 4. A lot of time on my own 
Stanza 5. GCSEs 
Stanza 6. Leaving the family 
 
PART 2. THE ACT 
 
STROPHE 3. REHEARSALS 
Stanza 7. Looking at the gun 
Stanza 8. Figuring the gun out 
Stanza 9. Ready to pull the trigger 
Stanza 10. Something that I could control 
Stanza 11. Wanting to but not doing it 
 
STROPHE 4. DOING IT 
Stanza 12. Choosing the day 
Stanza 13. Choosing the spot 
Stanza 14. Doing it 
 
PART 3. THE AFTERMATH 
 
STROPHE 5. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
Stanza 15. Astounded 
Stanza 16. Freaked out 
Stanza 17. This warm feeling of blood 
Stanza 18. Calling for help 
Stanza 19. Scared 
 
STROPHE 6. THE RESCUE 
Stanza 20. Banging and shouting 
Stanza 21. Lying in the dark 
Stanza 22. Found 
Stanza 23. Closing my eyes 
Stanza 24. Not dealing with it 
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The text follows a temporal sequence, with part 1 presenting the context in which Tina’s 
self-harm took place, part 2 describing the process whereby she first rehearsed and then 
executed the act, and part 3 narrating Tina’s experience in the immediate aftermath of 
the shooting. Within each part, strophes delineate broader themes. Strophe 1 is about 
Tina’s relationship with the female prison officer who encouraged her to report her 
dad’s abuse. Interestingly the patterning of the text suggests Tina’s growing proximity 
to this lady, from working for her in stanza 1, to telling her about the abuse and being 
encouraged by her to go to the police in stanza 2, before finally staying with her instead 
of being sent to ‘strangers’ in stanza 3.  
 
By contrast strophe 2 is about solitude, and how this set Tina up to shoot herself. The 
break with the happy resolution suggested in stanza 3 (staying with her lady friend) is 
clearly marked at the beginning of stanza 4 (‘But then’), which outlines Tina’s growing 
sense of disconnection. Stanzas 5 and 6 complete the picture by bringing forth academic 
pressures and the ‘shock’ of leaving the lively family house, both physically and 
psychologically (‘considering what I’d just told the police’). 
 
Part 2 is about the acting out of Tina’s distress, and opens with ‘So’, thus making clear 
that her turn to self-harm is a direct result of the isolation described in strophe 2. 
Strophe 3 is about gradually mastering the gun. In stanza 7, Tina describes taking the 
gun to look at it, an act she justifies in stanza 8 by reference to curiosity and a desire to 
figure the weapon out. Stanza 9 shifts the focus to Tina’s multiple death rehearsals with 
a turn to conditional tense (‘I would’). Stanza 10 is more reflective, querying the 
rationale behind Tina’s actions at that time, and emphasizing her sense of powerless 
and, once again, of disconnection. Stanza 11 echoes stanza 9 in both content and form 
(two lines), and provides a coda to the strophe.  
 
At the beginning of strophe 4, the expression ‘And then’ marks a new shift, also audible 
on tape in Tina’s more resolute tone of voice. In that strophe Tina no longer 
experiments, she turns to action, first choosing the day in stanza 12, then where to shoot 
herself in stanza 13, and finally pulling the trigger in stanza 14. Tina purposeful 
approach is embedded in the structure of stanzas 12 and 13, where an analysis of 
situation or options is concluded in a similar way: ‘so that was the day’, ‘so that’s where 
I shot myself’. It is also conveyed by the brevity of stanza 14: whereas stanzas 12 and 
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13 contain more details, as Tina actively tries to remember the chain of events and 
thoughts that took her to finally injure herself, stanza 14 is made up of four short lines, 
starkly descriptive of her final actions and given an air of inevitability by the opening 
word ‘So’ (see below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 3 looks at the aftermath of the shooting, and is first remarkable by the absence of 
any syntactic or psycholinguistic opening marker except for a short pause at the start of 
stanza 15. This further emphasizes the matter-of-fact presentation of the act itself in 
stanza 14: Tina moves swiftly on to a reflection on her feelings in the moments 
immediately following the shooting; of her feelings in the moments immediately 
preceding it she does not speak. And yet the very focus on sensations and feelings in 
stanza 15 marks a profound shift in the narrative: through part 3, Tina presents herself 
as mostly passive, helpless and overwhelmed; she no longer plans and acts, she feels 
and waits. Strophe 5 recounts her first impressions in great detail. There is the initial 
shock of having finally ‘done it’ in stanza 15, only to be ‘freaked out’ by her arm’s 
involuntary twisting in stanza 16. Stanza 17 describes the warmth of the blood running 
down her chest. In Stanza 18 Tina calls for help, her first ‘thought’ in the midst of 
strong sensations and feelings. The strophe ends with Tina brutally coming to her senses 
after passing out (‘But the next thing’) and experiencing fear, pain and regret in stanza 
19. Interestingly Tina’s description of regaining consciousness is mirrored in a 
reflective intonation at the end of line 65, and in her surprise at the detail of her 
recollection in line 66 (‘I seem to remember a lot actually’).  
 
The last strophe, strophe 6, narrates Tina’s rescue by the police, contrasting their noisy 
irruption onto the scene in stanza 20 with her lying in the dark, seemingly ‘forever’, in 
stanza 21. When her solitude is finally broken in stanza 22, the experience proves 
overwhelming: Tina closes her eyes (stanza 23). Stanza 24 reads like a coda to the 
Stanza 14  
 
So I remember going/ taking the gun/ went into her garage 
She had a garage that was attached to the house 
And I went by the back garden into her garage and 
Yeah I shot myself there 
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strophe, in which Tina reflects on ‘other times’, and on her inability to process her inner 
and outer experiences around self-injury once others come to her help.  
 
This first reading of the text thus provides a clear set of events, characters (Tina, the 
lady, family members, the police, the 999 operator, the gun), and themes (connection 
versus solitude, mastery and agency versus passivity, doing versus experiencing). As 
such it forms the bedrock for the subsequent analysis. 
 
Level 2: syntax and cohesion 
 
Gee (1991) sees the syntactic system of the text as providing cohesion and spelling out 
the ‘logic’ of the narrative. As was already alluded to above, this is indeed the case here. 
Throughout the use of ‘and’, ‘and then’ and ‘so’ strings Tina’s experiences, decisions 
and actions together, creating a strong narrative and at times an almost ‘logical’ sense of 
progression. From strophe 2 onwards, it is as if self-harm had been set in motion, the 
unavoidable outcome of growing isolation and of Tina’s efforts to regain a degree of 
control over life. At the same time other expressions (e.g., ‘But then’, ‘But the next 
thing’) introduce minor breaks in the action or experiencing, jolting the reader/listener 
into paying heightened attention.  
 
The repetition of certain words and phrases is also noteworthy. Stanza 1 for instance 
opens with the line ‘when I was15/just before my 16th birthday’. Stanza 2 ends with a 
similar turn of phrase (‘just before my 16th birthday/ when I was 15/I went to the police 
about it’), making time and event more salient: this was when it all started, when 
everything changed. The inverted repetition, and the symmetry between stanzas 1 and 2 
that it creates, also introduces a lulling effect, placing a contrasting emphasis on the 
conclusion ‘I went to the police’. In stanza 10, line 35 also presents an interesting 
syntax (‘what’s happened/ what was happening to me/ what my dad was doing’): here 
the effect is to emphasise the enormity and unspeakability of the abuse, since it takes 
Tina three attempts to designate it. Elsewhere repetition is used for emphasis (e.g., ‘that 
freaked me out the most’ in line 56; ‘this warm feeling’ in lines 58 and 59; ‘I remember 
lying there’ in line 71).  Though full interpretation requires attention to other levels and 
linguistic cues, syntax is therefore an integral part of Tina’s meaning-making around the 
event.  
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Level 3: main line of the plot 
 
The third level of analysis and meaning concerns the distinction between the main line 
of the plot and the material off that main line. The former can be traced back to main 
clauses in the text and to the perfective aspect thereof (i.e., in past tense narratives, the 
simple past tense or historical present), thus excluding states alongside generic, repeated 
and habitual events (Gee, 1991). However questions can be raised regarding seemingly 
incidental comments. Here for instance Tina’s remark concerning her GCSEs (‘I did 
actually pass them’) constitutes a main clause with perfective aspect; yet it comes across 
as an aside, and as such was eventually excluded from the main plot. Figure 4.3 presents 
the main material from Tina’s narrative. 
 
Figure 4.3: Main line material signalling the basic plot of the narrative 
 
STANZA 2 (lines 6, 7 and 8) 
 
1.  I told her that my dad was doing some things to me/ that he was abusing me 
2. She encouraged me to go to the police 
3. I went to the police about it 
 
STANZA 8 (line 31) 
 
4.  I figured out how to use it 
 
STANZA 13 (line 46) 
 
5.  I figured out that/ shooting myself in the shoulder was where to do that 
 
STANZA 14 (lines 50 and 51) 
 
6. I went by the back garden into her garage 
7. I shot myself there 
 
STANZA 18 (line 62) 
 
8. I went to the phone and/ phoned 999/ said I needed an ambulance 
 
STANZA 22 (line 76) 
 
9. They dragged me out into the hall 
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According to Gee (1991), level 3 helps the reader suss out the significance of the 
narrative, but only in conjunction with other levels; it throws up questions, to be 
answered later. For instance, the process of figuring out the practicalities of the shooting 
is given a central place in the plot, yet the gun is not named as the chosen weapon in 
any of the main clauses. Does that signify its accessory role, the gun being a mere tool 
in the hands of planning/thinking Tina? On the other hand, whilst the main line 
narrative seems to put Tina firmly in charge, her actions themselves appear so logical as 
to become inevitable, as if shooting herself was the obvious conclusion to her 
engagement with the lady and her gun. The latter in particular takes on the sort of 
‘ready-to-hand’ quality described by Heidegger (Mulhall, 1996); it almost calls out to 
be used by Tina.23 Last, one is struck by the skeletal nature of the plot and, by contrast, 
by the abundance of contextual and feeling material.  
 
Level 4: psychological subjects 
 
Level 4 is concerned with the grammatical subjects of main clauses in the text (whether 
main line or off main line), since these ‘are “psychological launching points” in a 
stanza; they represent points of view from which the material in a stanza is viewed, 
what the narrator is “empathizing” with’, whether animate or inanimate (Gee, 1991, 
p.23).24 In order to get a proper feel for each stanza’s psychological subjects however, 
Gee recommends excluding extra-narrative comments which take the narrator outside 
the stanza (e.g., ‘I remember’), and what he calls ‘dummy subjects’ because they do not 
designate anything (e.g., in ‘it was just curiosity’). Table 4.2 lists the psychological 
subjects identified in Tina’s narrative. 
 
Of particular interest when studying level 4 of a text is the way in which the narrator’s 
stance changes. Here one notices a gradual reduction in the number of psychological 
subjects or stances: in part 1 Tina shifts subject several times, moving between ‘I’, ‘she’ 
(the lady), ‘they’ (it is not clear whether this refers to the police or to social services), 
‘the exams’ and ‘my family’. 
 
 
                                                          
23
 I am indebted for this point to my supervisor Carla Willig. 
24
 In his own example Gee includes waves alongside girls and horses (Gee, 1991). 
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Table 4.2: Psychological subjects in each stanza (line numbers in parentheses) 
 
STORY DIVISION  PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBJECTS 
PART 1 
Stanza 1   I (2), she (= the lady, 3), she (3), I (4) 
Stanza 2   I (5), I (6), she (= the lady, 7), I (8) 
Stanza 3   I (10), they (= the police? social services? 11) 
Stanza 4   she (= the lady, 13), I (14), I (15) 
Stanza 5   the exams (17), I (18) 
Stanza 6   my family (21) 
 
PART 2 
Stanza 7   I (24), it (= the gun, 25), it (25), I (26), I (26) 
Stanza 8   I (28), I (31) 
Stanza 10   I (37) 
Stanza 11   I (38) 
Stanza 12   I (42)  
Stanza 13   she (= the lady, 44), I (46) 
Stanza 14   she (= the lady, 49), I (50), I (51) 
 
PART 3 
Stanza 15   I (53) 
Stanza 16   I (56) 
Stanza 18   I (62) 
Stanza 19   I (64) 
Stanza 20   I (66) 
Stanza 21   I (72) 
Stanza 22    they (= the police, 76), I (77) 
Stanza 23   I (80) 
Stanza 24   I (81) 
 
 
In part 2 however the range of psychological subjects narrows, to include only ‘I’, ‘it’ 
(the gun) and ‘she’ (the lady). Interestingly Tina’s lady friend now seems to perform 
merely an instrumental role, not unlike that of the gun (‘she had an anatomy book’; ‘she 
had a garage’), leaving Tina very much at the centre of the stage. This is also true of 
part 3, where ‘I’ is used throughout with a single exception (the police). By then Tina 
seems fully immersed into her sensations, feelings and thoughts, while the world is 
either invisible (police searching the house) or deliberately kept at bay (closing her 
eyes).  
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Level 5: focusing system 
 
The fifth and last level of interpretation concentrates on the use of pitch glides within 
each stanza. In the English language a pitch glide signals the focus of a sentence, the 
information that the speaker judges especially important and/or new. In Gee’s approach 
pitch glides not only help define distinct idea units, they also mark the most salient 
aspects of the narrative, ‘the key images or themes out of which we are invited to build 
an overall interpretation of the narrative’ (Gee, 1991, p.27). These can then be 
interpreted in the context of the other structural insights garnered through the analysis.   
 
Despite listening to the tape several times, it proved impossible to locate the pitch glides 
in each idea unit: Tina’s delivery was often flat, and I had therefore relied on content 
and pauses/hesitations as well as pitch glides in my earlier patterning. However in each 
stanza a few words or expressions did come out as bearing a more pronounced pitch and 
these are presented in Figure 4.4 below. Using Gee’s notation, material from different 
lines within a stanza is separated by a cross hatch (‘#’), while material from different 
units within the same line is separated by a comma. A few words were given especially 
strong emphasis in Tina’s narration, and these are underlined.  
 
Figure 4.4: Focused material within each stanza 
 
PART 1 
 
STROPHE 1 
Stanza 1 15 # this lady who # pedigree dogs # a job with her 
Stanza 2 for a few months # some things to me, abusing me # encouraged # 15 
Stanza 3 I stayed with her # into foster care 
 
STROPHE 2 
Stanza 4 shooting # quite long hours # an awful lot # I did 
Stanza 5 GCSE year # way down # pass them, amazing 
Stanza 6 time # shock 
 
PART 2 
 
STROPHE 3 
Stanza 7 under her bed # shoebox, locked # take it, into the lounge with it # look  
  at it 
Stanza 8 curiosity, what it felt like, heavy, do with it # after # stupid # how to use 
it 
Stanza 9 on the trigger # the trigger 
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Stanza 10 again, I can decide # any say, any final say # powerless, alone 
Stanza 11 experiment # to do  
 
STROPHE 4 
Stanza 12 decided, on such and such a day # cousins, young cousins, baby-sit, there 
was that # face that # that was the day, do it 
Stanza 13 anatomy book # bad enough, bad # in the shoulder # that’s 
Stanza 14 her garage # back 
 
PART 3 
 
STROPHE 5 
Stanza 15 initial # shock, astounded that I’d actually done it 
Stanza 16 vivid # muscles or tendons or something, or nerves, my whole arm, 
unrecognisable as an arm # freaked me out the most 
Stanza 17 warm # warm 
Stanza 18 impulse # vaguely # exactly 
Stanza 19 the next thing, then feeling scared, it’s then I could feel pain # a lot 
 
STROPHE 6 
Stanza 20 banging on the door # the police # all them shouting, their guns in their 
hands, me lying there 
Stanza 21 light bulb # lying there # I could hear the police, they couldn’t find me # 
forever 
Stanza 22 they dragged me  
Stanza 23 from then on, aware of everything # too much happening 
Stanza 24 other people have to come and help me, I can’t deal with it # everything 
else # thinking of 
 
 
Once the narrative’s focusing system has been outlined, a final interpretation can be 
offered that takes into account salient aspects in all five layers of meaning. Part 1 sets 
the scene for Tina’s self-harm, and this at several levels. First stanza 2, which describes 
Tina’s disclosure to the lady and her subsequent reporting of the abuse to the police, 
contains an inordinate quantity of main line material: these are the actions that set 
everything in motion, marking a turning point in Tina’s life story (and not, interestingly, 
the abuse itself); the way her exact age is underlined, twice over stanzas 1 and 2, further 
confirms this. The importance of Tina’s relationship with the lady is also marked 
throughout strophe 1: the relationship deepens, from work to confidante and supporter 
(strong tonal emphasis on the word ‘encouraged’), and on to housemate/surrogate 
parent (an alternative to foster care). The flow of psychological subjects in stanzas 1 and 
2 is also noteworthy: I – she – she – I – I – I – she – I. Stanza 3 comes almost as a 
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conclusion, a sort of happy ending for Tina, despite the mention of indistinct ‘they’ in 
line 11.  
 
Opening with ‘But then’, strophe 2 marks a brutal shift. There is no development in the 
main plot, though passing her GCSEs is hailed in hindsight as an unexpected 
achievement (focus on ‘amazing’). Instead Tina outlines the combined psychological 
pressures she gradually comes under ‘leading up to me shooting myself’, including the 
effect of a lack of social interaction, exam stress and ‘the shock of leaving’ (and 
betraying?) her real family. Tina’s account remains largely factual, with no use of 
emotion verbs. Yet the expression ‘on my own’ is repeated three times (lines 14, 20 and 
22), and Tina’s growing sense of isolation accentuated in words if not in pitch (‘awful’, 
‘shock’). In stanzas 5 and 6 the narrative also turns more disjointed. Sentences start and 
end abruptly. If strophes 1 and 2 share similar features (overall length, number of 
stanzas), they frame contrasting realities and end very differently: Tina staying with a 
trusted friend away from her abuser (and having had her own say in her living 
arrangements: ‘I didn’t want to’) in stanza 3; Tina in shock, on her own, away from the 
hustle and bustle of family life after having reported her dad to the police in stanza 6. 
The structure of part 1 thus underlines the gap between what may have been young 
Tina’s idealised vision of her new life, and the lonely, fractured reality she finds herself 
in.  
 
Part 2 is about Tina’s response to loneliness, and perhaps disappointment: harming 
herself, in a dramatic yet premeditated way. Once again the narrative unfolds in two 
stages, and thus two strophes. In strophe 3, the focus is on Tina and the gun. Little 
happens, with the only main line material concerning Tina’s successful mastery of the 
weapon (‘I figured out how to use it’). There is great unity of place, expressed both in 
the content and in the rhythm of the strophe: in stanza 7, and then again in stanzas 9 and 
11, Tina describes sitting in the lady’s lounge by herself, experimenting with the gun. 
This repetition feels like a chorus, amplifying the habitual, almost ritualistic nature of 
the act. The comparative length of the strophe is also noteworthy, its six stanzas 
charting the growing readiness of Tina, as she progresses from looking at the gun to 
putting the barrel in her mouth. Interestingly while the theme of aloneness is ever-
present (‘I’ and ‘it’ the only subjects), and in stanza 10 poignantly conveyed with a 
strong emphasis on the word ‘alone’, mastery is what the strophe is about. Tina is now 
126 
 
in charge, with verbs like ‘know’, ‘want’, ‘figure out’. Pitch glides are more perceptible, 
and accentuate terms like ‘I’ and ‘do’. Playing with the gun, rehearsing self-harm, gives 
Tina a sense of control in the midst of her powerlessness. Lines 35 and 36 are especially 
illuminating, describing first Tina as the helpless, silent victim of paternal abuse and 
then, once she has finally opened her mouth, as the equally voiceless, powerless victim 
of her new circumstances. By contrast figuring out the gun is proof that she is not 
stupid, and her finger on the trigger gives her ultimate control over her own fate. The 
two short lines of stanza 11 conclude the strophe, showing Tina finally primed for 
action.  
 
Strophe 4 turns to the act itself. It is shorter at three stanzas, yet more eventful, with 
three items of main line material, including the actual shooting. As already discussed 
above, stanzas 12 and 13 have a similar structure, each recounting in some detail one of 
Tina’s practical decisions, while stanza 14 is short, terse and factual, the actual shooting 
a mere logical step in Tina’s overall plan. The lady returns as a psychological subject, 
but now seems relegated to a subsidiary status: she no longer does anything, merely 
provides the means. Tina is the one in charge. Interestingly however others, and in 
particular family, are also in evidence, though not as subjects. Self-injuring is presented 
as a means to thwart unbearable family expectations (accentuation of ‘there was that 
that I had to do’, and of ‘I partly couldn’t face that either’); and as a carefully weighted 
way to communicate her emotional distress (strong pitch glide on ‘bad enough’ and 
‘bad’). Though Tina relishes her sense of control over life and death she wants to live, 
and through careful premeditation she instrumentalises her act of violence. In the 
process she shows little emotion: if strophe 3 hinted at a lonely helpless girl with a 
barrel in her mouth, strophe 4 is all about planning and doing. 
 
As previously explained, the lack of transitional words or clear psycholinguistic 
markers between the shooting in line 51 and the after-shooting in line 52 seems 
noteworthy. Yet stanza 15, with its two lines, may be seen as a transition in itself: still 
very much a part of Tina’s self-injurious actions, yet with a new, explicit focus on 
feelings and experiencing. This focus sets part 3 apart, and accounts for the fact that ‘I’ 
is this part’s only psychological subject, except for a single shift to ‘they’ (the police) as 
they erupt into the scene of the self-shooting and drag her out into the light, an act of 
violence as much as rescue. Like the others, part 3 comprises two distinct episodes or 
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strophes, this time of equal length (five stanzas). In strophe 5 Tina tries to capture her 
sensations and feelings in the immediate aftermath of her self-harm, from shock at 
having finally ‘done it’, to being ‘freaked out’ (repeated twice) by the involuntary 
twisting of her arm, to the warm feeling of her blood (repeated again, with the word 
‘warm’ heavily accented both times), followed by her call for help and ‘then’ 
(emphasized) and only ‘then’, pain and fear. Several aspects of this strophe merit 
attention. First, the rhythm imparted by the alternating of short stanzas describing raw 
sensations, and longer ones describing more complex actions (twisting of the arm, 
calling 999), and arguably mirroring Tina’s shifting awareness. Then the thorough, 
methodical nature of Tina’s reminiscing: stanzas 15 to 19 provide what seems a blow-
by-blow account of her inner experience, anchored in a clear (if subjective) timeframe: 
‘at the time’ (line 52); ‘immediately’ (line 57); ‘then’ repeated twice (line 58), ‘at the 
time ‘ again (line 59), ‘at that very moment’ (line 60), and ‘then’ (strongly accentuated, 
line 64). She later expresses surprise at the detail of her recollection. By contrast, 
despite providing the sole segment of main line material her impulsive call for help is 
only ‘vaguely’ remembered (with emphasis on the word ‘vaguely’). Stanza 19 closes on 
a litany as Tina, now lying scared and in pain, repeats to herself ‘I wish I hadn’t done 
this/ I wish I hadn’t done this’. By the end of the strophe all pretence at control and 
detachment has gone. 
 
Strophe 6 sees Tina’s sensorial bubble being pricked with the noisy intrusion of the 
police, ‘banging’ and ‘shouting’, with their ‘guns’ in their hand (all of which 
accentuated). The contrast with Tina’s situation, lying alone and in the dark, is stark. 
Whereas in strophe 5 she had confidently anchored her narrative in time, now she loses 
her chronological bearings: the wait feels ‘like forever’. Yet the way she is eventually 
‘dragged out’ into the hall, and into the light, almost feels like a violation, and her act of 
closing her eyes an instinctive response. The strophe concludes with a coda: in stanza 
24 Tina relates this first major episode of self-harm to others and outlines a consistent 
pattern.  Her choice of words in line 81 is worth considering: when other people ‘have 
to’ come and rescue her, is it because she leaves them no choice (calling emergency 
services) or because far from empowering her, self-harm ultimately reduces her to a 
state of complete helplessness? What is clear is that the aftermath of her act leaves her 
overwhelmed: unable to confront the (reproaching?) faces of her helpers and deal with 
‘everything else’ going on around her, and struggling to process her own ‘thinking’ 
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(accentuated in the text). Perhaps this last stanza also captures the complex, 
contradictory relationship Tina has with control and agency: wanting to act, yet at the 
same time wanting others to deal with the consequences of her actions.  
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
 
Gee’s linguistic approach to the text, with its close attention to structure and prosody, 
provided a further reading around Tina’s narrated experience of self-injury. At times 
this reading seemed to echo the thematic analysis carried out in chapter 3, where self-
harm had similarly been presented as a way to achieve control over life and as a means 
to communicate distress. However the detailed interpretation of this highly significant 
episode also focused attention on new elements. One was the importance of social 
connection or disconnection: Tina’s act was framed as the direct result of losing touch 
with family and lady friend and finding herself alone, an experience she both described 
and embedded into the text (e.g., through her choice of psychological subjects). The act 
of shooting herself became a dramatic call for attention and help, albeit one that she 
ultimately could not face up to.  
 
Also in evidence was the relationship between Tina and her weapon of choice, the gun, 
which became a psychological subject in its own right. Strophe 3 outlined a process of 
habituation whereby she familiarized herself with the weapon’s feel: its weight, the 
sensation of the barrel in her mouth. Always the scientist (see previous chapter), Tina 
described a behaviour initially driven by curiosity and based on experimentation. But 
the repetitive nature of that process (reflected in the length and structure of the strophe 
itself) suggested that Tina was also rehearsing severe self-harming, gradually breaking 
down her self-protective psychological barriers and developing mastery over her own 
instincts, a key precondition to violence against the self (Joiner, 2007). The repetition 
also gave Tina’s preparations a ritualistic feel, possibly adding to her sense of control. 
 
The richness of this single episode of self-injury was also noteworthy, confirming its 
status as ‘nuclear episode’. Within its 24 stanzas it encompassed a complex account of 
Tina’s actions and reactions, one which blended external circumstances and inner 
experiencing in making sense of her act. Taking the interpretative work further, one 
could reflect on the centrality within of the two thematic lines dear to life story analysts, 
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power and intimacy (McAdams, 1988). In Part 2 of Tina’s narrative self-shooting 
became a way to affirm mastery (over fear) and effect impact (on others); however it 
could also be read as a response to a lack or loss of intimacy, a desperate attempt to 
make others notice and empathise, as prefigured by Part 1. Part 3 exposed the futility of 
Tina’s actions: in Strophe 5 she lost control over her body and senses, and ended up 
mired in guilt and regret; in Strophe 6 her sense of isolation and helplessness was 
heightened by the brutal intervention of the police. Both the inner logic and the self-
defeating nature of Tina’s act were thus given a powerful expression, one that Gee’s 
approach rigorously articulated. 
 
4.3 Self-injury and Tina’s illness narratives 
 
But Tina’s self-harm did not begin and end with this episode, however significant. 
Instead, it accompanied her through life, from the beginning (‘as far as I can 
remember’) to the time of the interviews. It therefore seemed an important thread in her 
life story, one that might both reflect and express her sense of self. Exploring the 
meaning of Tina’s self-injuring in the context of her overall story required a different 
form of narrative analysis however: more holistic in its approach to the text, perhaps 
also more sensitive to Tina’s understanding of herself as someone who repetitively self-
injured.  
 
4.3.1 Frank’s illness narratives 
 
Having considered several frames of analysis (e.g., Gergen & Gergen, 1983; McAdams, 
1993), a decision was made to use that proposed by Arthur W. Frank (1995). Frank sees 
stories as ‘the self’s medium of being’; in the context of illness, stories also ‘have to 
repair the damage that illness has done to the ill person’s sense of where she is in life, 
and where she might be going’ (Frank, 1995, p.53). Frank argues that those engaged in 
such narrative repair work tend to use three main illness narratives, often in 
combination: a restitution narrative (‘Yesterday I was healthy, today I’m sick, but 
tomorrow I’ll be healthy again’); a chaos narrative, which Frank describes as “an anti-
narrative of time without sequence, telling without mediation, and speaking about 
oneself without being able to fully reflect on oneself’ (Frank, 1995, p.98); and a quest 
narrative, in which the illness becomes a journey, with new meaning as its destination. 
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Far from being passive, helpless victims of their fate, ill people are thus presented as 
‘wounded storytellers’, drawing narrative power from their sick body. 
 
The more I read her interviews the more Tina appeared to me as a wounded storyteller 
and the story weaved around her self-harming as an illness narrative; in turn, Tina’s 
cutting could be seen as a way in which her narrative was being expressed through the 
body, thus also echoing Frank’s interest in the ‘body-self’ and the ‘acting out’ of illness. 
I also felt that this approach, with its emphasis on the empathic bond between teller and 
listener, would bring out some of the dialogic aspects of the interviewing process, 
hitherto largely neglected. I did however refrain from pushing my discussion of the 
positioning of Tina’s narrative too far, for fear of undercutting the third and last 
segment of interpretative work (see chapter 5). 
 
Last, Frank’s insistence that one should think with stories, experience them as affecting 
oneself and not ‘merely’ try to analyse them, seemed a valuable counterpoint in this 
analytics-heavy research project, and one which deeply resonated with my own ethical 
and clinical stance, a point that is further taken up in the last section. 
 
As for method, the first step of the work consisted of reading through the three 
transcripts again in order to immerse myself anew in Tina’s overall narrative. I then re-
read them once more, this time holding in mind Frank’s heuristic frameworks. The idea 
was not to shoe-horn Tina’s story into one or more of his illness narratives, but rather to 
try and disentangle narrative threads and in the process recognise ‘what basic life 
concerns are being addressed and how the story proclaims a certain relation of the body 
to the world’ (Frank, 1995, p.24). I was also mindful of the way in which the narratives 
might combine and interrupt each other, both across and within individual interviews. 
 
4.3.2 Analysis 
 
From getting better to bearing witness 
 
All three of Frank’s illness narratives could be found in the telling of Tina’s story 
around self-injury. During the first minutes of the first interview, Tina volunteered a 
clear, tightly sequenced restitution narrative. Given the chronic nature of her difficulties, 
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the basic storyline of the restitution plot was somewhat twisted: instead of ‘yesterday I 
was healthy, today I am sick, tomorrow I’ll be healthy again’, Tina’s story outlined 
moderate, secret episodes of self-harming in childhood, followed by severe self-harming 
requiring in-patient treatment, followed by reduced self-harming after what appeared to 
be a successful course of specialist treatment. Interestingly, each of these stages took 
place in a different setting, from family home to hospital to independent 
accommodation, and suggested a different degree of agency on her part, from acting in 
secret, to being sectioned, to finally actively seeking help and moving abroad. Having 
figuratively retraced her steps and come to a place where her self-harm was 
‘significantly reduced’ Tina expressed satisfaction, first with a soft laughter, and then 
verbally: ‘I suppose when I say that all in one thing long, you know when I say that out 
loud it kind of makes me realise how far I’ve come so… It’s good.’ To borrow from 
McAdams (1993), the tone of this first narrative episode was resolutely optimistic: Tina 
the child had struggled; Tina the young adult had been very ill; the more mature Tina 
had found her own space, gained new control over herself, and could look to the future 
with hope. 
 
Tina’s restitution narrative was briefly foregrounded again in the third interview, in 
response to a question on possible ways in which her self-harming had changed over 
time: 
 
T. Um, significantly it’s reduced, um... I was actually thinking the other day that I 
haven’t, I have had like countless operations because of it, um, and it’s almost 
two years now since I’ve had one, which is a big thing for me. Cause, you know, 
I could have had, maybe five operations a year at one point, and, you know, 
that’s, it’s a big thing to go a whole two years without an operation, um… so… 
yeah, that’s… [sighing] um… And the other thing as well is that the more… the 
greater the gap between self-harm, the more you’re, the more you’ve left it 
behind you, say the last self-harm, the easier it gets to be able to challenge it. 
Because then you realise how… much better things are when you don’t self-
harm… 
 
In this extract Tina emphasized both the reduction in her self-injuring and how much of 
a ‘big thing’ it represented in the context of her story. Her cutting seemed a barometer 
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of her health, and its decreased severity an indication of her progress in life and therapy. 
She also spun a narrative of hope: after looking at the past with its ‘countless 
operations’, and taking stock of the surgery-free present, she framed a future when 
challenging her cutting might become ever easier. Self-harming might finally be ‘left 
behind’, and the integrity of the body restored.  
 
In this process of regaining control over self and body, Tina saw therapy, and in 
particular dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT) as having played a key role: it provided 
her with ‘strategies’, ‘tools’, ‘skills’, ‘something tangible, something that you can use’. 
Just as importantly, it gave her a new sense of direction, a map in the midst of her 
confused experiential landscape:  
 
you can see like a goal, you can see: right this is point A and we’re going to 
point B; and this is how I want to do it, by doing X, Y and Z. You know, you 
can see where you’re going. 
 
Being under the ongoing care of her therapist (‘my psychologist’) also seemed to 
provide Tina with reassurance: a place to check in, make psychological sense of her 
experience and keep track of her progress on a weekly basis. There was thus a clear 
restitution thread in Tina’s story, an episodic sense of being ‘on the mend’, both 
mentally and bodily, largely thanks to a new, more helpful course of treatment.  
 
But there were also glimpses of a quest narrative. Frank describes the quest story as 
being that of finding a voice: the narrator has been on a journey and has emerged from 
this experience not ‘cured’ but changed, in possession of a wisdom which he now wants 
to share with others, ‘perhaps to make a difference to the unfolding of their stories’ 
(Frank, 1995, p.127). This desire to share with others her own experience and maybe 
make a difference was clearly present in Tina’s narrative, from the very first interview: 
 
I think, um, I think because, you know, some of the reactions that I’ve had, not 
so much here in England but in Ireland, reactions from some health, not all, but 
some health professionals that, you know the whole thing about being 
manipulative and attention-seeking and all of that, I feel in a way that it’s quite 
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important for me, for people to see that it’s not what it’s about. And so I’m quite 
happy to talk about it if, you know, it makes a difference, um, you know.  
 
The third interview ended on a similar note: 
 
D. How was it to have the last interview?  
 
T. Um… I’m quite… I know, um… I’m not very good at using the word ‘proud’, I 
usually used the word ‘chuffed’, but yeah, I’ve got to say I’m quite proud of 
myself I’ve done it… yeah… cause I know this is gonna… help other people. 
 
D. Yeah. 
 
T. Um… you know, people that are maybe in the situation that I was in two or 
three years ago, and even people that are, sort at the same stage that I am now,  
you know this, you know this is gonna help, so. 
 
More generally, and as already discussed in the previous chapter, throughout the 
interviewing process Tina displayed a reflective stance, using our conversations to 
actively make sense of her self-injuring and how it fitted with her inner and outer 
experiences. Even though her meaning-making was very much ongoing, Tina’s story 
could thus be seen, in part at least, as a story of change: from being the ‘clueless’ victim 
of circumstances and mental processes, to becoming the aware, empowered manager of 
her own life and emotions, and witness to the difficulties encountered by those who 
self-harm. Nor was Tina’s testimony limited to the storying of her experience: her offer 
to show me her arms because ‘it may help you’ further emphasized the communicative 
function of self-injury itself, the embodied dimension of her illness. Together we looked 
at her scars, big and small, ‘significant’ and ‘superficial’, and it did indeed help me from 
both a relational and a phenomenological standpoint. I felt closer to her in that moment, 
physically and emotionally, and deeply engaged in a common process of sense-making 
around her self-injury. To use Frank’s terminology, Tina’s quest narrative also made her 
self-harm an essential part of her ‘living testimony’.  
 
  
134 
 
Self-harm and chaos 
 
Still, behind her new awareness of and increased control over her self-injuring lurked a 
third narrative, one that may have been unspeakable at times of acute distress and still 
conveyed a painful experiential truth. In chaos narratives life does not get better: the 
wound is just too raw, the danger ever-present. The chaos story is thus best seen as ‘an 
anti-narrative of time without sequence, telling without mediation, and speaking about 
oneself without being fully able to reflect on oneself’ (Frank, 1995, p.98). One of its 
distinguishing features is the absence of narrative sequencing: the speaker appears 
frozen in an uncontrollable present, full of fear and hopelessness. The following extract, 
taken from the beginning of the third interview, offers a glimpse into Tina’s chaotic 
world. 
 
T. I get times where, um, sometimes where, like days where I don’t remember a 
few hours or, a day or so… 
 
D. Um. 
 
T. I mean it’s just like the time passes and I know when it’s over, and, um, 
sometimes in those times I’ll have self-harmed, um… and, that’s really 
frustrating for me, cause… because… it’s almost like I’m fighting so hard not to 
do it that maybe it’s coming out in another way, and… you know, it’s such a 
strong, um… pull towards it, that I’m doing that unconsciously or something, 
um… [sighing] Um…and that can be really frustrating, um... [voice trailing off] 
yeah… Well more than frustrating, um… that’s… 
 
D. More than frustrating. 
 
T. Yeah, it’s… scary, it’s, um… [sighing] It’s anxiety-provoking, um… It’s… in a 
way it kind of makes you, makes me feel crazy [smiling/laughing], um… and… 
then I’m really really self-conscious, cause I worry that, you know I’m doing 
things and I’m not aware of it, and then, so, does that mean then that I say things 
and do things to people that I’m not aware of as well… Which nobody’s ever 
said that I have, but, you still have that worry in your head that, you know… 
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And then… what makes it worse is just that, um, that I’m always so careful 
about things I say and do that, um, that… that’s a big anxiety or upset that I did 
something that I wouldn’t normally do and you know, that’s… scary 
[smiling/laughing], um… so… yeah… [smiling/laughing; clearing her throat] 
 
In Tina’s account of her first episode of major self-harm the use of the syntactic 
structure ‘and then’ gave the narrative coherence and logic. Here however its 
introduction can be seen as a further indication that her narrative has turned chaotic, 
undercutting itself (Frank, 1995). The content of Tina’s story suggests a complete loss 
of control, from unconsciously hurting herself to (maybe) unconsciously hurting others, 
from being ‘always so careful’ to not being aware. The intermittent use of the second 
person is noteworthy, as it may represent an attempt to draw her listener in, to help her 
understand what cannot be truly conveyed, or alternatively indicate a lack of connection 
with her own experience. Yet Tina’s narrative is also punctuated by half smiles and soft 
bursts of mirthless laughter: it is as if she was trying to minimise the dramatic impact of 
her narrative, to lighten up dark words like ‘crazy’ and ‘scary’.  
 
Interestingly at this point I appeared to shy away from her pain and interjected a 
restitution storyline, effectively moving Tina’s narrative along, in a different direction.  
 
D. But the way you understand your self-harming has changed, you said, over time, 
especially over the past two years. 
 
T. Yeah. 
 
Because they sit on the edge of both despair and speech chaos stories are hard on the 
listener, who may then undercut the narrator in an unwitting attempt to alleviate her 
own anxiety. This is arguably what happened here: I cut in with an upbeat remark, as if 
unable to bear Tina’s fractured narrative and trying to restore a more optimistic tone. 
 
A similar sequence of speech events emerged towards the end of the third interview, 
where Tina presented her self-harm as a way to manage her life when other options, like 
talking, seemed even harder. Once again she foregrounded a chaotic narrative in which 
she lost all bearings, including her sense of the future. Her powerlessness was further 
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accentuated through the repetition of the word ‘really’ and she once again alternated 
between first and second person grammatical constructions.  
 
T. [pause] Yeah I suppose that self-harm is kind of, is an easier option in a way. 
Easier in the sense, well… easier in the sense that, you have… some… um… 
you know that… that it will work, at least for the short term. And that’s… See 
when you get really distressed or really anxious or overwhelmed, you can’t 
think… It’s really really hard to think beyond the next minutes or the next few 
seconds even. It’s like: I can’t stand this any longer, um... So you don’t… it’s 
like you just don’t have this foresight. You don’t have, um… you know, it’s 
really really hard to be able to stop yourself, to say, you know: this time next 
week I’m gonna have another scar on my arm or, you know, even in a couple of 
hours’ time, I might end up having to go to hospital, and I hate hospitals. But, 
you know, it’s just that, you know, you can’t see past the next few seconds or 
minutes; because it feels like forever.  
 
Like before, as Tina’s narrative continued to unfold her struggle to maintain a sense of 
self was also given syntactic emphasis with the use of ‘then’ to mark her erratic moves 
from one crisis to the next: 
 
And then even when you say to yourself: well… [clearing her throat] Like I 
know now I say to myself: crisis… remember, crisis is only short term. Then 
you say… sometimes you say to yourself, well, that’s ok. But, you know, I will 
have this crisis now for a few hours, or a day or two, and then I’ll have a nice 
couple of days when I’m sort of… more on a level, I can manage things. But 
then, a couple of days later I will have this crisis again, and it just feels like it’s 
never ending. And even when you have that sort of break between crises 
[smiling/laughing], um… you know… It’s all… that’s all in the back of your 
head. It’s always there, that, um… you know… I don’t know when I’m gonna 
feel completely overwhelmed again, um… And that’s just, that really… yeah 
[voice trailing off]. It kinda limits what, you know, what your life’s up to. 
Because you start avoiding things, you start avoiding situations that you know 
are gonna stress you. But then sometimes avoiding things only makes them pile 
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up so… so then that’s another stress, you know, so… It’s so hard to manage, 
um… It’s just… yeah… [smiling/laughing, voice trailing off] 
 
Again Tina expressed a lack of control over life and self, which echoed her accounts of 
dissociation. In her chaotic narrative self-harm seemed to represent both action and 
surrender, control and loss of control. Unwilling to end the last interview on such a 
hopeless note, once again I steered Tina away from her distress by bringing her back to 
a restitution story.  
 
D. But obviously you’ve become more able to manage this, since… 
 
T. Yeah. 
 
D. … you said it’s been two years since you’ve had an operation. 
 
T. Yeah, yeah. 
 
The contrast between the structured, progressive narrative drawn at the beginning of the 
first interview and the fractured, hopeless story glimpsed at the end of the third was 
stark. Maybe anxious to express more of her ‘true’ self, maybe emboldened by our 
growing intimacy, Tina may have seized this last opportunity to give her self-harming a 
much darker shroud, one that better captured her underlying anguish, to my unwitting 
yet obvious discomfort. Yet her ability to verbalise her distress, to communicate it to me 
in a felt, intelligible manner, also spoke to her emerging sense of self: Tina could now 
reflect on the presence of chaos in her life; in other words, stand outside chaos. 
 
Perhaps echoing that feeling, or perhaps responding to my ‘prompt’, Tina then spent the 
last few minutes of the last interview emphasizing anew the awareness gained, the 
usefulness of DBT, and her pride at having taken part so others could be helped. 
Looking back, I was reminded that one function of a quest narrative is to hold chaos at 
bay; maybe that is what this final exchange was also about: anchoring Tina more firmly 
in the transitional space between chaos and health.  
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4.3.3 Discussion 
 
Using Frank’s illness narratives as heuristic devices took the interpretative work in a 
different direction: no longer seeking to identify overarching themes, or to pick up 
linguistic and prosodic clues, but placing her account of self-injury within a broader 
meaning-making process, one concerned with her overall sense of self. Frank’s 
respectful emphasis on the intertwining of threads in illness stories was especially 
valuable. In Tina’s narrative, like indeed in most stories of illness and the self, 
restitution, quest and chaos seemed to alternate; self-harm was therefore imbued with a 
plurality of meanings: barometer of emotional health and physical integrity; living (and 
bodily) testimony of distress and survival; self-defeating attempt at controlling the 
uncontrollable. Recognising these different meanings, and how they fitted with Tina’s 
understanding of her mental illness and life story, shed a different light on her 
experience of, and sense-making around, self-harm. The fact that Tina was still self-
injuring at the time of the interviews was also worth bearing in mind, the way she held 
contrasting narratives in tension a reflection of her struggle to reconcile her new 
understanding of and greater control over self-injury with her enduring emotional 
difficulties. Past research on deliberate self-harm and illness narratives amongst 
previously injuring participants had found that chaos narratives tended to describe past 
actions and quest narratives the self-harm-free present (Sinclair & Green, 2005). There 
was no such sequencing here. 
 
The expression by Tina of multiple voices also raised important questions with respect 
to their construction, what Frank refers to as polyphony and heteroglossia in illness 
narratives: the former emphasizing the way in which the speaker’s voice resonates with 
that of significant others; the latter pointing to the multiple codes of language borrowed 
in the process of storytelling (Frank, 2012). These aspects of meaning construction are 
further explored in the next chapter. 
 
Additional insight was gained by paying attention to the response different narrative 
voices may elicit in the listener. As was shown above, on several occasions I 
unwittingly ignored Tina’s chaotic narrative and encouraged her to construct a more 
optimistic picture of her self-harm and inner world. In so doing I may have emulated 
past listeners, whether clinicians or significant others, who could not sit with the 
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intensity and disjointedness of her experience and in their denial merely confirmed that 
she could not be heard. By bringing in the dialogic dimension of the narrative, Frank’s 
approach thus laid out the contribution of the other (including the researcher) to the 
meaning-making process, and how it may constrain the production of a narrative as well 
as enable it. Inasmuch as the construction and sharing of a narrative is generally 
regarded as having therapeutic value, this last point also has significant implications for 
clinical practice.  
 
4.4 Reflections on the use of narrative analysis 
 
I found the plurality and openness of the narrative approach both appealing and 
daunting. Being able to select my very own mix of interpretative foci and models meant 
I could tailor the analysis both to the requirements of my project and to what I 
perceived to be the salient features of Tina’s account. For instance, the length of the 
material made a microanalysis of all three interviews impossible within the time and 
space imparted. Furthermore the interview guide used, though quite flexible, had 
shaped the telling of Tina’s story: instead of a long narrative with a beginning, middle 
and end, the transcript contained a succession of loosely, and to some extent 
thematically organised segments, some recognisable as ‘stories’, others less so. 25  
 
By combining the structural analysis of a segment of text with the holistic framing of 
Tina’s illness narratives I was able to zoom in and out, and in the process illustrate how 
my participant’s story-making made sense of her self-injuring. However I was also wary 
of opening my work to a charge of arbitrariness: why this approach and not that one? 
This segment and not another? The relative freedom afforded by a narrative approach 
thus meant added responsibility for my methodological and interpretative choices, and I 
spent a considerable time weighing my options and making sure the combination of 
narrative lenses eventually adopted would be both appropriate and coherent.  
 
In more practical terms, I occasionally struggled with the requirements of Gee’s 
approach: Tina’s flat delivery made it difficult at times to identify prosodic elements in 
the interview segment, and I wondered to what extent my command of English (for me a 
                                                          
25
 For a fuller discussion of the nature of stories and narratives, and in particular the defining role of 
sequencing within, see Riessman (1993) or Crossley (2000). 
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second language) might cloud the analysis. Overall however I appreciated the rigour 
and transparency of his layered approach to the text, and the way glimmers of meaning 
seemed to bounce across levels in the final reading.  
 
My experience with Frank’s narrative approach was very different. I tried to follow his 
injunction to think ‘with’ rather than ‘about’ the text, and found his illness narratives to 
be great listening devices. Expressed through multiple voices Tina’s story felt real, 
authentic. I also felt more openly involved in the meaning-making process: no longer 
‘neutral’ scribe and analyst, but co-producer, witness, fellow human. However this 
greater freedom and expressivity also raised doubts. Writing about Tina’s narratives 
felt at times like writing fiction, albeit a fiction created with Tina in mind and supported 
by her text. Would I end up romanticizing her narrative, an accusation previously 
levelled at Frank (Bury, 2001)? And most importantly, would the result be robust 
enough? Keeping an eye on the explicit criteria for evaluating narrative studies 
proposed by Lieblich and her associates (1998) – width, coherence, insightfulness and 
parsimony – provided some reassurance. So did my efforts to firmly ground the 
interpretation in Tina’s account, in line with my contextual constructionist 
epistemological stance. 
 
Still, I derived great satisfaction from being able to pay attention to form as well as 
content, and from recasting Tina’s story empathetically. In the process I developed a 
more intricate reading of her meaning-making around self-harm, one in which the 
patterning and expression of her experience took on a new importance. 
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5. Psychosocial reading 
 
In this third and last reading of Tina’s material an attempt was made to contextualize 
her meaning-making around self-harm, both in relation to the culture and discourse she 
had drawn on, and in relation to her own psyche and family relations. Despite the 
obvious socio-cultural embeddedness of the phenomenon and the existence of a rich 
psychodynamic literature on the subject, the literature review had failed to identify a 
single exploration of self-injury combining discursive and psychoanalytical readings. It 
was therefore hoped that this third interpretative lens would shed new light on the 
research question at the heart of this project: how does an individual who engages in 
repetitive self-injury make sense of her behaviour? This time however the expression 
‘make sense’ would take on a different meaning: no longer making sense to self through 
phenomenological exploration or the storying of experience; but making sense to others, 
including through unconscious communications. 
 
The chapter first provides a short introduction to the field of psychosocial studies, and 
discusses the value and difficulty of combining discursive analysis and psychoanalysis. 
In the process the methodological and epistemological issues raised by the choice of a 
psychosocial lens in the context of this project are elucidated. A second section presents 
the analysis carried out on Tina’s interview transcripts. A discussion of the findings 
follows, providing a critical appraisal of the approach. As always, a brief reflexive 
section concludes. 
 
5.1 The approach 
 
5.1.1 Psychosocial studies and psychoanalysis 
 
The psyche dynamically alters that which society imposes upon it  
(Cavaletto, 2007, p.262) 
 
With roots in critical social psychology, sociology, psychoanalysis and feminist social 
research, the field of psychosocial studies can be described as ‘a critical approach 
interested in articulating a place of “suture” between elements whose contribution to the 
production of the human subject is normally theorized separately’ (Frosh & Baraitser, 
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2008, p.350). Of particular interest here are efforts to bridge the divide between the 
social and the psychological by combining the insights of two contrasting approaches to 
human experience: discursive analysis and psychoanalysis.  
 
The logic behind this tentative articulation seems reasonably straightforward: exploring 
the contribution of unconscious processes to discursive positioning and language 
construction should enable the researcher to inject a psychological dimension into a 
discussion of the individual’s socially constructed reality, thus bringing together inner 
and outer experiences. 
 
However the two approaches rest on different epistemological stances. For discursive 
analysts, individual reality is socially constructed; the constructive and performative 
aspects of language therefore constitute the only valid focus of analysis. In other words 
discursive analysis is firmly grounded in a social constructionist position. 
Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, is predicated on the existence of an internal reality, 
one that can be investigated and ‘known’, albeit indirectly. Through the use of such 
techniques as free association or dream analysis, and by paying close attention to the 
intersubjective dynamics between analyst and analysand, the analyst can bring to light 
the psychic structures and processes that underlie meaning-making. It could be argued 
that psychoanalysts thus subscribe to a realist epistemology. 
 
In order to resolve this conflict psychosocial researchers have adopted a critical realist 
stance, one that assumes the existence of enduring underlying psychic processes (e.g., 
desires), yet accepts that these can only be known imperfectly, not least because they 
may manifest in an unusual and puzzling way (Willig, 2012). But they vary 
considerably in their belief that inner psychological mechanisms can indeed be 
accounted for. Some place identifiable unconscious conflicts and psychic defences at 
the centre of the interpretative work (e.g., Hollway & Jefferson, 2005 and 2012). 
Others, rejecting this approach as futile and deterministic, opt for a Lacanian 
perspective in which ‘the unconscious is understood and used not as a “thing” with a 
specific location, but rather as a domain of experience which is outside of our awareness 
but is nevertheless constitutive of that awareness’ (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010, 
p.516). Of particular import in this latter version are textual clues or ‘glitches’, 
linguistic moves that point to a failure to symbolize. This emphasis on language and 
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reluctance to define an underlying ‘reality’ takes the proponents of a Lacanian approach 
closer to social constructionism. 
 
5.1.2 Choosing a stance 
 
Developing a psychosocial interpretation of Tina’s account therefore required that I 
choose a set of psychoanalytically-informed theoretical concepts, a choice that would 
carry considerable implications in epistemological and methodological terms. After 
careful consideration, I opted for a Kleinian reading of the text, thus positioning my 
work at the ‘realist’ end of the critical realist spectrum. There were several reasons for 
this. Firstly, this stance would be compatible with that of contextual constructionism 
adopted so far, thus enabling me to triangulate, maybe even integrate my readings.  
Secondly, a Kleinian approach seemed one way of putting into practice my commitment 
to working therapeutically with enduring underlying psychological constructs and 
processes. The use of biographical and developmental information was also habitual in 
my clinical work. Last, I was curious to see how a dual focus on Tina’s family 
dynamics and on our transference/countertransference might open up new vistas of 
interpretation. I therefore decided to follow the approach proposed by Wendy Hollway 
and Tony Jefferson (2012).  
 
5.1.3 The method 
 
Though they are keen to point out that their work uses ‘psychoanalytically informed’ 
methods and concepts rather than psychoanalytic ones, the interpretative approach 
developed by Hollway and Jefferson pays particular attention to unconscious defences: 
both participant and researcher are seen as ‘defended subjects’, and the task of the 
researcher is to offer a reading of the participant’s account that is informed by possible 
underlying conflicts, using constructs drawn largely from object relations theory. To 
achieve this, the researcher relies on several sources: the contradictions and 
inconsistencies present in the text; biographical information, especially that concerning 
childhood experiences and family dynamics; and the researcher’s own emotional 
response to the interview, as documented in a field journal.  
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Several aspects of this approach deserve to be briefly discussed here, starting with its 
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’. Though interested in the participant’s ‘face value’ account, 
Hollway and Jefferson argue that it will naturally gloss over inner motives and 
contradictions, many of which may elude the participant’s conscious awareness. 
Bringing those contradictions and underlying psychic structures to light should 
therefore produce a fuller, truly psycho-social picture of the meaning-making taking 
place around a particular experience.  
 
However this requires the collection of rich personal data, both biographical and textual. 
To gather such data Hollway and Jefferson use what they call free association narrative 
interviewing (FANI), a form of interview that uses open-ended questions, invites the 
narrator to share their story, avoids ‘why’ questions, and lets the participant set the 
sequencing, content and pace of the interview to a large extent, so that ‘pathways of 
associations’ can emerge. Building on Bion’s notion of therapeutic containment, they 
also advocate the use of two interviews, ideally one week apart, so that trust can 
develop between participant and researcher:  
 
the researcher is implicated at every stage, often unintentionally, in what can and 
cannot be thought and said. Usually (when conditions of trust are established), a 
containing interview relationship enables participants to relax the defences that 
could otherwise show up as talk limited to what is already familiar and 
intellectually fenced. (Hollway & Jefferson, 2012, p.151) 
 
As was discussed in chapter 2, the form and scheduling of Tina’s interviews largely 
abided by these recommendations, opening up space for her complex, and possibly 
contradictory sense-making around self-harm to emerge.  
 
Also interesting is the strong emphasis placed on the role of unconscious 
intersubjectivity in the interviewing process. In practice, the approach requires that the 
researcher carefully records her first impressions, paying attention to how she responds 
and relates to what the participant is saying; that she analyses the co-production of data 
through the flow of questions and answers, once again looking at the contribution of 
unconscious dynamics between defended researcher and defended subject; and 
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considers the extent to which containment may or may not have been provided so that a 
freer, richer narrative may emerge (Hollway & Jefferson, 2012).  
 
The analytical work proceeds in stages. First the text is considered at face value and its 
key themes identified. Then it is read in context: all the information gathered through 
the interviews, biographical and textual, is mustered in an effort to locate the defended 
subject and raise questions concerning the narrator’s choice of discursive positions. In a 
third stage, psychoanalytical concepts are brought in to make sense of inconsistencies, 
contradictions and discursive investments. Last, reflexivity is utilised to alert the 
researcher to the ways in which she contributed to the reconstruction of meaning.  
 
A similar approach was followed here, with one exception: by the time the psychosocial 
analysis started the themes of the interviews had already been explored. The work 
therefore began with a careful re-reading of the three interviews, paying attention to 
how language had been used by both Tina and me. As I was reading I asked myself 
questions about what was being said and how it was being said. I then repeated the 
process, this time line-by-line, combing the text in order to see how its features 
(terminology, grammar, metaphors…) delineated certain interpretative repertoires, 
which in turn supported particular discursive constructions and positionings (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). In identifying the latter I also drew upon my biographical knowledge 
of Tina. Throughout I remained alert to possible contradictions and inconsistencies. I 
then began writing my analysis up, albeit tentatively, so as to clarify key themes and 
illustrations. 
 
The next step consisted of drawing on psychoanalytical concepts, within an object-
relations framework, to interpret Tina’s discursive constructions in relation to self-
injury. Last, I returned to my field journal, and to the detailed notes taken after each 
interview, to incorporate an intersubjective layer of analysis in my reading of the text, 
i.e. provide ‘a space for checking out the researchers’ responses to the research 
participant and thinking through what these responses might signify’ (Frosh & Saville 
Young, 2008, p.113). 
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5.2 The analysis 
 
Over the course of the three interviews Tina adopts a complex, at times almost 
contradictory positioning, the main purpose of which seems to be to affirm her as a 
credible source of information and insight around her experience of self-injury, whilst at 
the same time exonerating her from blame for her behaviour. As will be shown below, 
this positioning can be usefully explored through a combination of discursive and 
psychoanalytical lenses. 
 
Tina as a fragile ‘deep thinker’ around her experience 
 
From the beginning of the first interview Tina positions herself as an external, reflective 
observer of her own experience. Her replies are full of hesitations, rephrasings, caveats 
and precisions, suggesting that she is both a ‘deep thinker’ (her term) and a careful 
wordsmith. At times her use of pauses and markers creates the impression that she is 
thinking ‘live’, digging deep into her memory to create a meaningful and accurate 
account, as in the following extract:  
 
Other times, um, I would… Yeah I would kind of experiment with doing 
different things, and then I suppose as I got older, um… uh…  
 
The way ‘I would’ is left hanging, and is then followed by a definite ‘Yeah’, creates the 
impression of someone following a trail, one which at times disappears in the 
undergrowth only to reappear, unmistakable. This positioning is especially clear in the 
segments where she engages in recollection of past events. The picture that emerges is 
of Tina working hard to provide the researcher with the material she needs, and doing 
this with transparency and honesty: letting her into her thought processes, even 
volunteering a ‘tour’ of her scars. In doing so Tina may be responding to my own cue: 
my opening line (‘Now Tina in your first email to me, you mentioned that you had self-
injured on countless occasions, you said.’) can be read as an expectation that she will 
indeed provide details to match her claim; my later probing around the pattern of her 
self-cutting again positions her as the possessor of unique personal knowledge. And 
sharing that knowledge she eagerly does, sometimes in a didactic fashion as evidenced 
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by her intermittent use of the second person, most commonly used in guiding people 
through a process. 
 
It could be argued that Tina’s frequent use of the terms ‘probably’ (e.g., ‘probably 
started off with’, ‘I was probably thinking’), ‘maybe’ (e.g., ‘maybe it does’, ‘maybe 
kind of an elation’) and ‘I suppose’ (e.g., ‘I suppose during that time’, ‘I suppose when I 
say that’) undermines her effort: she may be working hard, but a lot must be 
hypothesized, especially when it comes to Tina’s own felt experience. At the end of the 
day her memory and understanding remain partial, and the factual details and precisions 
she provides in places may ultimately function as warrants for her efforts at 
remembering and truth-telling, a way to convince the researcher of the value of her 
account despite its subjective and at times inchoate quality (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  
 
Yet, and somewhat paradoxically, her cautious phrasing itself may at times serve a 
similar purpose, as in this description of her ‘over-thinking’: 
 
Yeah, and I wanna, I feel like I can’t slow, slow myself down, um… And it’s 
strange because I… I think, well, maybe it’s just my perception but I think 
that… I’m not sure whether people actually see that, that I’m thinking really 
fast, um…  
 
The extract shows Tina at her most tentative, caught up between wants and feelings 
(‘and I wanna, I feel like I can’t’), openly wondering about her perceptions. Of 
particular interest here is the way she acknowledges the ‘strange’, highly subjective and 
possibly invisible nature of her experience in advance of her listener, thus pre-empting a 
possible questioning of its validity. Together with her obvious efforts at sense-making, 
this complex warrant (almost a three-part list) ends up strengthening her credibility as a 
reflective truth-teller even as it conveys her emotional fragility. It thus exemplifies the 
arduousness of the task as presented by Tina throughout our work together: sharing her 
raw and possibly disturbing experience without compromising her credibility as a co-
researcher. It may also be interesting to think of this in terms of shoring up her fragile 
self-esteem. 
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Tina as knowing yet out of control 
 
A similar tension exists around Tina’s positioning as newly enlightened and ‘knowing’. 
The narrative is shot through with references to Tina’s novel understanding of her self-
harm, thanks to therapy and her own psychology studies. Time and again she uses the 
expression ‘I know’ (e.g., ‘I know why that is’, ‘I know now’, ‘I know where that 
comes from’), thus emphasizing her insight, which she explicitly associates with a 
reduction in her self-harming behaviour. In what is otherwise an intensely personal 
narrative, she also interjects bits of information with a rehearsed, almost generic feel: 
for instance stating, seemingly out of the blue, that ‘some of it it’s about punishment’, 
as if underpinning her position with a broader, psychological understanding of the 
functions of self-harm.  
 
Yet the extent to which being a knowledgeable observer of herself translates into greater 
control over her self-injury is repeatedly called into question. Indeed, throughout the 
interviews Tina constructs a dualistic position for herself: the position of hard-working, 
insightful and capable Tina; and that of dependent, clueless and out-of-control Tina. 
Capable Tina can analyse her self-harm and thus regain control over it. Out-of-control 
Tina is swayed by inner and outer forces. At times she seems uncertain which version to 
put forward: 
 
So I was rushing out of the flat, um, I had a glass, um, where I’d just had a drink 
of orange juice for my breakfast, and I accidentally dropped it on the kitchen 
floor,  and it smashed everywhere and my first instinct was just to lift a piece of 
glass and to cut myself with it. Um… But, uh… so in that way it was, yeah I 
suppose it was impulsive, um… But, um… I was able to stop myself, um, quite 
quickly actually… which was good. 
 
In this extract Tina describes a recent episode of ‘minor’ self-injury. The first sentence 
captures the action. Interestingly, after a couple of typical hesitations it becomes quite 
free-flowing, creating an impression of spontaneity uncharacteristic of Tina’s 
presentation of her account in the interviews. The account then stops abruptly, and 
becomes hesitant as Tina shifts to her observer position, tentatively labelling her actions 
(‘in that way’, ‘I suppose’) and thereby stepping back from her out-of-control self. She 
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then gives Capable Tina the leading role (‘I was able to stop myself’), and even 
commends her self-control (‘which was good’). Tina’s positions as observer and 
‘controller’ of her self-harm thus appear complementary, showing her as a woman in the 
process of developing awareness and control. 
 
The back and forth between Tina’s two positions is perceptible throughout the text. Of 
particular import here, it is also at the heart of her depiction of the experience of self-
harm, as in the following segment:  
 
I think sometimes, I know it sounds strange but, um, when I know I’ve got X, Y 
and Z done, then I do the self-harm. But the strange thing is that, um, as I 
approach that, that date, then I start getting doubts in my head: do I really want 
to do this? Um... But because I have obsessed about it for so long, it’s like: I 
have to do it. And you know, it’s like: no, I made this decision, I have to do it. 
And even when, um, like for example the cutting, um, even when I know I’m 
just about to do it, at that moment I, I’ve even said to myself, out loud: ‘Tina 
you don’t want to do this, you don’t want to do this’. 
 
Several things are worth noting here. First is the disclaimer that opens up the extract: ‘I 
know it sounds strange but’, a turn of phrase that repeats through the transcript and 
constitutes a classic way of warding off a negative attribution to the self (Willig, 2008). 
Here Tina may be trying to pre-empt attributions of ‘madness’, a theme that is further 
developed below. But she also appears to signal the actual incommunicability of her 
experience just as she is about to attempt to narrate it. The effect may be to exonerate 
her of responsibility: others may not understand, but she tried. Or it may merely 
emphasise the ‘otherworldliness’ of her experience, acting as a warning to those, like 
myself, who attempt to analyse it. Tina then builds an image of self-harm as a planned 
activity, the timing of which she controls (‘when I know I’ve got X, Y and Z done, then 
I do the self-harm’).  
 
However this image is soon replaced by another, in which Tina appears wrecked by 
contradictory impulses. Significantly these impulses are given voices of their own, a 
rhetorical device known as footing and generally deployed to enliven an account and 
make it more believable (Goffman, 1981). In this extract, as in several others across the 
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text, Tina uses footing to bring her inner conflict around self-cutting into sharp relief: 
‘do I really want to do this?’ says one self; ‘I made this decision, I have to do it’ says 
another. Once again Tina positions herself as split, a dualistic position which seems to 
achieve several effects on the listener: on the one hand, Tina is presented as the victim 
of her own poorly integrated sense of self; on the other, she comes across as trying very 
hard, even crying out loud: ‘Tina you don’t want to do this, you don’t want to do this’. 
This discursive positioning enables her to avoid blame for her behaviour, thus 
counterbalancing the ‘negative’ impression that could have been created by her 
description of a premeditated act in the opening sentence.  
 
Elsewhere in the transcripts Tina achieves a similar effect by referring to ‘some power 
in me’, or to ‘someone else at the steering wheel’. One is reminded of the blame often 
attached to self-injury, notably by medical staff (Arnold, 1995); a blame that Tina 
herself reports as being open and pervasive and one important reason why she decided 
to come forward to present a more ‘accurate’ picture. In part at least, Tina’s discourse 
can be interpreted as an attempt to defend against accusations directed at those who self-
harm for being ‘manipulative’, ‘opportunistic’, and ‘attention-seeking’.  
 
Self-harm as an addictive, externalised behaviour 
 
In line with this positioning, Tina portrays her self-harm as governed by external forces. 
Some of these forces are circumstantial (family dynamics, work stress, hospitalisation, 
over-medication). Others stem from her psychological processes but, like in the 
example given above, are ‘externalized’. Tina’s insistence on the addictive nature of her 
self-injury, already discussed in chapter 3, provides one illustration of this:  
 
I don’t know if it’s physical or psychological or what it is, but there’s something 
about it that keeps bringing you back to it. 
 
In this formulation, self-harm becomes the subject and Tina the passive object ‘brought 
back’ to the behaviour again and again. Significantly, addiction is also the construction 
she chooses when trying to make sense of her behaviour for her parents’ benefit, 
comparing self-injuring to smoking. This is of course an imperfect analogy, as 
confirmed by their repeated inability to ‘get it’. But it is arguably one that enables Tina 
151 
 
to deflect blame from both them (‘I was not really able to tell them the whole story’) 
and herself. 
 
Here is another example: 
 
And quite often it’s… it’s been in my head that… I don’t know if I’ve actually 
had this narrative in my head about it but it’s like a feeling maybe, but I’ve had: 
how badly, how close to death can I get, without actually dying? Um… And I 
don’t know I… I don’t know how it’s a, like… I almost feel like I want to justify 
it now, but I don’t know why I do that. It’s just a thought that comes into my 
head, um… I’m not sure where it comes from or what… 
 
This extract illustrates the way Tina repeatedly constructs her experience as something 
that goes on in her head, and without any intent, or indeed full understanding on her 
part, once more externalising the internal. Here the more severe forms of self-harm she 
engages in are described as driven by a desire to ‘flirt’ with death: ‘how close to death 
can I get, without actually dying?’ Yet the nature of this desire or drive (one is reminded 
of Freud’s Thanatos) is heavily qualified: it is maybe a narrative, or a thought, or a 
feeling; Tina doesn’t know much about it (‘I don’t know’ repeated four times); indeed 
she is ‘not sure where it comes from or what’. Equally significant is the use of the 
phrase ‘I almost feel like I want to justify it now but I don’t know why I do that’, which 
here works as a warrant to the listener that Tina is merely trying to articulate a troubling 
experience, not hiding or excusing an underlying motivation. All these can be seen as 
rhetorical devices deployed for blame reduction, once more suggesting a tension 
between Tina’s positioning as an open, insightful analyst of her own behaviour, and the 
way she attempts to deflect responsibility for it.  
 
Interestingly, the preceding extract also conveys some of the fascination self-injury 
exerts on Tina, how ‘enthralled’ she is to her dance with self-destruction (Joseph, 1982). 
Here the notion of self-harm as addiction takes on a slightly different meaning: the 
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behaviour may be irrepressible but it is also pleasurable, something that Tina herself 
hints at twice:26  
 
Well, I’m not saying the self-harm is pleasurable but, there’s almost like an 
addictive part to it… 
 
It’s almost like, um, I wouldn’t say I get pleasure out of it it’s probably not the 
right word, but maybe some sort of… [sighing] I don’t have a word for it. 
 
The way these hints are constructed further reflects Tina’s communicative challenge: 
how to claim the position of honest, self-aware participant whilst at the same time 
denying self-gratification in relation to what in her experience is seen by others as an 
objectionable behaviour. One way to achieve this is to qualify her more open, intimate 
statements very heavily, as in the examples above.  
 
Once again it is worth noting that illness narratives can function as defensive 
disclaimers, especially when dealing with complex and/or controversial conditions 
(Horton-Salway, 2001). Establishing authenticity and accuracy is a major concern in 
such narratives, which may also be filled with external attributions as interviewees work 
to convince the interviewer that their illness is neither willingly self-induced nor indeed 
self-serving. A similar dynamic seems to be at play here: Tina’s account is steeped in 
detail and reflexivity, and built to make her come across as a credible witness engaged 
in a painful battle with thoughts, feelings and, most importantly here, a behaviour that 
she did not chose and cannot fully control. 
 
In that respect dissociation presents a particular challenge for Tina: whilst not being 
able to remember why or how she self-injured can be seen as the ultimate form of 
exoneration from responsibility, it is one that does not sit easily with her position as 
knowing and capable Tina. This may explain her unusual use of external insight when 
accounting for the behaviour (‘I’ve been told that that’s dissociation, that I just 
completely can’t deal with what I’m doing and I just shut it away’). Unable to explain 
                                                          
26
 One is reminded of the autoerotic dimension of self-injury so central to psychodynamic formulations of 
the behaviour (e.g., Gardner, 2001). This dimension also transpires in Tina’s evocation of the ‘warm 
feeling of blood’ that accompanies the act in the aftermath of her more serious episodes. 
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or even provide a full account of her dissociated actions, Tina resorts to citing another 
base of knowledge, possibly in an attempt to avoid damaging her credibility 
(Pomerantz, 1984a). 
 
Tina as the rational observer of a ‘tangible’ phenomenon 
 
Throughout the interviews Tina positions herself as a ‘scientist’, and her credibility as 
an intelligent, rational observer is repeatedly bolstered: by reference to her academic 
achievements (passing her GCSEs despite family and inner turmoil, doing well with her 
current course of study, including the research component); by the ‘medic-like’ use of 
impersonal anatomical terms to describe her injuries (‘I’d cut through arteries, veins, 
tendons and ligaments and stuff’); by her knowledge of the importance of 
neurochemical circuitry (e.g., the adrenalin behind the ‘rush’) and of psychology 
generally; even by owning to the father-daughter transmission of a logical, scientific 
bent, exemplified by their common engineering training.27   
 
It is within the context of this positioning that her deployment of mechanical metaphors 
to frame her experience of self-injury can be read: her mood swings are likened to an 
airplane crashing or a roller coaster; the way inner tension builds up to the growing 
pressure of water behind a dam. The forces at play almost seem measurable, ‘tangible’ 
to use one of Tina’s adjectives. Importantly, they are also formidable. This construction 
thus achieves a threefold purpose: confirm Tina as a valid, ‘objective’ co-researcher; 
frame self-injury as the direct (and perhaps inevitable) effect of powerful, mechanistic 
forces (gravity, hydraulic pressure); and excuse Tina’s powerlessness. Also interesting 
is Tina’s reporting of her coping strategies in metaphorical terms: she describes ‘filing’ 
her emotions for later discussion and ‘taking notes’ in her head so she can keep a 
conversation going, both suggestive of a methodical, organised, ‘grown-up’ approach to 
her difficulties. 
 
From a discursive perspective, Tina’s efforts to position herself as a reflexive, analytical 
observer of her self-injuring can be read as a way of resisting popular representations of 
                                                          
27
 Developing a fuller psychodynamic formulation of Tina’s emotional difficulties would entail querying 
her intellectual and professional identification with her father, possibly a way to affirm separation from a 
mother described as emotional and teenage-like. 
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the mentally ill, typically seen as simple-minded, irrational or violent (Roth Edney, 
2004). Significantly, Tina’s own depiction of an inpatient ward echoes such 
conceptions: 
 
all these people did these weird things, it was like: what is this place? Um… 
You know… People screaming, and people… I remember this woman, um, 
elderly woman who was bald but she had a wig, but she kept taking it off and 
throwing it at people. I remember then, I was moved into a bay with three other 
women, um, and this woman opposite me all she would eat was apples, and I 
couldn’t figure it out in my head. I was thinking in my head: why does she only 
eat apples? Now I know it was probably cause she had an eating disorder or 
something, um…  
 
Although the very topic of the interviews forces Tina to engage with a seemingly 
‘crazy’ behaviour (a term she only uses once to describe her experience, and with 
difficulty as suggested by a shift in her emotional tone), she constructs for herself and 
for her self-harm a position of logic: first by presenting a vivid picture of a ‘mad’ ward 
as experienced by her confused adolescent self following the shooting; and then by 
emphasizing that she now ‘knows’ that the woman opposite her in the psychiatric ward 
probably had an eating disorder. As for her cutting, it serves a function (‘it does 
something’, ‘it works’), even becoming a modern compass, a ‘SatNav’. Set against 
prevalent images of mental illness, Tina’s positioning as a co-scientist may thus be 
related to her determination to distance herself from the ‘insane’, a move made all the 
more necessary by her perceived status in the family as 
 
the daughter that’s been in a mental hospital, St G of all places, um, that is like, 
was originally an insane asylum, um, the daughter who has all these scars on her 
arms28  
 
It may also be linked to the interview situation itself, and to my own input into it. From 
the beginning I place Tina in the position of knowledgeable informant and adopt a 
flexible but probing stance which she may be responding to, for instance asking her: 
                                                          
28
 For lack of supporting evidence, the extent to which Tina identifies with this image of the ‘crazy 
daughter’ remains an open question. 
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‘Can you think of the sort of things that you would feel, that you would say?’ By 
identifying repetitive self-injury as a topic worthy of investigation, I also signal interest 
in the psychological underpinnings of the phenomenon, thus orienting Tina further. 
Last, the fact that we are both psychology students may act as an equalizer, enabling 
Tina to occupy the position of co-researcher with added confidence.  
 
Self-harm as failure of containment and surrender to a caring other 
 
But Tina’s discourse also creates another, child-like position for herself. Some of the 
expressions she uses during the interviews have a childish feel: her being in a ‘wee-
bubble’ for instance; or, when offered the possibility of DBT treatment, her insistent 
‘when is it gonna happen, when is it gonna happen’. Significantly, I occasionally join in 
the construction of that childlike position, at one point encouraging Tina to ‘Take a sip’ 
as she reaches out for coffee in what could be regarded as a rather maternal counter-
transferential response.  
 
Exploring the motivations behind this particular discursive investment requires further 
foray into the psychoanalytical realm. For instance, Tina’s choice of a childlike position 
may be linked with an unconscious longing to remain a child, innocent and good, 
instead of becoming like her mother and father, presented as callous and self-serving. 
Tellingly she compares herself to her much younger siblings and not, as she would have 
in the past, to her elder sister who now is ‘like a clone of my mum’, and ‘quite 
forthright’ (i.e., blunt and insensitive).  
 
Her positioning could also reflect a deep sense of child-like helplessness, perhaps best 
expressed in her dam metaphor. In it she tries to describe what it is like for her when the 
‘bad stuff’ that she has tried hard to ‘file away’ starts to ‘leak out’: 
 
T. I suppose it’s a bit like… I don’t know what it is, is it a fairy tale or a, story 
about the little boy who puts his finger in the hole in the dam, um,  
 
D. Um. 
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T.  And so, um, it’s almost like the only thing that’s holding the dam is this, you 
know, this tiny little thing holding it in there, um, and, like… I think the story 
goes this way that the boy takes his finger out of the hole in the dam and the 
whole dam comes crashing down, um…  That’s the little weakness there, and 
then… so, um… 
 
Here the dam appears to symbolise Tina’s attempt to keep her inner turmoil contained.  
However it is faulty, there is a ‘little weakness’ requiring further containment, and all 
that stands in the way of mounting hydraulic pressure is the finger of a little boy, a ‘tiny 
little thing’. From a discursive standpoint, this construction conveys a dual message: 
that she is trying; and that she cannot be held accountable. But the metaphor also speaks 
to the fragility of Tina’s inner world. She is like that little boy: child-like, unable to 
stem the powerful flow of her own emotions. According to Bion (1967), the capacity to 
metabolize painful experiences requires a capacity for containment, for thinking through 
rather than acting out. In turn, this supposes the presence of an attuned caregiver whose 
empathic responses the infant will gradually internalise. In the absence of such capacity 
for containment, inner distress will ‘spill out’ as feelings are evacuated through action. 
In the case of self-injuring individuals, the spilling out of blood can be regarded as a 
visible expression of this spilling out of unprocessed experience (Turp, 1999). In Tina’s 
metaphor, the little boy simply cannot contain the water forever; when it finally spills 
out, the flow is powerful enough to take the whole dam with it.  
 
Her metaphor is also interesting in the way it echoes the fairy tale quality of some of the 
early memories she narrates in the third interview. There she portrays herself as a young 
runaway, repeatedly trying to escape a bleak and violent family home yet ultimately 
pulled back by her inability to fend for herself in the world. She invests the position of 
resourceful but ultimately helpless ‘orphan’ (‘I never really felt that my mum and dad 
really… were my mum and dad’), her innocence a poor protection against the evils 
visited by self-absorbed and ‘out-of-control’ adults. 
 
Tina adopts a similar position of child-like innocence in other contexts, most notably 
the hospital where she is first sectioned following her self-shooting and which she 
describes as an alien and incomprehensible environment: ‘I did not have a clue’; ‘I 
probably didn’t know what a psychiatric ward was’; ‘it was like: what is this place?’. 
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The medical personnel she interacts with remain nameless (‘these two doctors’, ‘this 
nurse’), and participate in the construction of a helpless patient by appearing to take 
charge without ever explaining their actions, even using an infantilizing vocabulary: 
 
And these two doctors came along, and I don’t remember them saying to me that 
they were psychiatrists or psychologists or something like that, but they came 
along and they said: ‘We’re gonna, we’re gonna take you to the special ward in 
the hospital, where we can help you.’ And it was like: I did not have a clue what 
they were talking about. 
 
Interestingly, young Tina is later presented as resisting this treatment: trying to figure 
things out, asking about her care, refusing to answer the intrusive questions of a child 
psychologist. From clueless child she becomes thoughtful, defiant patient, once more 
signalling a tension in Tina’s discourse around her sense of agency, and maybe some 
ambivalence in her relationship to care. 
 
Tina’s depiction of another act of self-injury, carried out whilst an adult psychiatric in-
patient, lends further support to this interpretation:  
 
I was in the PICU, and I’d been given 15 minutes leave, and I managed to get to 
the shop in that time, and buy some blades, and went into, um, the ladies 
bathroom in another area in the hospital, and I cut quite deeply, and then, um… 
as I was bleeding on the floor, um… It was like the life was draining out of me, I 
could feel it, and, uh… You know I, I suppose I cut so deeply that, you know, 
that I was, if I was left long enough I probably could have died but, um, you 
know, somebody found me and… 
 
The contrast between the first and second halves of the extract is worth dwelling on. In 
the former Tina positions herself as resourceful (‘I managed to get to the shop in that 
time’) and determined (‘I cut quite deeply’). But the last sentence is constructed as 
tentative (‘I suppose’, ‘it was possible that’, ‘probably’), with several pauses, giving it a 
more reflective tone, as if Tina was only now realising how close to death she had 
come. It also appeals directly to the researcher (‘you know’ used three times), inviting 
her to reflect on the seriousness of the act alongside Tina. The result is to position Tina 
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as a defiant child: cunning and decisive, yet perhaps not fully aware of the implications 
of her acts. Read with an eye to the attribution of responsibility, this discourse also 
exonerates her and indirectly condemns the hospital for failing in its duty of care (like 
her parents?), a condemnation she fully and repeatedly articulates in the interviews. 
 
Yet in Tina’s own words, one important reason why hospitals seem to trigger more self-
injury is the fact that ‘in hospital there’s always gonna be someone there to rescue you’. 
Elsewhere she recalls falling in the playground on purpose as a young child, ‘because 
then I would have to go to the school nurse, and the school nurse would be able to fix 
it’. Tina’s self-harm, like her childlike presentation, may therefore also be a way to 
evoke caring responses from others, to be looked after. Gardner speaks of a psychic 
conflict within self-injuring young women: on the one hand is the malevolent, 
overwhelming mother, an engulfing object they are trying to ‘cut off’; on the other ‘a 
depleted, hungry baby part’ that longs to be taken care off (Gardner, 2001, p.71). In its 
most extreme forms, Tina’s self-harm may therefore be seen as an attack on the internal 
bad object and a form of surrender to the care she craves but cannot ask for, a surrender 
made tolerable by its very necessity. This surrender is powerfully rendered in the extract 
analysed in the previous chapter, where Tina describes how ‘when it comes to the point 
that other people have to come and help me, then I just close my eyes cause I just can’t 
deal with it’. It is as if through self-injury Tina turned herself into a passive, helpless 
child that others ‘have to come and help’.  
 
Feelings and discursive positioning: anger and guilt 
 
Though Tina describes being swept by ‘a snowball of feelings’, emotion words tend to 
be used selectively in a narrative laden with ‘think’ words. This is in line with her 
efforts to construct herself as an ‘objective’ informant, and perhaps also as someone 
able to articulate her experience instead of acting it out. Still, two feelings keep 
reappearing, the discursive construction of which also contributes to Tina’s complex 
positioning around self-injury.  
 
The first one is anger, around which Tina seems to build a rather ambivalent position 
for herself, as shown in the following extract.  
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T. So I kind of beat myself up in both ways, um… so… 
 
D. Do you get angry at yourself? 
 
T. Yeah, I think I do, but I think I have a big problem with anger because I don’t 
really want to deal with it, um… I have never lifted a hand on anyone in my life 
before, nor will I, and that’s just not, that’s just not what I would do, um… And 
I don’t like, I don’t like what anger makes people do, and so for me it feels 
wrong to actually express anger. Um, so, I tend to hold it in a lot, um… until, 
you know… Like I know now it’s funny cause I was, I was talking about this to 
my therapist yesterday, my psychologist, and, um… Now, probably in the last 
couple of years through doing DBT and through my, I actually have the words 
for things. Or maybe I had the words for things before but I just didn’t know 
how to apply them to me. 
 
This extract is remarkable in several respects. First, my orienting Tina to her possible 
anger at herself takes us in an unexpected direction: violence against others. Further, she 
volunteers an emphatic example of extreme case formulation (‘never’, ‘anyone’, ‘nor 
will I’, ‘just not what I would do’), conveying the strength of her feelings and leaving 
no room for disagreement or qualification (Pomerantz, 1984b). In the next sentence she 
draws a link between this stance and her own experience - but keeping it impersonal and 
vague (‘what anger makes people do’), no more than a hint at possible events in her 
past, before restating her position on dealing with/expressing anger, this time giving it a 
moral frame (‘wrong’). Her reasoning (‘And’, ‘so’, ‘so’) then takes her back to the issue 
of processing her own anger, though she stops short of any explicit reference to self-
injury, instead leaving the consequences of her anger unsaid (’until… until, you 
know…’). It is as if the subject could not be verbalised.  
 
The next sentences suggest this might indeed be the case: first there is the reference to 
something ‘funny’ (emphasized with a smile), a term that seems inappropriate to the 
context and content of her anecdote and may be there as a means to lighten up the 
mood, hers as well as mine; then the reference to a recent discussion with her 
psychologist, a familiar and comforting figure. Last, Tina brings up the subject of 
‘words’: having the words, applying the words. Set against what may have been a 
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wordless hint at violence against the self, her proud acknowledgment of a new capacity 
to symbolise emotions seems designed to strike an optimistic note, once again signalling 
a more capable, self-reflective Tina; yet the discrepancy lingers. Thus, while Tina 
appears to position herself as insightful and therefore harmless since she can use words 
instead of acting out, her discourse also suggests a darker, perhaps more primitive side.  
 
Here again, bringing in psychoanalytical concepts can help illuminate Tina’s 
positioning. Klein (1933) describes infancy as a time of intense anxiety arising from the 
child’s fear of his own aggressive impulses, themselves the manifestation of a ‘death 
instinct’. Developmentally ill-equipped to deal with this struggle between the urge to 
destroy and the urge to preserve, the infant projects it outwards, to be handled by the 
primary caregiver. Should the latter prove nurturing and responsive, a good experience 
or ‘loving object’ will be taken back (reintrojected), strengthening the infant’s life-
enhancing impulses and enabling him to handle inner aggression. If however empathic 
attunement is lacking (and Tina’s description of her mum as self-absorbed and 
invalidating suggests this may have been the case), then the infant will come to 
internalise a hostile, ‘dependency-hating’ object, reinforcing the destructive instincts. 
Overcoming internal aggressive impulses becomes even more difficult where they have 
been reinforced by the internalization of an abusive object (Nathan, 2004). The self-
injuring individual would then discharge an inner hostility perceived as uncontrollable 
in a way that feels comparatively safe: by turning aggression inwards, thus remaining 
dissociated from her hate for the persecuting other.  
 
Tina’s ‘flirtation with death’ could thus be seen as a manifestation of her powerful 
destructive instincts, instincts that she appears both to satisfy and to keep in check 
through self-harming. In turn, her emotional investment in the position of safe, non-
threatening individual - a theme that repeats (invariably through the medium of extreme 
case formulations) through the interviews - would reflect her dissociation from her 
underlying aggression. The following extract provides some evidence for this 
interpretation: 
 
Well, I’ve been on the bus sometimes and… and I’ve… you know had a tee-
shirt on, it was a hot day, just had a tee-shirt on and… so people could see the 
scars, and there’s a couple of occasions where someone was just about to sit 
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down right beside me, and I could see that they looked at my arms and they got 
up and moved away, and sat somewhere else. And so I wondered if people think 
that… that I’m a danger to them, which is, like, for me that’s like, completely an 
alien concept. I’ve never ever lifted a hand on anyone else, it’s only ever, I only 
ever harm myself, um… And I would never even… it just, for me it just seems 
inconceivable, um… […] So, it’s just against my nature to do that, and… But I 
often wonder, if people look at my arms, if they think I’m a danger to them 
 
Here Tina contrasts her gentle nature with what she regards as others’ perception of her, 
i.e. as a danger to them. Once again she uses an extreme case formulation to affirm her 
harmless ‘nature’: hurting others is ‘completely an alien concept’; she has ‘never ever’ 
harmed ‘anyone’ and ‘only ever’ harms herself; even the hypothetical possibility of her 
committing such an act is ruled out (‘I would never even’). Sitting in front of Tina 
during the interview I clearly sensed her hurt and outrage at how fellow bus passengers 
seemed to have interpreted her scars, and felt that her reading of their reactions did tie in 
with popular representations of the mentally ill as ‘dangerous’ (Roth Edney, 2004). But 
the very strength of Tina’s disowning of any aggressive impulse raises the possibility of 
projections onto others of her dissociated fear of her own destructive instincts; after all 
the passengers’ reaction might have been motivated by no more than a general 
discomfort, and people looking at her arms may be feeling sorry for her rather than 
scared. Trapped in her inner struggle with often overpowering death instincts, Tina may 
be misreading her fear for that of others. Most importantly here, the symbolic 
association between her scars and the dangerous part of her self seems strong. 
 
The second feeling explicitly discussed during the interviews, guilt, is described as ever 
present but also as reportedly harnessed by Tina in her attempt to control her behaviour: 
 
When the self-harm comes into my head, I’ll be able to um… be a little bit 
objective about it, you know, this is how you feel afterwards, um… You always 
feel guilty, cause you feel you’re wasting everybody’s time, you know, you’ve, 
you know, you’ve ended up in A&E and, you know, people in A&E have better 
things to do, and all these things go through your head, um… And the other 
thing is that, um, yeah this whole debate in your head, it just goes, gets bigger 
and bigger, because you start… on top of the worries that you already had before 
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you self-harmed, now you feel guilty, now you feel, um… Yeah now you feel… 
you’ve done something really wrong, um…  
 
This extract reveals another interesting ambiguity in Tina’s discourse around self-injury. 
Throughout her interviews self-harm is constructed as a tremendous source of guilt, 
something made very clear here by the choice of an extreme case formulation (‘You 
always feel guilty’); by the tonal emphasis placed on the word ‘always’; and by Tina’s 
use of the second person to describe the way she vigorously argues with herself over the 
behaviour. However here Tina also adopts a defensive position, externalising her self-
harm (‘comes into my head’), and suggesting that the guilt itself is imported, tied in 
with the messages of uncaring dismissal received from others (‘people in A&E have 
better things to do’). It is also harmful since it just adds to the ‘debate’ and ‘worries’ in 
her head, making Tina a victim twice over. While a cursory reading of this extract might 
emphasize Tina’s crushing sense of guilt and responsibility for her actions, a discursive 
focus shows her acknowledging the guilt but undermining its very foundations, and in 
the process denying responsibility for her actions and feelings. Her last sentence (‘now 
you feel… you’ve done something really wrong’) provides the finishing touch by 
exonerating Tina from a moral standpoint: guilt is what turns self-injury from an act that 
is not really wrong into one that is.  
 
Shifting to a psychoanalytical reading provides a different, but possibly complementary 
perspective. Here Tina’s pervasive sense of guilt would be fuelled by a punitive 
superego, that critical part of her psyche so much in evidence during the interviews. 
Born from the introjection of significant objects in Kleinian thinking, the superego 
appears to be especially critical in the case of abuse victims, who seem to take on the 
guilt and responsibility of the act (Gardner, 2001). The emotional, physical and sexual 
abuse reportedly visited on Tina by her father might therefore feed her physical and 
ideational self-attacks and constitute another, perhaps an essential, motivation behind 
her insistent discursive positioning as the blameless victim of circumstances and inner 
dynamics. Drawing on her biographical account and on psychodynamic concepts, one 
can interpret the preceding extract as capturing something of Tina’s battle with her 
superego. Importantly, her self-hatred and guilt would crystallize around her self-injury, 
in an endless cycle of attack and expiation. A psychosocial reading of the text thus 
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brings to light the possible contribution of unconscious dynamics to Tina’s meaning-
making around her self-injuring. 
 
5.3 Discussion 
 
This third reading of the text brought out its performative dimension, identifying Tina’s 
discursive positions and repertoires and exploring their potential underpinnings using a 
combination of discursive and psychoanalytical lenses. Of particular interest was the 
way in which Tina seemed to construct a dual position for herself: as capable, hard-
working Tina on the one hand, and as out-of-control Tina on the other, each pole a 
potential means to deflect criticism for her behaviour. Further readings suggested the 
two additional positions of scientist and child, possibly variations on the original split 
construction. Tina’s meaning-making around self-injury seemed to be largely articulated 
around these positions: at times it was framed as an observable, almost mechanistic 
phenomenon (notably in her engineering metaphors); at times as an addiction; always as 
an externalised behaviour over which Tina had limited power, however hard she tried to 
understand and control it.  
 
As was discussed above, possible motivations for Tina’s constructions could first be 
searched in broader social discourses around self-injury and mental illness. Constructing 
self-harm as an irrepressible behaviour, and herself as rational and trying hard to cope, 
enabled Tina to counter views of self-injury as the wilful, self-serving and manipulative 
act of a ‘crazy’ person. Like other illness narratives her account thus seemed to 
function, a least in part, as a defensive disclaimer. Her carefully chosen words, her 
appeals to science, her efforts to separate the young Tina from her new mature and 
enlightened self all seemed to participate in this effort. It is worth noting that the 
researcher was fully involved in this process, not only orienting Tina to specific aspects 
of her experience but also representing the ‘other’ she needed to convince. 
 
However bringing in psychoanalytical concepts added another dimension to this 
interpretation of Tina’s discursive moves and outlined, albeit tentatively, some of the 
unconscious dynamics underpinning her sense-making around self-harm. An 
exploration of her childlike positioning emphasized the helplessness behind her self-
injury, and the way in which the act might reflect a failure of containment, a literal 
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‘spilling out’ of blood and emotions. The analysis also suggested that Tina’s self-harm 
might fulfil a critical, but seemingly unconscious, communicative function: to express 
her primal, unspeakable emotional needs in such a compelling way that others would 
have no choice but to come to her rescue, enabling her at last to fully surrender to their 
care. Last, a closer look at Tina’s discursive constructions around anger and guilt 
revealed that both might be central to her behaviour and this in ways she did not show 
awareness of. Her self-injury became both site and symbol of a struggle between life-
enhancing and destructive instincts. The same unconscious dynamics could be called 
upon to further explain Tina’s discursive efforts to free herself from blame. Object 
relations theory thus enriched the interpretation by allowing a deeper understanding to 
emerge, understanding that was nonetheless grounded in textual analysis.  
 
So did the incorporation of countertransferential insights.29 Tina presented as a solid-
looking young woman, and her demeanour was calm and thoughtful. The way she 
organised the aftermath of our interviews (meeting up with her social worker so she 
would have a place to ‘take her feelings’) spoke to her ability to look after herself, as 
did her reported use of her own therapy to process the interviews. Yet over the three 
weeks that I met with her I found myself repeatedly looking after her: getting her a 
drink and encouraging her to take a sip; checking she was comfortable with the chair 
and heat; even ‘making her better’ by shifting the conversation away in those few 
instances when it seemed to affect her more deeply. In this way I may have 
unconsciously responded to her child-like side. Looking back on my notes, I found the 
question ‘How old is she?’ scribbled under the date of the second interview, suggesting 
that the discrepancy between her mature behaviour and my countertransferential 
response may have been troubling me. I also went through a strong emotional episode 
following our first interview, during which I felt edgy, overate, and finally woke up 
during the night feeling lonely and distressed for no clear reason. Reflecting in my field 
journal the following day, I wondered if I had not become the repository of Tina’s 
difficult feelings, feelings that she had reportedly kept at bay during the interview itself, 
to the extent of declaring at the end that ‘mostly it’s like I’m talking about someone 
else’. Though this strong emotional reaction did not repeat after the second and third 
                                                          
29
 Though ‘countertransference’ seems to be broadly used in the context of psychosocial analysis, the 
term transferential might have been more appropriate here since I was the one coming to Tina for help 
with my project (Frosh, 2010). 
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interviews, thinking back on a possible unconscious communication enabled me to 
achieve a deeper understanding of the unspoken emotional needs underlying Tina’s 
meaning-making around her behaviour.  
 
5.4 Reflections on the use of psychosocial analysis 
 
This third segment of interpretative work raised a number of significant concerns. First 
came the perceived danger of ‘over-interpreting’ the data, a criticism widely voiced in 
relation to psychoanalysis and one echoed in Frosh and Emerson’s (2005) assertion 
that Kleinian interpretations were top-down rather than bottom-up: superimposed on 
the data rather than emerging from it. The richness of the psychodynamic literature on 
self-injury made the danger of superimposing a psychodynamic formulation onto Tina’s 
narrative very real. However Hollway and Jefferson (2012) argue convincingly that in 
their approach, as in other approaches to interpretative work, a predefined concept 
remains valuable as long as it helps make sense of the evidence. Drawing on 
psychoanalytical insights only when they seemed to enrich the textual analysis helped 
me remain confident that this was indeed the case here.  
 
A second critique often levelled at psychoanalytic interpretation - and indeed at 
psychoanalysis itself - is that it puts the researcher in the position of expert, solely able 
to decipher the unconscious meanings of the participant (e.g., Frosh, 2010). Such power 
imbalance would be irreconcilable with a democratic practice, and therefore raise 
troubling ethical issues; it might also compound the risk of developing a ‘wild’ 
interpretation. One way to address this problem might have been to take the analysis 
back to the participant (Hoggett et al., 2010). However the very nature of Tina’s 
account, not to mention her fragility, made this at best a questionable option. Instead, 
efforts were made to maintain a reflexive attitude throughout and to rigorously ground 
the analysis in the data. I also refrained from pursuing ‘hunches’ which may have been 
helpful in the therapy room but would have taken me too far from the text and the 
research question, for instance regarding the evocative role of symbolic intrusions (e.g., 
letter though the door or family phone calls) in triggering Tina’s self-harm. 
 
Last but not least, I felt uneasy at times with my ‘suspicious’ reading of Tina’s heart-
wrenching account, not least because nothing in either my briefing or debriefing had 
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suggested that her experiential insights would be subjected to this sort of scrutiny. 
Indeed Willig (2012) questions whether discursive and psychosocial analyses ought to 
be carried out on accounts of suffering for this very reason. Yet capturing the 
performative aspects of Tina’s story seemed important here, inasmuch as these also 
conveyed something of her meaning-making around self-injury, this time meaning-
making directed at others; and the use of psychodynamic concepts did help me 
formulate new hypotheses concerning Tina’s relationship with her behaviour. How such 
an interpretation can be combined with the more ‘respectful’ readings provided by IPA 
and narrative analysis is a question considered in the next and final chapter. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This final chapter revisits both the insights gained and the challenges confronted 
throughout the project. Combining three interpretative lenses would, it was hoped, 
enable the researcher to develop a rich, multidimensional understanding of one 
individual’s meaning-making around the experience of repetitive self-injury. However 
the use of a pluralistic qualitative design also raised significant methodological and 
epistemological issues. In reviewing how these were addressed, this concluding chapter 
illustrates the value of qualitative pluralism as a mixed methods approach enabling 
researchers and scientist-practitioners to engage more deeply with the subjective 
meanings attached to complex behaviours.  
 
The chapter starts with a review of the study’s findings, illustrating the insights 
produced by each of the interpretations and reflecting on the overall picture thus 
created. It then queries the significance of the work, and how well qualitative pluralism 
might fit with the values of counselling psychology. A third section turns to the 
methodological challenges raised by the approach, and shows how issues of 
epistemological coherence, reflexivity and validity were addressed. The chapter ends 
with a final reflection on the author’s research journey. 
 
6.1 Crossing interpretative lenses 
 
Interpretative phenomenological analysis 
 
The IPA interpretation produced an intricate, multi-layered account of Tina’s subjective 
experience. In her attempt to make sense of her self-injury, she seemed to plait together 
several strands of meaning: first she sought to describe the behaviour and its manifold 
functions, in what could be seen as a descriptive strand; then she drew a link between 
her self-injuring and the more diffuse emotional distress born of a ‘fragile self’, in what 
was labelled a first contextual strand; in a second contextual strand she related both her 
self-harm and the underlying suffering to her experience of the ‘other’; the impact of her 
early experiences was then echoed in a third, historical strand; finally, Tina affirmed her 
growing intellectual and verbal grasp of her experience of self-injury in what could be 
seen as a meta-cognitive strand. 
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While these five strands were presented as distinct superordinate themes, they were 
closely intertwined in practice; aspects of Tina’s experience came in and out of focus as 
I moved from one theme to the next, allowing a greater depth of understanding. For 
instance, the theme of control seemed to cut across several superordinate themes: self-
injury helped Tina through life (‘it’s the only thing I can control’); it was often triggered 
by the experience of being ‘out of control’ (‘all those things going on in my head’); and 
it was tied in with Tina’s experience of the ‘other’ (‘everybody else had control’), and 
of the family (‘I have to be in contact with my parents, and pretend that everything is 
ok’). This first reading of Tina’s account thus produced a multifaceted and deeply 
individual picture of her sense-making around self-injury. 
 
Narrative interpretations 
 
The use of narrative approaches produced additional layers of meaning. First came the 
analysis of a single significant episode of self-harm, using Gee’s (1991) approach and 
paying close attention to linguistic and paralinguistic clues. The resulting reading 
seemed at times to echo the IPA interpretation, where self-harm had already been 
presented as a way to achieve control over life and as a means to communicate distress. 
However this focused, detailed and structured interpretation also pointed to the 
importance of social connection. Tina’s self-shooting was framed as a response to a 
growing sense of isolation from family and friend, and as an arresting call for attention. 
The ineluctability and futility of Tina’s act were also powerfully expressed, as she 
moved from mastery (of the gun) and action (the shooting) to fear, guilt and further 
disconnection. Focusing in depth on language and prosody thus created new insight into 
the logic and self-defeating nature of Tina’s behaviour. It also revealed some of the 
complex linguistic apparatus underpinning her attempt at meaning-making. 
 
Using Frank’s (1995) illness narratives as heuristic devices produced a different sort of 
interpretation. This time I no longer sought to identify overarching themes within Tina’s 
account of her experience, or to analyse its linguistic and prosodic properties. Instead 
the personal significance of her behaviour was tentatively framed in the context of her 
life story. Several narrative threads were identified, each a reflection of Tina’s efforts to 
make sense of her emotional distress: a hopeful restitution narrative, emphasizing her 
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growing sense of self; a reflective quest narrative, in which Tina’s illness became a 
journey towards self-awareness; and a darker chaos narrative, which tentatively 
conveyed the more inchoate aspects of her experience. Each of these narratives imbued 
self-harm with a different meaning: in the first it became a barometer of emotional 
health and a marker of physical integrity; in the second a survivor’s living testimony; in 
the third the contradictory expression of a never-ending struggle. Recognising the 
tension between these different meanings, and how each of them fitted with Tina’s 
understanding of her mental distress and life story, shed a different light on her 
meaning-making process around self-injury.  
 
Psychosocial analysis 
 
The third reading of the text used a combination of discursive and psychoanalytical 
lenses to explore its performative dimension. Tina appeared to construct a dual position 
for herself: as capable and hard-working on the one hand, as out-of-control on the other, 
each pole arguably a means to deflect criticism for her behaviour. Further readings 
suggested two additional (and possibly related) discursive positions: those of scientist 
and child. Importantly here, Tina’s meaning-making around self-injury seemed to be 
largely mapped onto these positions: it was framed sometimes as a ‘tangible’, even 
mechanistic phenomenon, notably through the use of engineering metaphors; sometimes 
as an addiction; always as a behaviour governed by external forces, over which Tina 
had little control.  
 
Tina’s constructions could first be related to negative social discourses around self-
injury. By constructing herself as the insightful, hard-working but ultimately helpless 
victim of an irrepressible behaviour, Tina may have sought to deflect blame for an act 
often portrayed as self-serving and manipulative, and/or a sign of ‘madness’. However 
bringing in psychoanalytical concepts added a further dimension to this interpretation of 
Tina’s discursive moves, by pointing to the way unconscious dynamics may also 
participate in her sense-making around self-harm. A closer look at Tina’s childlike 
positioning, and at her constructions around anger and guilt, suggested new 
interpretations for her behaviour: in one, it became a symbolic expression of her 
inability to contain inner thoughts and feelings; in another, a means to draw caring 
adults to her side without having to voice her unspeakable needs; in another still, the 
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site and manifestation of an unconscious conflict between life and death instincts. 
Unconscious dynamics could also be called upon to explain Tina’s discursive efforts to 
exonerate herself from blame, thus allowing a different understanding to emerge.  
 
Each of the approaches chosen thus produced a distinct take on Tina’s meaning-making 
around self-injury. Yet their respective insights were often echoed and amplified across 
interpretative divides. For instance, object relations theory shed a new light on the 
‘fragile self’ underpinning Tina’s self-harm, a self already explored from a 
phenomenological standpoint in the IPA analysis. So did Frank’s (1995) heuristic 
framework, Tina’s chaos narrative becoming a signpost to the fragmented and partly 
incommunicable nature of her experience. Rather than undermining each other, these 
readings could be seen as forming distinct layers of sense-making around Tina’s 
material: marking the potential salience of particular aspects of her experience of self-
injury whilst opening up a multiplicity of viewpoints for the researcher to consider. In 
this way the pluralistic qualitative approach adopted here may have gone some way 
towards respecting the fragmentation of the study’s human subject (Frosh, 2007). 
 
6.2 A different take on repetitive self-injury? 
 
Back to the literature 
 
How did the readings sit with existing research on repetitive self-injury? As could be 
expected, Tina’s account often resonated with previous findings on the aetiology and 
finality of the behaviour. The ‘rush’ of cutting, the abusive background, the 
interpersonal issues were all there, as were attempts to cope with overwhelming 
emotions, to punish the self, to communicate distress, to combat dissociation and to 
affirm control. But ticking off existing boxes could hardly convey the uniqueness and 
complexity of her experience as constructed through the interpretations: its 
embeddedness in Tina’s early family life and developing sense of self; the crushing 
loneliness behind her teenage self-shooting; the seduction of a close encounter with 
death and the comforting feel of warm blood; or the way self-injury simply seemed ‘to 
work’, helping Tina navigate a tumultuous, and at times chaotic emotional landscape.  
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Revisiting the clinical models of repetitive self-injury reviewed in the introductory 
chapter yielded similar conclusions. Tina’s emotional roller-coaster and her BPD 
diagnosis brought to mind Linehan’s biosocial model and corresponding dialectical 
behaviour therapy, an approach Tina herself had described as helpful. But behavioural 
theorists would no doubt have pointed to the positive reinforcement reportedly received 
by Tina around her self-harm: the caring school nurse attending to her early injuries; the 
previously indifferent family flocking to her hospital bed in the wake of her self-
shooting. By the same token, Tina’s depiction of the way in which self-injury seemed to 
activate intense feelings of guilt followed by more self-injury matched a key tenet of the 
experiential-avoidance model; and the reported impact of hospitalisation on Tina’s 
behaviour could easily be read through the prism of psychosocial approaches, with their 
strong emphasis on the perceived powerlessness born of institutionalisation and the way 
it may mirror early family experiences (a link drawn by Tina herself). As for the 
usefulness of a psychoanalytical reading of Tina’s account, it was amply demonstrated 
in chapter 5.  
 
The variety of insights gleaned into Tina’s meaning-making around self-injury thus 
spoke to the value of an approach that opened up rather than closed down, that offered a 
range of competing yet in important ways complementary readings of an individual’s 
subjective experience, paying attention to form and content, manifest and unconscious; 
never claiming to speak ‘the truth’ and certainly not ‘the whole truth’, but merely 
engaging in a tentative and reflexive manner with an overdetermined behaviour. In the 
process, it acknowledged the central role played by the researcher in the production of 
meaning around behaviours such as repetitive self-injury, thus illustrating once again 
the co-constructed nature of any exploration of individual experience (Kvale, 1996). 
With the important exceptions of the psychoanalytical and psychosocial literatures, 
research on self-harm has often overlooked the complex ways in which researchers both 
enable and inevitably distort the creation of knowledge around the subject. This project 
may therefore serve as a modest reminder of the need to pay close attention to 
reflexivity when studying personally challenging and ontologically disputed behaviours, 
whatever the method used. 
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Qualitative pluralism and counselling psychology 
 
The way in which the approach followed resonated with the values of counselling 
psychology is also of direct relevance here. A first meeting point lay in the emphasis 
placed on the lived experience of the individual, since 
 
At its core, counselling psychology privileges respect for the personal, 
subjective experience of the client over and above notions of diagnosis, 
assessment and treatment, as well as the pursuit of innovative, 
phenomenological methods for understanding human experience (Bury & 
Strauss, 2006, p.120).  
 
The common value placed on reflexivity and intersubjectivity was also noteworthy. But 
it is perhaps the pluralistic ethos of counselling psychology that made qualitative 
pluralism such a natural match. Counselling psychologists advocate the tailoring of 
therapeutic work to the unique needs of each client (e.g., Cooper & McLeod, 2011). In 
their research orientation they similarly recognise the potential of methodological and 
epistemological pluralism (Rafalin, 2010). As illustrated in the present study pluralistic 
qualitative approaches can considerably enrich one’s understanding of individual 
experience. As such they deserve inclusion among the array of methodological options 
presented in doctoral training programmes, alongside more traditional single and mixed 
methods approaches.  
 
6.3 Qualitative pluralism revisited 
 
Though rich and rewarding, the approach followed here posed serious challenges for a 
novice qualitative researcher. 
 
Holding several methodological approaches in tension 
 
The first one was of course the need to achieve a sufficient degree of proficiency in 
using what effectively turned out to be five different analytical procedures. Being able 
to rely on the guidance and encouragement of my supervisor proved invaluable. But the 
work also called for a considerable degree of methodological reflexivity: enough needed 
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to be known about each approach to design a coherent project and gather suitable data, 
rich in here-and-now experiencing and historical/biographical details. Yet it also 
seemed important to maintain some degree of naivety so as to engage with each 
approach fully and on its own terms when the time came, and not prejudge their 
contribution or possible shortcomings.  
 
In the end, efforts were made to ensure that every aspect of the data collection, from 
recruitment to transcription, would factor in the textual requirements of the different 
analyses to be carried out. Further, each of the decisions surrounding the design and 
implementation of the project was weighted with an eye to its possible impact on the 
interpretative work, and carefully documented to guarantee integrity (Williams & 
Morrow, 2009).  
 
As was discussed in chapter 2, the sequence to be followed was also given consideration 
and breaks were arranged between segments of interpretative work so that I could return 
to the text with relatively fresh eyes. Last, all three interviews were approached as a 
block, and I only moved to another interpretative lens once I was satisfied that sufficient 
meaning had been extracted from the whole set. This was to preserve the coherence of 
Tina’s overall narrative and to remain ‘in approach’ throughout each cycle of analysis. 
Keeping a journal also allowed me to reflect on the research process itself, with its new 
and complex methodology.  
 
The risk of epistemological dissonance  
 
A second challenge concerned the very real risk of dissonance between three 
epistemologically distinct approaches. The epistemological position underlying each 
approach was given careful consideration, as were the requirements of the contextual 
constructionist stance adopted overall. I took pains to return to the text time and again, 
using it to ground the interpretation and make it as intelligible and honest as I could. 
Multiple quotes were also drawn from the interviews, so the reader could engage with 
the quality of the interpretation more fully. 
 
Because contextual constructionism views the researcher’s input into the interpretative 
work as being context-dependent itself, considerable attention was also paid to personal 
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reflexivity. Possible preconceptions regarding the functions and meanings of self-injury, 
and how the behaviour may tie in with the symptoms and aetiology of borderline 
personality disorder (with which Tina had been diagnosed), were held in awareness 
throughout the IPA work and beyond. Because of their explicit concern for the 
dialogical and performative elements of the text, narrative and psychosocial approaches 
further required an in-depth reflection on my potential input in the interviewing process.  
 
Reflexivity also meant remaining aware of my own identity and how it may colour the 
interpretative work. One way to verify that my analyses had remained true to Tina’s 
material might have been to share the readings with her; however taking the work back 
to such a vulnerable participant, and this one year on, would have raised significant 
methodological and ethical issues. Keeping a reflexive journal enabled me to better 
delineate my contribution to the meaning-making process. It also met one of the key 
requirements of the psychosocial approach, with its emphasis on transference and 
countertransference between interviewer and interviewee. Still, throughout the work I 
was reminded of the limitations of my undertaking: adopting a multiplicity of analytical 
lenses might help me not get too wedded to a single theoretical frame, thus opening up 
my interpretation; but Tina’s subjectivity would remain elusive, and my analysis a 
partial, contextual and co-constructed account of her experience of self-injury.  
 
The issue of validity 
 
Validity needed to be considered. Though well established in psychological research, 
and eminently compatible with each of the interpretative approaches selected, single 
case studies are still seen as lacking external validity. Yet case-centred analysis 
uniquely allows for the exploration of the many facets of subjective experience around a 
given phenomenon (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Given the research question the ideographic 
method seemed highly appropriate, and the attention paid to reflexivity and 
transparency throughout the project helped ensure the trustworthiness of its findings.  
 
So did the coherence of the interpretations offered, both individually and together. At 
the onset of the project it was anticipated that each of the interpretative lenses used 
would produce a distinct picture of the participant’s meaning-making around repetitive 
self-injury. Using the IPA lens would produce phenomenological insight: a here-and-
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now take on the quality and meaning of the lived experience of self-harm. The narrative 
analysis might contribute a reflection on the place of language and storying in meaning-
making, by showing how Tina’s experience of self-injury might have been articulated 
and expressed to the researcher. Last, the psychosocial work would combine a 
discursive and a psychoanalytical reading of the text, and in the process bring out the 
performative dimension of Tina’s account and the role within of underlying conflicts.  
 
However one fear was that the three pictures thus drawn would end up undermining 
each other, or at the very least confuse the reader, thus calling into question the 
pragmatic value of combining different interpretative strategies (Williams & Morrow, 
2009). Instead the picture of Tina’s sense-making around her self-injurious behaviour 
proved both rich and coherent. As was shown above, each of the three paradigms 
delivered distinct and often thought-provoking interpretations. Further, in addition to 
providing a measure of methodological triangulation (cf. for instance the cross-
analytical centrality of issues around control and mastery), the layering of these 
different approaches created a tapestry of insights, many of which were reflected across 
interpretations.  
 
As for the pragmatic validity of the research, i.e. its usefulness to others, feedback from 
colleagues working with self-harming individuals has so far proved encouraging. 
However only time will tell whether the multidimensional picture of meaning-making 
around self-injury presented here proves of interest to other researchers or clinicians, 
and affords those affected by the behaviour a richer understanding of its individual 
complexity (Riessman, 2008).  
 
A last point deserves consideration here: the well-being of the participant herself. 
Applying a qualitative pluralistic approach to the study of severe emotional and 
behavioural difficulties raises particular ethical issues. Some of the more ‘suspicious’ 
interpretations (e.g., discursive or psychoanalytical) may hurt or offend the interviewee 
if shared, or at the very least appear dishonest to a participant who thought the 
researcher was solely interested in the nature of her experience (Willig, 2012). Perhaps 
even more critically, the account needs to be rich, requiring more than one interview 
around potentially distressing topics. Here it meant subjecting Tina to several hours of 
interviewing around an intensely private and painful experience. Interestingly however 
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she consistently reported that the meaning-making process had felt positive, perhaps 
even ‘therapeutic’ since for the first time in her life she had focused on her behaviour in 
depth, and in the company of a listening other. This finding echoed that of others, who 
showed that participating in qualitative interviewing around self-harm may have a 
positive impact on vulnerable individuals (Biddle et al., 2013). This suggests that the 
depth of interpretation associated with qualitative pluralism need not be an issue when 
exploring severe psychological difficulties, provided the researcher can adopt a 
sensitive stance.  
 
Overall, there is no doubt that qualitative pluralism places heavy demands on the 
researcher in terms of reflexivity (see also Nolas, 2011). Yet it also possesses definite 
strengths and as such deserves greater recognition as one important approach to mixed 
methods research, notably among ‘scientist-practitioners’. First, combining different 
methodologies and sets of epistemological claims can allow for multidimensional 
understandings to emerge. This could be especially valuable when exploring the sort of 
topics devoid of consensus around ontological status so prevalent in the field of 
psychopathology (Frost & Bowen, 2012). Second, pluralistic qualitative approaches 
seem to offer a valuable middle ground between prescriptive blueprints and 
‘methodology-free’ research (Chamberlain, 2012), something which may hold particular 
appeal for qualitative researchers wishing to follow their creativity without sacrificing 
methodological rigour. Last, qualitative pluralism offers a multifaceted way to engage 
with subjectivity and meaning-making. It can deepen the way one thinks about the lived 
experience and its communicability, and as such may hold particular value for those 
engaged in therapeutic work. 
 
6.4 Final reflections 
 
Developing a pluralistic interpretation of Tina’s reported experience of self-injury was 
a demanding process. Beyond the theoretical and methodological challenges already 
discussed, I felt that my participant had entrusted me with a unique and courageous 
narrative, and that I had to do it justice. Yet I was also aware of having taken 
ownership of her material, and this from the moment I had set out to transcribe the 
interviews: would she even recognise herself in my interpretations, especially the more 
‘suspicious’ ones? Short of sharing them with her, something I felt uncomfortable doing 
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for reasons already mentioned, this question would have to remain unanswered. In that 
respect too, my first foray into qualitative psychological research provided valuable 
learning. 
 
Overall however, reviewing my journey through the project brings me much 
satisfaction. I set out hoping to make this piece of research a key aspect of my 
professional and perhaps personal development through my doctoral training. This was 
undoubtedly the case. As the picture of Tina’s meaning-making around self-injury grew, 
layer by layer, I found myself revisiting many of the assumptions around self-harm that 
I had developed as a researcher and clinician, with direct impact on my clinical work. 
The analysis also brought out the complexity of the communications taking place 
between researcher and participant, something of obvious relevance to a developing 
counselling psychologist. Rather than being an ‘add-on’, my research thus became a 
thought-provoking extension of my clinical training, an opportunity to consider, in slow 
motion and from multiple angles, the complex process of sense-making taking place 
between two people, and to reflect differently on its therapeutic impact. Three years on I 
feel enriched by the experience, and I am grateful to Carla and Tina for making it 
possible.  
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Appendix B: Recruitment flyer 
 
 
Have you been self-injuring for several years? 
 
Are you aged 18 or over? 
 
Then I would really like to hear your story 
 
 
For my doctoral research as a Trainee Counselling Psychologist at  
City University, London, I am exploring what it means to self-injure, and  
I am looking for someone willing to share his or her experience with me. 
 
I am hoping that this project will contribute to a better understanding  
of self-harm, and therefore better support for those seeking help.  
 
All the information collected will be made anonymous and kept confidential. 
 
If you are interested in participating, please call  
Daphne Josselin on 07722 243 549 or email  
daphne.josselin.1@city.ac.uk for more information. 
 
 
This research is supervised by Professor Carla Willig  
(C.Willig@city.ac.uk), at City University 
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Appendix C: Information sheet 
Information for participants 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research project. This information sheet 
provides some details about the project and what your participation would involve.  
My research is exploring the meaning of self-injury for the person who is self-harming. I 
am hoping that it will contribute to a better understanding of self-injury by those offering 
psychological help, and therefore better support for those seeking it. 
Your participation will involve two, possibly three interviews with me, each lasting 
between one hour and one hour and a half. The interviews will take place in London, at 
a private and convenient location, with date and time to be arranged; however it is 
important for you to commit to both interviews. The areas I will be looking at are your 
experience of self-injury, and the meaning you may attach to it. You will be 
compensated for your travel expenses, and you will receive a £15 M&S voucher as a 
small token of appreciation. 
 
I will record the interviews so that I can transcribe and analyse them later. I will need 
your consent to do this, and I have a form that I will ask you to sign when we meet for 
the first interview. In this form you will also be asked to agree to the possible 
publication of extracts from the transcripts, provided your anonymity is fully preserved. 
This is so I can use the research to raise awareness of the meaning of self-injury 
among members of the health professions.  
I am well aware of the sensitivity of this subject, and the interviews will be conducted 
respectfully in a non-judgmental manner. You will be free to refuse to answer any 
question. At the end of each interview I will ask you how you found it to participate, and 
I will provide information regarding sources of support should any difficulty arise for you 
as a result of discussing your experience. 
All data gathered during this study will be held securely and anonymously. You will also 
retain the right to withdraw from the study at any point, in which case I will destroy any 
recordings or data related to you. 
If you would like to take part in this study, or if you have any question, please contact 
me using the details below.  
Daphne Josselin 
Trainee Counselling Psychologist  
City University 
Tel: 07722 243 549 
Email: daphne.josselin.1@city.ac.uk 
 
I thank you in advance for giving participation serious thought: research into self-injury 
is still in its infancy and developing a better understanding of the behaviour ‘from within’ 
would be a significant step forward. 
 
This research is being supervised by Professor Carla Willig (C.Willig@city.ac.uk) and 
has received ethical clearance from City University. 
  
201 
 
Appendix D: Interview schedule 
 
 
First interview 
 
1. In your first email you wrote that you had self-injured ‘on countless  
occasions’. Can you tell me more about that?  
2.  Can you recall a recent episode when you self-injured? Can you tell me
  what happened?  
3.  Do you remember the first time you self-injured? How old were you? Can 
you tell me more about that? 
4.  How does it feel to be discussing your self-injuring with me? 
5.  I have no further question for you today. Is there anything else you would 
like to mention before we finish the interview? 
 
Second interview 
1.  How did you feel after our last interview?  
2.  Is there anything that you thought you should have told me then and did 
not? Can you tell me more about that today? 
4.  If a friend asked you to try and explain why you self-injure, what would 
you say?  
5.  Last week you told me that when you self-injure, you also mean to 
communicate something to others. Is it always the case? What might that 
be?  
6. Do you feel that you can be open about your self-injuring? Who with? 
Why is that?  
7.  What do your family or friends think about your self-injuring? How do you 
feel about that? 
8.  How does it feel to be discussing your self-injuring with me for the 
second time? 
9.  I have no further question for you. Is there anything else you would like to 
mention before we finish the interview? 
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Third interview 
1.  How did you feel after our last interview?  
2.  Is there anything that you thought you should have told me then and did 
not? Can you tell me more about that today? 
3.  Can you tell me more about your experience growing up?  
4.  Looking back on your life so far, can you think of any event that may be 
relevant to your self-injuring? How so? Can you think of anything else?  
5.  Can you think of any relationship, past or current, that may be relevant to 
your self-injuring? How so? Any other relationship? 
6.  Do you feel that your self-injuring has changed in the time that you have 
been doing it. Could you tell me more about that?  
7.  How does it feel to be discussing your self-injuring with me for the third 
time? For the last time? 
8.  I have no further question for you. Is there anything else you would like to 
mention before we finish the interview? 
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Appendix E: Consent form 
 
 
 
Participant’s consent to record and participate 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in my doctoral research on the meaning of self-
injury. Before we begin the first interview, it is important that you give signed consent to 
show that you fully agree to participate and understand what is involved. As part of my 
research it is necessary that I record the interviews for later transcription and analysis. 
The transcripts of the interviews will be completely anonymous and confidential. Any 
names used in the final piece of work will be pseudonyms to protect your identity. In 
case this work is later published in whole or in part, the same guarantees of 
confidentiality will apply. 
In the interviews I will be looking at your experience of self-injury, and at the meaning 
you may attach to it. The first interview will last around one hour and a quarter, and 
subsequent interviews will last around one hour. You will be free to refuse to answer 
any question. You can also withdraw your consent to participate at any stage, without 
giving a reason. 
 
This consent form will be stored securely, separately from the written transcripts. 
 
************************************************************************************************ 
 
I understand what will be required of me in the research project on the meaning of self-
injury. I agree to participate in the research, and that the interviews are recorded for 
later analysis. I also agree to the publication of extracts from the transcripts, on the 
condition that anonymity is fully preserved. 
 
Participant’s name………………………………………………………………………….. 
Participant’s signature…………………………………………..  Date…………………… 
 
Interviewer’s name………………………………………………………………………….. 
Interviewer’s signature………………………………………….  Date…………………… 
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Appendix F: Resource sheet 
 
Resource sheet 
 
Please find below a number of resources and telephone numbers which you may find 
helpful if you feel you are experiencing any difficulties after the interview. The following 
numbers and websites all provide help and support for people who are self-harming. 
Bristol Crisis Service for Women (email and text support for girls and women in 
emotional distress, particularly those who harm themselves) 
www.selfinjurysupport.org.uk   
 
Harmless (postal and email support for people who self-harm) - www.harmless.org.uk   
 
National Self-Harm Network  (confidential support, advice and helpline for individuals 
who self-harm) – www.nshn.co.uk  0800 622 6000 (opening hours –Thursday-Saturday 
7pm-11pm, Sunday 6.30pm-10.30pm, including public holidays) 
 
Samaritans (24h emergency helpline) – www.samaritans.org.uk  08457 90 90 90 
 
Support Line (confidential emotional support for children, young adults and adults by 
telephone, email and post) – www.supportline.org.uk  01708 765 200  
info@supportline.co.uk 
 
The Site (information, advice and support for young people) 
http://www.thesite.org/healthandwellbeing/mentalhealth/selfharm 
 
If you wish to see someone privately to discuss any problem, the following 
organisations have lists of qualified therapists and counsellors which can be accessed 
under the ‘Find a therapist/psychologist’ section. 
www.bacp.co.uk (British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy) 01455 
883316 
www.psychotherapy.org.uk (UK Council for Psychotherapy – UKCP) 020 7014 9955 
www.bps.org.uk (British Psychological Society) 0116 254 9568 
www.babcp.org.uk (British Association for Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapies)  
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Appendix H: Superordinate themes and themes for each interview 
 
 
Superordinate themes and themes from the first interview 
 
Themes   Page/line Key words/sentences 
 
Self-harm as a way of  managing life 
 
Always there   1/9-10  as far back as I can remember 
      
Different types   6/13-14  some of the self-harm that I do, I don’t  
remember doing 
12/21-23 the times when I had to have surgery were the 
times where the self-harm, um, was completely 
premeditated 
 
Lots of little things  21/24-25 it’s usually lots of little things that build up 
      
A clandestine obsession  13/6-9  you get on with your normal day to day things,  
um, as if there is absolutely nothing wrong 
with you, but in the background you’ve got 
this’ 
 
Having control   13/13-15 it’s like I’ve got control over something, 
      that’s something I can control 
 
This awesome sort of rush 30/8  I just feel this awesome sort of rush 
 
Touching the void  33/7  I was thinking: this is what it’s like to die 
      
Punishment   20/24  some of it is about punishment 
 
Communicating distress  39/23-25 bad enough that people would realise  
      how…how much pain I’m in, emotionally 
 
 
What’s underneath: the fragile self 
 
Flicking    24/5-7  I actually put my head between the pillows in 
bed and just as I flick I’m trying to hold my 
thoughts in 
      
Two separate me  26/20-22 it’s like there’s two separate me 
 
Confused   23/8-11  I often find myself debating things in my head: 
you know: should I, shouldn’t I? You know: 
why did this happen, or… 
      
Self-judgment   18/18-19 I still have quite a lot of judgment about  
      myself 
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It’s not me   27/24-28 if I’m cutting my arm it’s all… it’s like, well I  
know it’s my arm, but it feels like, or it looks 
like it’s not mine 
 
Hidden  24/16-19 I can often be having a conversation with 
someone and it’s like, other stuff’s going on 
there at the back of my head as well 
 
 
What’s underneath: experiences of the other 
 
 
The judging other  21/10-11 I worry that people are judging me as well 
    
Alone    38/31-32 I felt really powerless then… and really alone 
 
The controlling other  38/27-29 then I felt like, then everybody else had  
control, that I didn’t have any say into what 
happened 
      
The supportive other  7/27-28  I’ve got support now, I’ve got people like that,  
      if I ring, they’ll understand 
 
 
Developing a new understanding of self and self-harm 
 
 
Clueless   43/15-16 I did not have a clue what they were talking 
       about 
      
Having the words  16/23-28 now, probably in the last couple of years […],  
      I actually have the words for things.  
      
Saying it   5/19-22  when I say it all in one thing long, you know,  
      when I say that out loud, it kind of makes me  
      realise how far I’ve come 
     
The scientific way  17/15-16 the way that I’ve come about understanding it  
is, you know, I kind of look at it in a scientific 
way 
      
New options   4/25-28  now that I have that sort of knowledge, now  
that, I, that helps me think of other options 
      
Understanding vs feeling 18/15-17 I can understand it on an intellectual level but  
feeling it and, me, um, applying it to me, that’s 
quite difficult 
 
Helping others understand 50/19-21 it’s quite important for me, for people to see  
      that it’s not what it’s about 
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Superordinate themes and themes from the second interview 
 
Themes   Page/line Key words/sentences 
 
Self-harm as a way of managing life 
 
An addictive feeling  31/18-19 there’s almost this addictive element to it 
 
Having control   4/13-15  it’s the only thing I can control, the only thing  
      that I can, you know… have any say in 
 
Communicating distress  9/18-21  so maybe just to communicate how bad you 
feel you self-harm again 
 
Hospitals make it worse  2/24-25  hospital admissions make my self-harm a lot 
worse 
 
 
What’s underneath: the fragile self 
 
Flashbacks from the past 11/9-10  sometimes I get, um… images in my head that  
      are like flashbacks from the past 
  
Sucked underground  11/12-14 the distress itself… that almost feels like 
you’re being sucked underground 
 
No room in my head  11/21-24 these thoughts, like they’re being… pushed 
into my head, um… and it’s almost like there’s 
so much going in there, um… that there isn’t 
any room left 
 
Empty    16/13-15 that numbness kind of feels like kind of empty,  
      like an empty shell or something 
 
I’m not me   15/5-7  I’m not me in a way, like I’m not, like, uh…  
      It’s almost like I’m looking at me 
 
That powerful feeling  17/23-26 there’s some force around me – I know it  
sounds weird – that, you know, that is acting 
for me 
 
Confused   17/19-21 even at the time I know, there’s something  
telling me that this isn’t quite right  
 
Nosedive   19/2-4  way up there and then, this massive nosedive, 
um, where this rush of everything just comes 
in 
 
Out of control   20/21-23 it feels like you’re out of control, like you’ve  
got no…like someone else is at the steering 
wheel 
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Why can’t I do that?  12/18-20 So there’s that kind of anger at myself that, 
you know, I can do this, so why can’t I do 
that? 
 
Hiding    27/11-14 there’s other days when I’m feeling a bit… not  
so good and… I don’t feel like I can manage 
people staring at me 
 
 
What’s underneath: experiences of the other 
 
Horrible comments  8/18-20  I’ve had lots of really horrible comments to me 
     
Making it worse  9/17-18  hearing that, this was like: I just feel even  
      worse now 
      
They’re judging me  26/4-5  they’re judging me before they even know me 
       
They don’t get it  6/14-17  that may come across to some people like  
manipulative, or like you’re seeking attention 
or… but… you know it’s not really about that, 
for me  
      
Those who understand  8/6-8  there’s people that can really grasp, that can  
      understand the reasons you’re doing it 
 
 
What’s underneath: experiences of the family 
 
My parents are part of it  29/27-29 If I’m honest my parents are like, part of the 
reason why I am the way I am, um… part of 
why I self-harm 
      
Invasion   33/10-11 it’s almost like they’re invading my space here,  
      and this is my safe place 
 
 
Developing a new understanding of self and self-harm 
 
A new awareness  2/4-6  I have a lot better understanding of myself and  
      how, and you know, why I self-harm 
      
What others do   21/14-17 I’m often thinking about why other people do 
things, and how they manage to be around 
other people, and I kind of file it in my head 
 
Using the word   23/14-16 Maybe in my head I knew the word, but I  
wouldn’t have used it, because I thought that I 
would be judged  
 
Saying it loud    42/9-10  sometimes when you say it out loud, it doesn’t  
sound so bad 
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So much to say   1/19-20  I was quite surprised at the end that I’d  
      so much to say 
 
 
Superordinate themes and themes from the third interview 
 
Themes   Page/line Key words 
 
Self-harm as a way of managing life 
 
Always there   8/17-19  I’ve self-harmed so much over, like, for as  
      long as I can remember 
 
Punishment   52/4-6  it would have been to punish yourself, cause I  
      was this bad… I was this little bad person
   
 
Irrepressible   12/14-16 it’s almost like I’m fighting so hard not to do it  
      that maybe it’s coming out another way 
 
Communicating distress  11/10-11 I’m using it to communicate cause I’m feeling  
this way 
     
Blocking things off  53/12-15 you can block everything else that’s going on 
outside but also you could divert your attention 
from how you’re feeling 
 
It works   54/5-6  you know that it will work, at least for the  
      short term 
 
 
What’s underneath:  the fragile self 
 
All those things   16/26  All those things going on in my head 
 
Stuck in time   54/19-21 you can’t see past the next few seconds or 
minutes, because it feels like forever 
     
Confused   25/19-21 my self-harm got so bad because I just got so  
      confused about how I was supposed to feel 
 
Out of control   55/8-9  I don’t know when I’m gonna feel completely  
      overwhelmed again 
      
Frustration   16/9-11  there’s that sort of shame and, that feeling  
about, you know, doing it and… a frustration 
with yourself 
 
Hiding the self   18/14-15 until somebody really properly knows me, they  
      won’t actually see that in me 
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What’s underneath: experiences of the other 
 
Internalising the critiques 3/5-7  you kind of internalize all that and you say  
those things to yourself as well, and believe 
them yourself 
 
 
What’s underneath: experiences in the family 
 
The abuse   22/6-10  my dad abused me, as I was growing up, me 
and my older sister C, and… So… part of 
what, um, triggers self-harm for me is like I get 
lots of flashbacks  
 
Away from them  28/17-19 a big massive part of why my self-harm is  
reduced is because I moved here, and I’m 
away from them 
 
Denial    25/3-5  I had to… deny outwardly you know, kind of  
like… sweep everything under the carpet, you 
know, everything’s fine 
 
Trapped   49/6-8  it’s a bit like the times I’ve been in hospital,  
how hospital has felt like to me, like feeling 
trapped 
 
Still under control  27/30-28/2 for me to be able to see my sisters and my 
brother, and my nieces and my nephews, I 
have to have contact with my parents, and 
pretend that everything is ok 
 
 
Developing a new understanding of self and self-harm 
 
Clueless   8/21-24  for something to be such a big part of your life  
and to, for so long not really understand it, or 
even… even know that you need to understand 
it 
   
New understanding  8/6-9  having the awareness of how self-harm, what it  
means for me and that… you now… how it 
affects me and… you know, my reasons for 
doing it   
     
Actual physical things  56/11-14 now that I’m doing biological psychology and  
knowing that there’s actual physical things 
happening 
 
Understanding to managing 11/5-6  understanding that actually helps me reduce  
      doing it 
   
Understanding vs believing 15/14-15 Sometimes you can understand but not  
      necessarily believe it and, you know, inside 
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Having the words  6/16-18  It takes people so long to get to know how  
      things affect me because I can’t express myself 
 
Talking about self-harm  10/14-16 there are constructive ways of talking about it  
    and not so helpful ways of talking about it 
 
So much to say   59/7-9  I didn’t think I was gonna be able to talk so  
      much, but… I have done 
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Appendix I: Master table of themes across the three interviews 
 
 
Master 
 
  
Master table of themes across the three interviews 
 
Themes         Page/line 
 
1. Self-harm as a way of managing life 
 
Always there 
Interview 1: ‘as far back as I can remember’     1/9-10 
Interview 3: I’ve self-harmed so much over, like, for as long as I 
can remember, from doing little things right up to doing massive things’  8/18-21 
     
Lots of little things 
Interview 1: ‘it’s usually lots of little things that build up’   21/24-25 
 
In the background 
Interview 1: ‘you get on with your normal day to day things, um, as if there  
is absolutely nothing wrong with you, but in the background you’ve got this’ 13/6-9 
 
Having control 
Interview 1: ‘it’s like I’ve got control over something, and that’s something  
I can control’         13/13-15 
Interview 2: ‘it’s the only thing I can control’     4-13-15 
Interview 3: ‘you can block everything else’     53-12-15 
 
This awesome sort of rush 
Interview 1:’I just feel this awesome sort of rush’    30/8 
Interview 2: ‘there’s almost this addictive element to it’    31/18-19 
 
Punishment 
Interview 1: ‘some of it is about punishment’     20/24 
Interview 3: ‘it would be to punish yourself cause I was this bad… I was 
this bad little person        52/4-6 
 
Irrepressible  
Interview 3: ‘it’s almost like I’m fighting so hard not to do it that maybe  
it’s coming out another way’       12/14-16 
 
Touching the void 
Interview 1: ‘I was thinking: this is what it’s like to die’    33/7 
 
Communicating distress 
Interview 1: ‘bad enough that people would realise how… how much pain 
I’m in, emotionally’        39/23-25 
Interview 2: ‘so maybe just to communicate how bad you feel you  
self-harm again’        9/18-21 
Interview 3: ‘I’m using it to communicate cause I’m feeling this way’  11/10-11 
 
Hospitals make it worse 
Interview 2: ‘hospital admissions make my self-harm a lot worse’  2/24-25 
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It works 
Interview 3: ‘you know that it will work, at least for the short term’  54/5-6 
 
 
2. What’s underneath: the fragile self 
 
Flashbacks from the past 
Interview 2: ‘images in my head that are like flashbacks from the past’  11/9-10 
  
Sucked underground 
Interview 2: ‘the distress itself… that almost feels like you’re being sucked  
underground’         11/12-14 
    
Overwhelmed 
Interview 1: ‘just as I flick I’m trying to hold my thoughts in’   24/5-7 
Interview 2: ‘these thoughts, like they’re being… pushed into my head’  11/21-24 
Interview 3: ‘all those things going on in my head’    16/26 
 
I’m not me 
Interview 1: ‘I know it’s my arm, but it feels like, or it looks like it’s not mine’ 27/24-28 
Interview 2: ‘I’m not me in a way, like I’m not, like, uh… It’s almost  
like I’m looking at me’        15/5-7 
 
That powerful feeling 
Interview 2: ‘there’s some force around me – I know it sounds weird – that,  
you know, that is acting for me’       17/23-26 
 
Stuck in time 
Interview 3: ‘you can’t see past the next few seconds or minutes, because it  
feels like forever’        54/19-21 
 
Nosedive 
Interview 2: ‘way up there and then, this massive nosedive, um, where  
this rush of everything just comes in’      19/2-4 
 
Out of control 
Interview 2: ‘it feels like you’re out of control, like you’ve got no… 
like someone else is at the steering wheel’     20/21-23 
Interview 3: ‘I don’t know when I’m gonna feel completely overwhelmed  
again’          55/8-9 
 
Divided and confused 
Interview 1: ‘it’s like there’s two separate me’     26/1 
Interview 2: ‘even at the time I know, there’s something telling me that this  
isn’t quite right’        17/19-21 
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Why can’t I? 
Interview 1: I say ‘why can’t you just ask? Why are you being so stupid 
about that?’         16/5-6 
Interview 2: ‘So there’s that kind of anger at myself that, you know,    
I can do this, so why can’t I do that?’      12/18-20 
Interview 3: ‘there’s that sort of shame and, that feeling about, you     
know, doing it and… a frustration with yourself’     16/9-11  
  
Hiding the self 
Interview 1: ‘it’s like, other stuff’s going on there at the back of my head’ 24/18-9 
Interview 2: ‘I don’t feel like I can manage people staring at me’   27/12-14 
Interview 3: ‘until somebody properly knows me, they won’t actually see 
that in me’         18/14-15 
 
 
3. What’s underneath: experiences of the other 
 
Horrible comments    
Interview 2: ‘I’ve had lots of really horrible comments to me’   8/18-20   
 
They’re judging me 
Interview 1: ‘I worry that people are judging me as well’    21/10-11 
Interview 2: ‘they’re judging me before they even know me’   26/4-5  
 
The controlling other    
Interview 1: ‘then I felt like, then everybody else had control, that I  
didn’t have any say into what happened ‘     38/27-29  
      
They don’t get it    
Interview 2: ‘that may come across to some people like manipulative, or like  
you’re seeking attention or… but… you know it’s not really about that, for me’  6/14-17   
 
They make it worse   
Interview 2: ‘hearing that, this was like: I just feel even worse now’  9/17-18   
Interview 3: ‘you kind of internalize all that and you say those things to  
yourself as well, and believe them yourself’     3/5-7   
 
Alone      
Interview 1: ‘I felt really powerless then… and really alone’   38/31-32  
 
Those who understand     
Interview 1: ‘I’ve got support now, I’ve got people like that, if I ring,  
they’ll understand’        7/27-28   
Interview 2: ‘there’s people that can really grasp, that can understand  
the reasons you’re doing it’       8/6-8   
 
 
4. What’s underneath: experiences of the family 
 
My parents are part of it    
Interview 2: ‘If I’m honest my parents are like, part of the reason why I am  
the way I am, um… part of why I self-harm’     29/27-29  
 
Interview 3: ‘a big massive part of why my self
because I moved here, and I’m away from them’
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The abuse     
Interview 3: ‘my dad abused me, as I was growing up, me and my older  
sister C, and… So… part of what, um, triggers self-harm for me is like  
I get lots of flashbacks ‘        22/6-10   
 
Invasion     
Interview 2: ‘it’s almost like they’re invading my space here, and  
this is my safe place’        33/10-11 
Interview 3: ‘It’s hard sometimes when that space feels invaded by the odd  
text, or the odd phone call’       28/24-26 
 
Denial      
Interview 3: ‘I had to… deny outwardly you know, kind of like… sweep  
everything under the carpet, you know, everything’s fine’   25/3-5  
 
Trapped 
Interview 3: ‘it’s a bit like the times I’ve been in hospital, how hospital  
has felt like to me, like feeling trapped’      49/6-8 
 
Still under control    
Interview 3: ‘for me to be able to see my sisters and my brother, and my  
nieces and my nephews, I have to have contact with my parents, and  27/30-28/2  
pretend that everything is ok’         
 
 
5. Developing a new understanding of self and self-harm 
 
Clueless     
Interview 1: ‘I did not have a clue what they were talking about’   43/15-16 
Interview 3: ‘for something to be such a big part of your life and to, for so long  
not really understand it, or even… even know that you need to understand it’ 8/21-24   
 
A new awareness    
Interview 2: ‘I have a lot better understanding of myself and how, and 
you know, why I self-harm’       2/4-6 
Interview 3: ‘having the awareness of how self-harm, what it means for me and  
that… you now… how it affects me and… you know, my reasons for doing it’ 8/6-9  
  
What others do     
Interview 2: ‘I’m often thinking about why other people do things, and how  
they manage to be around other people, and I kind of file it in my head’  21/14-17 
  
The scientific way    
Interview 1: ‘the way that I’ve come about understanding it is, you know,  
I kind of look at it in a scientific way’      17/15-16 
Interview 3: ‘now that I’m doing biological psychology and knowing that  
there’s actual physical things happening’     56/11-14  
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Having the words    
Interview 1: ‘now, probably in the last couple of years […], I actually have  
the words for things’        16/23-28 
Interview 2: ‘Maybe in my head I knew the word, but I wouldn’t have used it,  
because I thought that I would be judged ‘     23/14-16 
Interview 3: ‘It takes people so long to get to know how things affect me  
because I can’t express myself’       6/16-18  
 
Saying it loud     
Interview 1: ‘when I say it all in one thing long, you know, when I say  
that out loud, it kind of makes me realise how far I’ve come’   5/19-22  
 
So much to say     
Interview 2: ‘I was quite surprised at the end that I’d so much to say’  1/19-20 
Interview 3: ‘I didn’t think I was gonna be able to talk so much, but… 
I have done’          59/7-9  
 
New options  
Interview 1: ‘now that I have that sort of knowledge, now that, I, 
that helps me think of other options’      4/25-28  
Interview 3: ‘understanding that actually helps me reduce doing it’  11/5-6  
  
Talking about self-harm  
Interview 1: ‘it’s quite important for me, for people to see that it’s  
not what it’s about’      50/19-21 
Interview 3: ‘there are constructive ways of talking about it and not  
so helpful ways of talking about it’      10/14-16  
 
Understanding is not enough  
Interview 1: ‘I can understand it on an intellectual level but feeling it  
and, me, um, applying it to me, that’s quite difficult’    18/15-17 
Interview 3: ‘Sometimes you can understand but not necessarily  
believe it and, you know, inside’      15/14-15 
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